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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

APRIL 1978

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EDITOR'S NOTE

It is a source of satisfaction to us that this issue contains substantially the longest section on Comment and Correspondence that we have had since the section was inaugurated four years ago. We had suspected all along that the writing of letters to a given magazine is more than anything a matter of reader habit, and are pleased that the habit seems to be taking. In some cases the topics addressed by our readers are of a lengthy and analytic nature approaching that of an article itself.

George Kennan's considered comment on the controversy that continues to rage around the doctrine of containment is a further contribution to contemporary history. Turning to the grave problems that bedevil American policy toward southern Africa, the propositions put forward by two thoughtful readers have given rise not merely to a rebuttal by our authors, Clyde Ferguson and William Cotter, but to further elaboration on the policy options that they feel should be considered by the United States. Finally, Daniel Cheever, who has served as a Non-Governmental Organizations Observer at the Law of the Sea Conference, not only takes issue with Richard Darman's "rethinking" of U.S. interests in achieving an agreement at the Conference but goes on to advocate an alternative fallback approach to the problems facing the United States in the negotiations—that is, a partial Law of the Sea treaty. We believe that the substantive nature of this correspondence is an important way of extending *Foreign Affairs'* traditional credo of offering broad hospitality to divergent ideas.

Let us remind our readers again that for proper consideration letters submitted for publication should be in our hands not later than the first day of the month we go to press (February 1, May 1, August 1, November 1). If readers have in mind an especially long submission of the kind that might be considered alternatively as a reply article (which we also encourage), they might wish to let us know as soon as the urge strikes, so that we can advise and plan accordingly.

The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to inform American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

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WILLIAM LEONARD LANGER
1896-1977

In the autobiography privately circulated two years ago and published finally in January 1978 just after his death, William L. Langer tells of his last year as a graduate student at Harvard in 1921–22. With typical industry he was both teaching an important course and writing a long Ph.D. dissertation, all within a single academic year. He relates that his situation was complicated

> by my relations with Professor Coolidge, who liked to have me drop into his elegant office in Widener about every day to discuss new books. . . . He was at that time deeply involved [with the founding of the] Council on Foreign Relations, [which] proposed to publish a quarterly. . . . Coolidge had been named as the editor. . . . He often discussed his editorial ideas and problems with me. . . .[1]

From that earliest time onward, Professor Langer was closely associated with the Editors of *Foreign Affairs*—as student and protégé of Archibald Cary Coolidge, as contemporary and close colleague of Hamilton Fish Armstrong, and finally as seminar teacher and longtime mentor to the present Editor. Both the magazine and the Council have felt his imprint deeply and for good.

In the case of *Foreign Affairs*, his formal tasks began with the single-handed writing of the Recent Books section from 1925 to 1936. Although his notes were almost always shorter than those of our reviewers today, the considered appraisal of some 150 books a quarter (shipped back and forth to Cambridge) may strike some as more than the side effort it represented for Langer. Although the section had started with the magazine, it is fair to say that Langer made it effective and widely read. In addition, he edited with Mr. Armstrong the pioneer ten-year *Bibliography,* enlarging and reappraising reviews of the worldwide literature that appeared between 1919 and 1932. In this, as in his scholarly work, his reading command of a dozen or more languages made his breadth of coverage alone almost unique.

In our July 1973 issue, Professor Langer has written movingly of his 50-year friendship with Mr. Armstrong and of their constant contacts. In the field of writers and writings on international affairs, Langer's unique command of the scholarly end of the spectrum was a constant source of ideas and judgment. And in

[1] William L. Langer, *In and Out of the Ivory Tower*, New York: Neale Watson, 1978, p. 121.

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1950 the link once again became formal, when he joined the Editorial Advisory Board of *Foreign Affairs*, of which he remained a member till his death.

This is not the place to attempt a detailed assessment of Langer as historian and teacher. He enlarged the scope of traditional diplomatic history, making it an adventure in which the meticulous examination of documents was only the beginning of searching inquiry into why men and nations acted as they did. The two volumes that he wrote with Everett Gleason on the background of American entry into the Second World War—a four-year project sponsored by the Council—were in a sense the capstone of his career in that field. Thereafter, he pioneered in the creation and development of Russian and Middle Eastern Centers at Harvard, while in his own work he enlarged not only his own horizons but those of the historical profession, writing on the whole European civilization in 1832–48, on the importance of psychological insights for history, on population and the potato in Europe. The rigorous sense of scholarship that he always instilled in his students persisted, but the canvas of his thinking seemed constantly to expand and with it his mellowness as a person.

Through these same students he had a special added tie to the Council. Graduates of the Langer seminar have held a succession of senior staff positions here—among them Robert Woolbert, Philip Mosely, and in the present staff John Campbell and Richard Stebbins since 1946 and 1949 respectively.

Dr. Langer's two tours of government service—in 1941–46 as head of the Research and Analysis branch of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and in 1950–51 as the first Assistant Director for National Estimates in the Central Intelligence Agency—promoted the distinctive historical method he had perfected during the Cambridge years to the status of a national policy. In the OSS days, an organization of some 1,000 specialists, drawn from highly diverse backgrounds and endowed with widely varying capabilities, was expected (but seldom managed) to duplicate on a universal scale the kind of operation that Langer personally had conducted in writing his major books, from remorseless ingestion of every available scrap of information to the exgurgitation of an homogenized product that would forever supersede the conventional wisdom. Though scarcely distinguished as an administrator, Langer dominated by sheer force of character two organizations of high-strung intellectuals, some of whom were later to provide essential leavening at the Council on Foreign Relations.

In all of these pursuits, what lingered most with his associates

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—apart from his ability to master all the contemporary evidence and then to put it in the framework of his lifelong study of the behavior of nations—were his relentless honesty and his openness to reasonable argument, coupled with total scorn for any parochial or self-serving attempt to influence the content of intelligence judgments. As a dedicated patriot, Langer lived by, and up to, the belief that scholars can serve government without for a moment abandoning their standards.

By the same token, Langer all his life fought the use of simplistic labels and themes. Nor did his own views fit neatly into any category. Of the articles he wrote for *Foreign Affairs* over the years, two in particular stand out in retrospect. In 1935, he not only dissected the roots of European imperialism (insisting in the process that for the sake of any orderly discussion the term should be reserved for cases of territorial control), but saw its ending as inevitable. In this he was, if one were to deal in labels, a premature "liberal" anticolonialist. Yet in 1962, writing on a "Farewell to Empire," his views of the impact of European overseas imperialism—that, for all its grave flaws, the "imperialist interlude" might have been the only way to open up all parts of the world—and his insistence that the real contemporary imperialist power was the Soviet Union, were far from the liberal stereotype.

We who were first his students and then his close colleagues at different stages of his varied career pay tribute to Bill Langer for an immense contribution to the whole field of international relations, but especially for what he did for the Council on Foreign Relations and for *Foreign Affairs*. His example will always be with us. But we shall miss the continuing advice and constant stimulation of a wise, learned and deeply cultivated man. He was above all a warm friend to us, as to so many others who work in this vineyard.

William P. Bundy
John C. Campbell
Richard P. Stebbins

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Ugo La Malfa

COMMUNISM AND DEMOCRACY IN ITALY

The existence of a powerful Communist Party in Italy has been a constant source of concern to me in over 50 years of political activity, first as a clandestine anti-Fascist in the Resistance movement, and finally in the free democracy that Italy has enjoyed since the liberation.

As a young Sicilian of 22, I first joined a democratic party in 1925. This was the National Democratic Union, founded by Giovanni Amendola, a highly distinguished politician of irreproachable moral standing. Among the members of this party were Mario Berlinguer, father of the present Secretary of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and Silvio Trentin, my old professor at Venice University and father of one of the most intelligent and forceful exponents of Communist trade unionism today.

A few months after I joined this party, Giovanni Amendola was beaten to death by the Fascists, and I found myself at his deathbed with his son Giorgio, whose politics were the same as his father's. In 1930, with the Fascist scourge at its height and the ominous threat of Nazi dictatorship looming on the horizon, Giorgio Amendola abandoned the democratic cause and threw in his lot with the underground Communist Party. Gradually, most of the young men who had been my companions in the early clandestine resistance to Fascism between 1925 and 1930 decided to carry on the fight under the hammer and sickle, and I was left virtually alone with just a few like-minded friends.

I have often wondered why so many brilliant and undoubtedly sincere young men lost faith in the democratic cause during the 1930s and went over to the Communists, particularly the three sons of Giovanni Amendola, a great democratic victim of Fascism, and those of such noted democrats as Silvio Trentin and Mario Berlinguer. I can only explain this by recalling that at the time, in the wake of Italy and Germany, the whole Western world seemed about to succumb to Fascism. The Spanish Civil War, which

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Ugo La Malfa is President of the Italian Republican Party. He has been a member of the Italian parliament throughout the entire postwar period and held various Cabinet posts, including Vice Premier, Minister of the Treasury, Minister of Foreign Trade, and Minister Without Portfolio.

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showed up the weaknesses of the Western democracies and culminated in a triumph for Franco, and the incredible appeasement of Hitler at Munich can only have lent weight to this argument. In the West, the fabric of democracy appeared to be gradually crumbling under the pernicious onslaught of Nazi-Fascism. Yet in the East there stood a champion in the struggle against Fascism, the mighty Soviet Union, governed by an all-powerful Communist Party, which gave support and a haven to communists from all over the world.

Whatever my personal view of how the ideology of certain Communist leaders came to be formed, the fact is that as soon as Italy was liberated it immediately had to contend with a strong Communist Party, largely dominated by Soviet ideology. Since then I have always felt that any democracy with a powerful communist party in its midst can only be a weak, or, if you like, a lame democracy. And so it is that Italy has been limping along ever since 1945.

I now belong to a minority democratic party, the Italian Republican Party (PRI), whose inspiration and democratic ideals derive directly from great figures in the *Risorgimento* such as Giuseppe Mazzini and Carlo Cattaneo. During the Resistance period and for a brief time after it, I was a member of a short-lived militant party, the Action Party, also founded on democratic ideals. And it was precisely because I stand for a democratic tradition, embodied in those ideals of the *Risorgimento,* that after the war I felt there was a need to build a new bulwark against the Communist Party, an organization with close ideological and political ties to a nation and a party I have always held to be the negation of all the true values of freedom, democracy and orderly civil, economic and social development so cherished by my own party and others.

After the Liberation of Italy in 1945, governments consisted of representatives of all parties that had played a role in the Resistance movement, and this included the Communists. The Socialist Party, which has had a solid democratic tradition, though fundamentally Marxist in outlook, was linked to the Communists by the so-called United Action Pact. Concerned by this, I proposed that an alliance be formed between the Action Party and the Socialists that would carry enough political and electoral clout to provide an adequate counter to the Communist Party and on the other side to the Catholic party, the Christian Democrats, which was already displaying increasing strength. The Socialists turned down this proposal with the result that the non-Catholic democratic parties and the Social Democrats, who had splintered off from the

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Socialists under the leadership of Giuseppe Saragat, had no alternative but to join forces with the Christian Democrats in a coalition that could mount a reasonably strong front against the constant and increasing pressure exerted by the Communist Party and its Socialist ally.

The first such coalition was formed in 1947, when the Communists and Socialists left the government, and between that year and 1953 it proved possible to form democratic, centrist coalitions that were able to start forging firm links between Italy, Europe and the West, both in terms of institutional, economic and social policies at home, and also in the international sphere, by bringing Italy into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and helping to build the foundations of the European Community. To illustrate the situation in those early postwar years, I can recall that in the latter half of 1948, I was appointed head of the Italian delegation sent to the Soviet Union to negotiate details of the peace treaty with the Russians. I spent four months in Moscow to complete those negotiations and came away with an indelible impression of the authoritarian, military-like regime prevailing in the country. Thus, I was able to quote from first-hand experience in stating how crucial it was for Italy to adhere to the Atlantic Alliance when the time came for the Chamber of Deputies to debate the issue of membership in the spring of 1949. The motion concerned was hotly opposed by the Communists and their Socialist allies under Pietro Nenni, both of whom used the full gamut of filibustering tactics in a united attempt to keep Italy out of NATO.

Despite the strong anti-Communist line-up in this critical period when Italy's postwar domestic and foreign policy was being shaped, my worries grew. Not only did the powerful Communist Party in itself make it very difficult to get democracy to work properly in Italy, but the Socialist alliance with the Communists made things even worse. The center coalition, formed by the Christian Democrats, Liberals, Social Democrats and Republicans, continued to hold the fort, but the strain of governing in such conditions was beginning to take its toll. The strong opposition mounted by the Communist-Socialist bloc meant that the coalition partners had every reason to fear that this bloc might sooner or later win an election, resulting in an alternative movement that would pose a major threat to the whole direction of Italy's domestic and international policy. This danger receded when, just before the 1953 elections, the Socialist Party began to develop a more independent line.

The prospect of a divorce between the Socialists and the Com-

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munists after so many years of wedlock thus began to emerge, and chances were that the Socialists might be won over into coming into a citadel of government that had hitherto been the preserve of the other democratic parties. Democracy in Italy was beginning to look rather less lame than I had thought up to that time. Many democratic political leaders started a campaign to get the Socialists into the government, and thereby leave the Communists on the sidelines as the sole opposition party. After some ten years of perseverance, this aim was achieved when a Center-Left government was finally put together.

Much hope was placed in the Center-Left formula and the participation of the Socialist Party in government. In the early 1960s, Italy's economy was still booming. It was felt that Italy's high potential for further growth could be harnessed to tackle some of the country's chronic problems, such as the depression in the south, unemployment and emigration as well as shortcomings in basic social services such as education, health, transportation and so on. So much for the initial intention. But as it turned out, pressure from the unions, whose policies were fundamentally irrational and misconceived, along with unremitting pressure from the Communist Party, a general failure to grasp the issues at stake in a modern industrial society and a tendency to muddle along on a constant diet of hand-to-mouth policies, all combined to thwart any such good intentions. First, it proved impossible to maintain the previous high growth rate. Then came May 1968, in Paris. The Italians followed the French example with a vengeance; instead of lasting just a month, as had happened in France, a total breakdown of the economic and social system became a permanent feature of the Italian scene. More recently this economic and social disarray has spread to undermine law and order and the very functioning of the country's institutions.[1]

To put my view of the turn of events in Italy between 1962 and 1976 in the most succinct terms possible, I will simply quote a statement I once made to a well-known Italian journalist: "In recent years, the Christian Democrats have distinguished themselves by mismanaging the country, the Communists by plumping for extreme socialism and populism, and the Socialists by contributing half the mismanagement and half the extreme socialism and demagogy."

As the economic and social situation, and with it law and order, deteriorated, the tenuous links that had held the Center-Left

[1] See my writings on this subject including *L'altra Italia*, Milano: Mondadori, 1975; *La Caporetto economica*, Milano: Rizzoli, 1974; *Intervista sul non governo in Italia*, Bari: Laterza, 1977.

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partnership together for 15 years became increasingly frayed. The Socialists brought their growing impatience into the open and, sensing the ever more active presence of the Communist Party in Italian society, finally demanded that it be included in the government. The grounds given were that if the Communists were to come out of opposition and be given some responsibility, this would help to solve Italy's problems while at the same time diminishing the attraction of the Communist Party to those sections of the electorate that were still voting Socialist.

Early in 1976 the Socialist Party brought down the Moro-La Malfa government, a Christian Democrat-Republican coalition. This led to a short-lived administration, containing only Christian Democrats, which held office until a general election was able to be called—ahead of term—on June 20, 1976.

The Christian Democrats went to the country on a platform firmly geared to keeping the Communists out. Voting returns gave the Christian Democrats 263 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, the Communists 228, the Socialists 57, the Social Democrats 15 and the Republicans 14. The majority needed to form a government was 316 seats. It will be seen from these figures that a Center-Left coalition could still have been stitched together by the Christian Democrats, Socialists, Social Democrats and Republicans, who together mustered 349 seats compared to the Communists' 228. Yet, because the Socialists had formally declared that they would refuse to take part in any government that did not include the Communists, it was clear that the Center-Left era was over for good. In any case, that policy had already proved to be a failure. The Communist Party thus came out of 30 years' opposition into the general arena of government (albeit only through the device of abstaining on the confidence motion) that the democratic parties had managed to control since 1945. The Andreotti government, composed only of Christian Democrats, which lasted as long as 18 months, came into being on a vote of confidence from the Christian Democrats, but with all the other democratic parties, as well as the Communists, agreeing to abstain.

II

What was this Communist Party that had abstained from voting against the Andreotti government, that had abandoned its extremist opposition stance and joined forces with other parties that had agreed to abstain (or voted to keep) a democratic administration in office? Was it the Marxist-Leninist Party, imbued to the hilt with Soviet dogma, that we had encountered on the morrow of the

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Liberation? Or was it another party, committed to an earnest reappraisal of its old ideology, gradually feeling its way into the democratic fold? If the first hypothesis were right, then Italy's 30-year-old democracy had suffered its first crushing blow, because the Andreotti government had taken office on the strength of the Communist abstention. If the second were correct, then a new recruit to democracy had come to lend Italy a hand in its darkest hour.

This is the crux of the arguments for and against the democratic credentials of the Italian Communist Party, and with it, the credibility of the so-called Eurocommunist movement, that have been the subject of so much animated debate in Italy and throughout the world.

My opinion, which is shared by my party and broad sections of other parties, is that the PCI is now no longer the animal we knew so well during the Fascist period, the Resistance and the first decades of Italy's postwar republic. The new factors that I feel bear serious study are these:

1. For several years now, the PCI both in Italy and abroad has formally been declaring its willingness to respect the values of democracy, pluralism and free elections and renouncing its ideological commitment to achieve a proletarian dictatorship.

At the celebrations for the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution in Moscow last November, Soviet Party chief Leonid Brezhnev's hard-line reaffirmation of all the well-worn principles of Soviet dogma was followed by a speech from Enrico Berlinguer, Secretary of the PCI. Berlinguer calmly stated that his party believed in the historic, universal precepts of democracy, in the non-ideological nature of the state (i.e., not in the state as conceived by Marxist-Leninist doctrine), in the coexistence of different political parties, and in pluralism in society, culture and ideas. In the debate in Italy on the implications of all this, I made it clear that I felt what Berlinguer had said was significant, because he had said it on a solemn occasion in the presence of delegates from communist parties the world over. My feeling also was that his message would echo through the underground vaults of dissent in the Soviet-bloc countries to herald the arrival of a third heresy, after the Yugoslav and Chinese variants. Other commentators responded that whereas the Spanish Communist leader Santiago Carrillo had been barred from the podium, Berlinguer had been allowed to have his say. They took this to indicate that the Soviets might be working in closer rapport with the Italian Communist Party than with its Spanish counterpart. There is, however,

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another interpretation: the treatment meted out to Carrillo could have been designed as an indirect warning to Berlinguer himself. Preventing Berlinguer from speaking would have implied a tacit admission by the Soviets that the most powerful Communist Party in the West had become overly heretical, with all the consequences that would ensue. The Soviets could ill afford to let the pot boil over immediately. From Berlinguer's standpoint, as leader of that party, he had somehow to trigger the laborious process of easing the PCI out of its old ideological ways and loosening its time-honored allegiance to the Kremlin.

2. Around the same time, the PCI declared that it went along with the concept of Italy remaining within the NATO alliance, and that is was willing to work with other democracies toward building a European union. In recent foreign policy debates in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, the Communists have joined democratic parties in putting their names to policy documents reaffirming the traditional principles of Italy's foreign policy, notably its membership in NATO and the European Community. The contrary view is that the PCI will ostensibly accept these principles at the outset, but seek to alter or overturn them later. Here it is worth recalling that when the Socialists joined the Center-Left coalition, they advocated a policy of total neutrality and were demanding that Italy withdraw from NATO. The Socialist Party has certainly done very little to advance Italy's social and economic progress. Against that, after so many years in government, it has not in fact even scratched the surface of Italy's traditional foreign policy. In any case, when the PCI asks for a say in the country's affairs, it is perfectly aware that it is in a minority position vis-à-vis the other democratic parties. If, on entering government, they were to repudiate Italy's foreign policy, this would be enough in the eyes of public opinion for the democratic parties to break up such a coalition, whereas in present circumstances the Communists can only be, as it were, put on trial for their alleged intentions.

In trying to come up with a clear assessment of this vital issue, another aspect should not be overlooked. The image the Italian Communist leaders had of the Soviet Union and the West before Khrushchev's revelations on the Stalinist era and the ensuing developments must be totally different from what they have learned in the light of years of political experience in a Western democracy like Italy, and profound inside knowledge of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. Party policies and the thinking of party leaders undergo some processes of reappraisal that can be

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admitted in public and others that, though unavowed, are all the more effective.

3. On the economic and social front, the PCI has of late been retreating from its traditional populist and demagogic stand based on a blind faith in collectivization, and has stated it is willing to back a tough policy aimed at setting Italy's economic and social house to rights, putting law and order on a sound footing, after all the depredations it has recently suffered, and consolidating the country's democratic institutions, all within the context of Italy's existing Western-style economy. Again, Luciano Lama, Secretary-General of the Communist CGIL, the largest trade union confederation, recently gave an interview to a Rome newspaper which aroused widespread comment. Lama stated that wages and employment could no longer be considered independent variables, and that, in pressing their claims since 1969, the unions had overlooked the question of unemployment. This had created a difficult situation, and a whole new approach was needed to help put the country on its feet again. In other words, Lama seemed to be intimating acceptance of the concept of an incomes policy and social compact that has helped the United Kingdom to recover from a crisis, characterized by high inflation, a huge balance-of-payments deficit and an excessive rate of government spending, that bedevilled it until a short while ago. Italy is now alone at the bottom of the EEC league, still wallowing in just such a crisis, precisely because its government has been powerless to secure the support of the unions in putting through a British-style rescue package. It may be objected that Lama made this statement just when Andreotti had fallen and the Communists were forcefully putting in their bid to enter government, or, at least, in a parliamentary majority. Yet those of us who feel, as I do, that Italy will plunge even deeper into crisis if the unions persist in the policies they have adopted since 1969 and that there is no way out of this crisis without cooperation among the government, the unions and industry, cannot afford to take Lama's offer too lightly.

Here it may be helpful to recall what I feel could have been a significant juncture in the war of words between Communist and democratic leaders in Italy in the past. In 1965, I took part in crowded public debates with the top-ranking Communists Pietro Ingrao and Giorgio Amendola. The point I put to them both was roughly this: you, as Communists, look back with longing to the 1917 Revolution which swept the Bolsheviks into power. But remember that Italy today could not be more different from the Russia of 1917, a country with practically no industrial develop-

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ment, inhabited by a vast mass of poverty-stricken peasants, oppressed by a Czarist regime that had no more notion of liberty then than its Soviet successor has now. Italy, with all its problems, is an advanced industrial nation, with highly variegated traditions, firmly in the mold of Western civilization. How do you really expect to import into Italy an ideology and a political solution that was applied to such a fundamentally different environment half a century ago? The Italian Republican Party (PRI), a minority but intellectually respected party, has been insistently preaching this theme ever since, and it is my modest but fond hope that it may have had some part in the current critical rethinking of the Italian Communist Party.

III

Leaving aside for the moment these three points, let me try to make a global assessment of the situation in political terms.

As indicated earlier on, the Christian Democrats emerged from the last general election in June 1976, unable to form a traditional Center-Left coalition because the Socialist Party, whose votes were essential to achieve an overall majority in Parliament, refused to take part in any government or coalition from which the Communist Party was excluded. The Andreotti government was thus brought in on the basis of a vote of confidence from the Christian Democrats and an agreement by all the other parties, democrats and Communists alike, to abstain. The Andreotti government survived for 18 months and was able to set about tackling some economic problems and a few issues of law and order, because the Communists let it survive on this basis for that long a time. A compromise had therefore already been arranged with the Communist Party, but it was certainly at most an illusion to expect it to allow such a situation to persist until the next general election. Sooner or later, the Communists were bound to ask for a greater say in running the country. In any case, precisely because Andreotti had to govern in this anomalous situation, without a real majority in Parliament, he was unable to make any substantial progress toward overcoming Italy's basic economic problems, i.e., the huge government budget deficit, the excessively high cost of social security, wage costs running far ahead of productivity, and the need to mount rescue operations for a broad segment of the country's industry, chiefly for large companies in severe financial difficulty. At this writing, now that the Andreotti government has fallen, only two options remain open. Either a new government

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must be formed with the Communists in it or in a parliamentary majority, or a general election must be called.

My party has advocated the first of these options, because an election at this time would not only split the country into two opposing camps, but would also adversely affect the fortunes of the smaller parties now lying between those camps. In any case, the Christian Democrats would still not have a large enough majority to form a government. The result would be very largely a repeat performance of the June 1976 election with both the Christian Democrats and the Communists picking up a few votes, but in the context of a further deterioration in law and order and the economic and social scene as a whole. Furthermore, the two main parties, on emerging battle-scarred from a bitter contest, would then have to seek a mutual accommodation in order to govern the country. In other words, in the continuing absence of any alternative to a compromise, the Christian Democrats after the election would perforce have to accept what they had refused to accept before it. Those who strongly oppose the entry of the Communists into the government or in a parliamentary majority (which, as I have sought to show, is unavoidable whether or not a general election is now held) are deploying every possible doom-laden argument to support their thesis. They refer to the experience the West has had of tactics whereby the Communists have managed to get into government, sometimes in cooperation with other political parties, only to take over afterwards and turn democracies into totalitarian regimes. They quote all the present Soviet-bloc countries as examples, culminating in the tragic fate of Czechoslovakia in 1948. If there were any margin for doubt, the authoritative voice of former U. S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has now swept it away.

Taking this forbidding scenario for granted implies, of course, that no credence whatsoever is lent to anything the Eurocommunists in general and the Italian Communist Party in particular have been saying all this time about their willingness to abide by the rules of democracy and respect freedom. In short, the doomwatchers have convinced themselves that every word the Eurocommunists have uttered is just part of an intricate, cunning scheme to get into power and, once there, to lose no time in setting up a totalitarian regime.

Now, this view of Eurocommunism is not shared by many Italian democrats. First, it is unlikely that a Eurocommunist party would embark on a long, soul-searching reappraisal of its ideologies and policies, which not only involves its leaders but also the huge

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masses of its rank and file, only to make an abrupt turnabout on gaining power. As part of the current debate in Italy, a leading daily, Milan's *Il Corriere della Sera,* published an interview in January 1978 with Milovan Djilas, the noted Yugoslav political commentator, a man who has never had a soft spot for Communist totalitarian regimes, including his own country's, and has suffered persecution as a result. Here is what he had to say about Eurocommunism, and the Italian variety in particular:

> The Kremlin has already lost a great deal of its influence on the Western communist parties and is afraid of losing its prestige and power over the Eastern parties as well. Its ideological objections are only put on for show. Russia's hostility to Eurocommunism is really of a political nature. The Spanish Communist Party and part of the Italian Party are in the slow process of abandoning Leninism. This is a process that can either go on or be stopped, depending on international developments and the particular political situation in each country. Personally, I am convinced that it will go on and even spread to the French Party, which at present is still Leninist in outlook.

Aside from this, it is hard to accept the reasoning that puts Italy on the same plane as Czechoslovakia in 1948, or Poland, or Hungary. Italy is neither occupied nor dominated by the Soviet army. She lies within the NATO defense structure, and these defenses the Communists accept. She has major U. S. bases on her soil. A coup supported by foreign military forces is therefore not in the cards, and any attempted internal coup would be vigorously resisted by the Italian army and police. While, as a whole, they could tolerate the Communists sharing in government, they would rebel if any attempt were made to turn the country over to a totalitarian regime. The prospect of this democratic state being successfully defended *in extremis* against such an eventuality, which, I believe, is in itself improbable in the extreme, gains weight when one remembers that the President of the republic, who will certainly not be a Communist, is in charge of the armed forces, including the police, and also presides over the supreme council of the judiciary. He is thus able to take all the decisions needed to cope with any extreme situation where Italy's democratic constitution might appear threatened. As I have said, I do not feel that such a situation is ever likely to arise.

Second, though the traditional democratic parties no longer have either the capacity or the will to go on keeping the Communist Party out of the coalition government or the parliamentary majority, they collectively wield enough power in Parliament to resist with every weapon at their disposal any attempt by the Communists to monopolize that government and overturn the constitution. To

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put it another way, people in many democratic parties do not feel they can adhere to their traditional dyed-in-the-wool anti-communism faced with a Communist Party leaning toward a democratic stance, yet they would fight tooth and nail if the Communists were to change their spots again.

And it is much easier to fight the Communists on the grounds of an attitude they might adopt today than it would be to fight them on the basis of circumstances that emerged many years ago in other countries in a totally different historical and political environment. Increasingly, the tendency in Italy today to give the Communists, as it were, the benefit of the doubt has come about because of the very difficult situation the country is now experiencing. This attitude would vanish overnight at the first inkling of any *volte-face* in the Communists' position. In any case, the impact of any such backtracking on the Communist rank-and-file would without doubt severely impair the Party's ability to maintain, let alone expand, its electoral base.

IV

These then are the checks and balances which we must rely on when arriving at an objective assessment of the state of Italy without at the same time falling prey to unwarranted preconceptions. There is also a further point that has been hinted at between the lines several times earlier in this article. Italy's deep economic, social and institutional crisis has brought it to the verge of becoming ungovernable in the democratic sense. An immense effort is needed to pull ourselves out of the trough, and bring the country back to its rightful place as a sound Western democracy. In such a situation it is fair to ask: What sense of responsibility would the democratic leaders be showing to the people who elected them if they shrugged off the Eurocommunists' offer on the basis of outdated prejudices?

Communist leaders of great sincerity (and I rate Enrico Berlinguer one of them) have wholeheartedly committed themselves to Eurocommunism. If, through the process of critical reappraisal that they have been going through for years, they fail to acquire democratic respectability, then their policy will have suffered a resounding defeat. The Communist Party will have to replace it once again by another policy. And that alternative policy can only be a return to Soviet-style orthodoxy. There would be no going back. A large section of Italian society would retreat once and for all beyond the democratic pale and would once again look to the Soviet Union for its lead. In Italy's present state, the reversion of

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its Communist Party to Soviet orthodoxy and a kind of neo-Stalinism could deal the *coup de grace* to a country with its institutional framework already in peril. This could result in near-revolutionary disorder, if not something bordering on civil war. A situation like this would be brought about, not by substantiated evidence that the Italian Communist Party is a threat to democracy, but by the preconceived notion that Eurocommunism is nothing but a false front for the communism of yore manipulated by the Soviet Union.

It would be extremely hazardous to throw Italy's fate in the balance on the basis of such a proposition, when the Communist Party has offered to help Italy out of its crisis without impinging on Italy's democratic traditions and ideals. Rather, it seems far more reasonable to put the PCI to the test on the job. If the Communists pass the test, Italian democracy will be consolidated and the country can be set on the road to economic and social renewal, thus strengthening Western democracy as a whole. If they fail, there will always be time, and no lack of ways and means, for a head-on, no-holds-barred confrontation between those forces that stand for democracy and freedom and those that wish to impose a nondemocratic regime. The state of Italy is now such that this test cannot be avoided.

One final word. The real risk of bringing the Communists into the government or into a parliamentary majority situation is not that Italy will meet the fate of Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary. It is that a government based on cooperation among Christian Democrats, Socialists and Communists might be just as ineffective as those past governments made up of Christian Democrats and Socialists. The prospect of yet another government still lacking the authority and drive so vitally needed to set Italy's house in order, whatever its partners' good intentions, is my only anxiety. And it is this grim prospect that my own Party is pledged to do everything in its power to avoid.

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Jacques Chirac

FRANCE: ILLUSIONS, TEMPTATIONS, AMBITIONS

For obvious reasons, domestic politics have monopolized the passions of the French people during these last months. However, the debate we have been engaged in would lack breadth if it were not accompanied by a review of the politics France should follow on the international scene. Such a review must rise above personal quarrels and political maneuvering. While I will not attempt to describe what is—or what should be—French foreign policy in every area, problem by problem, sector by sector, I may be able to suggest some of the temptations that I believe our diplomacy should resist.

II

At the outset, I should like to explain the illusions that the Socialist-Communist opposition would like the French citizens to succumb to, and indicate some delusions that may bedevil the governing Majority.[1] I wish it were easier to discuss the foreign policy of the Left. But this is a difficult undertaking. Socialists and Communists disagree on the main points and thus mention foreign policy very rarely. Out of the 185 pages of the Common Program, hardly 15 pages deal with it, including some which are clearly ambiguous.[2] Moreover, when the Left Radicals adopted and agreed to support this document, which, like any work tailored for the occasion, has aged rather badly, they added an Annex in which not one line, not one word mentions this essential aspect of French politics.

[1] The governing Majority at the time this article was written, preceding the March 1978 legislative elections, was made up of the Gaullist Assembly for the Republic (RPR), headed by Jacques Chirac, the Independent Republican party (RI), associated with President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, and several Centrist parties.

[2] The Common Program of Government was signed in June 1972 by François Mitterrand's Socialist Party and by Georges Marchais' Communist Party. The small Left Radical party, made up of Socialist-oriented Centrists and headed by Robert Fabre, joined in July 1972. In 1977, these three parties began discussions to update their program. This is precisely when the break between the French Communist Party and its allies occurred. Notwithstanding, the 1972 version of the Common Program continues to inspire the policy of the three parties, in spite of electoral ups and downs. Consequently, it is an essential instrument for those who wish to discuss the aims of the French Left.

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Is French foreign policy really worth no more than a confused and off-hand postscript?

Undoubtedly, the Common Program includes a whole series of generous propositions to which my movement, the Assembly for the Republic (RPR), subscribes with enthusiasm, especially as it has always supported and worked for the implementation of: respect for the U.N. Charter, world peace, development of international cooperation, the fight against any form of fascism and racism.

The desires of the French people, however, will not be long satisfied by these worn-out slogans. In a way, it is quite natural that Messrs. Mitterrand, Marchais and Fabre substitute verbal acrobatics for a coherent vision of international relations. But when they try to proceed from professions of faith to specific analyses, they are immediately faced with an abyss of disavowals and ambiguities. I shall cite only three examples.

1. In Chapter Three, entitled "European Security," the Common Program proposes the "immediate dissolution of NATO and of the Warsaw Pact" and commits itself to initiating "the necessary steps to arrive at a European Treaty that would imply a new security organization."

At first glance, what is more needed and more desirable than to do away with the policy of blocs, spheres of influence and military camps? But behind these seductive words, the Socialist-Communist proposition is, in fact, extremely dangerous. Indeed, its implementation would clearly favor the Soviet Union to the detriment of the Western camp, for an elementary reason over which the signatories to the Common Program have chosen to throw a veil of modesty: Moscow is linked to all the popular democracies by a network of bilateral agreements that would not be affected by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. On the other hand, the West—as one sometimes tends to forget—has no such system of treaties at its disposal.

If the leaders of the Common Program casually juggle with utopian solutions and pretend to solve in six lines a problem that the evolution of relations between East and West makes more worrisome each day, that is, after all, "their" problem. But if their proposals faithfully reproduce the theses developed by the Soviets for over 20 years, then that becomes "our" problem. While the Fifth Republic enjoys excellent relations with the Soviet Union, that does not mean that our interests necessarily coincide.

I invite anyone tempted to take Georges Marchais at his word when, as Secretary General of the French Communist Party, he

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affirms "all that is national is ours," to refer to the edition of the Common Program prefaced by that same Georges Marchais. You will find there, among other surprises, proof of the "Sovieto-centrism" that characterizes the thought of the Communist leader. Indeed, he writes (on page 17) without the slightest qualm: "Nevertheless, unlike capitalist countries, socialist countries follow an ascending line and gradually solve the problems presented by the building of a society where man is no longer exploited, and where unprecedented circumstances are created for the flourishing of the individual." Which means, when clearly stated, that for Georges Marchais Soviet society constitutes the best framework for the harmonious development of individual liberties!

Every international event brings us further confirmation of this quasi-automatic alignment of the French Communist Party with Soviet theses: Did Georges Marchais not strongly approve the involvement of Cuban troops (transported by Russian planes) in Angola at the time of its accession to independence? On the other hand, has he not explained that in Zaïre, the situation was "totally different" and had to be resolved "without foreign intervention"? To be "for" foreign aid when it is Russian, "against" when it is Western, does not, it seems to me, give a French orientation to the Communist conceptual framework.

This type of ambiguity must be denounced, even at the risk of being accused by an oversensitive intelligentsia of "primitive anti-communism." But who cares about snap judgments? Gaullists are not afraid of words.

2. In matters of "disarmament and national defense" (Chapter Two), the Common Program calls for "the renunciation of the French nuclear deterrent in any form whatsoever, the immediate halting of the construction of the French nuclear striking force, and the reconversion, according to a precise schedule, of the military nuclear industry into a civilian atomic industry. . . ."

This position is not realistic but at least it has the virtue of clarity. However, on May 11, 1977, the Central Committee of the French Communist Party made a 180-degree turn and, in M. Jean Kanapa's words, explained that the nuclear arm represented "the only real means of dissuasion that, for the time being, the country will have at its disposal in order to face a threat of aggression."

Some will perhaps see in this sudden change of course by the French Communist Party the tardy but sincere expression of a doubt, and will be tempted to forgive it. If so, they would sin through innocence. The acceptance of the nuclear arm by the Communists is, in fact, purely demagogic: for 20 years, the

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Communist Party has expressed its opposition to nuclear weapons in particularly unequivocal terms. For example, the 1964 Congress of the French Communist Party accused the nuclear deterrent force of "increasing the risks of nuclear conflict." Jean Kanapa, in his report to the Central Committee of April 14 and 15, 1975, took the following position: "The nuclear weapon can only be the instrument of a generalized nuclear war that our country would not survive."

A simple conclusion follows. The hostility of the French Communist Party to the French nuclear striking force has always been justified because of the very nature of the nuclear weapon—considered dangerous for its intrinsic qualities—and not on the basis of an evaluation of the circumstances in which it might be used. This is why the Communist Party's current change of opinion does not result from a fresh analysis inspired by the evolution of the national and international military context but is quite clearly a doctrinal disavowal, motivated by political tactics. Of course, the French Communist Party would like to have people believe that its positions are changing as a result of its reflections on strategic questions. Actually, it is discarding its convictions. Or, rather, pretending to do so.

Not that this is surprising. The French nuclear striking force is acceptable to the French Communist Party only as a tool for a policy of autarky, isolationism and neutralism as well as for a policy attempting to alter the solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance and the unity of the destinies of the peoples of Western Europe.

As for the Socialist Party, badly torn in two directions (some favorable to the atomic weapon, some violently hostile), it hesitates. As early as July 1977, François Mitterrand had no scruples in disowning the Common Program, signed five years ago, and in accepting the principle of "maintaining in proper condition" the French nuclear striking force. But, very quickly, the opposition of the "anti-nuclear" members of his own political party forced him to admit that his change of opinion last July was mainly inspired by pragmatic considerations and that his final aim remains the one inscribed in the 1972 Common Program. (The National Convention of the Socialist Party, which met in early January 1978, has confirmed this analysis.) I confess that such electoral "elasticity" on so essential a subject as the security of France astounds me.

3. Regarding the European Economic Community (Chapter Four), the Common Program gives priority to two objectives: First, participation in the building of the Community with an end to freeing it from the domination of "big business" and democratizing

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its institutions. Second, protection of the freedom of action of the Left to carry out its political, economic and social program.

But what do these slogans really mean? What lies under these meaningless formulas repeated a thousand times, such as "big business," and "freedom of the Left"? The answer is easy: a lame compromise.

The Socialists campaign sincerely in favor of Europe in general and the Common Market in particular. The Communists, for their part, do not want to have anything to do with either one or the other. For a long time they have characterized the Common Market as an "anti-national," "antisocial" and "anti-Soviet" organization. Less than a year before the signing of the Common Program, in "Change of Course",[3] the French Communists were still at the "great and true Europe" stage and condemned the Common Market as a barrier to "true international cooperation."

Nothing could be less surprising, then, than the statement of Georges Marchais, January 10, 1976: "The acceptance of the election of the European Parliament on the basis of universal suffrage is a crime against France, against the French. . . ." The same is true of Jean Kanapa's declaration on January 18, 1976: "Never shall we Communists accept the election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage."

These brutal formulas are not new. They are the reflection of the 30-years war waged by the French Communists against any kind of strengthening of European unity, including the Congress of Europe (May 1948), the European Movement (in which Léon Blum participated), the Council of Europe (1949), the proposed European Defense Community (1952–54), the European Coal and Steel Community (1952), etc.

However, on April 17, 1977, Georges Marchais declared that the French Communist Party was no longer opposed to the election of a European Parliament by universal suffrage. But who can believe that the Communist Party has been suddenly seized by a sincere European conviction? Has Georges Marchais been touched overnight by European grace?

Quite obviously, it is not in order to score points that I have brought up some of the doctrinal arabesques to which Socialists and Communists have unfortunately conditioned us. Rather it is because any approach to foreign policy must, first of all, be an exercise in demystification.

[3] "Program for a Democratic Government of Popular Union," adopted by the Central Committee of the French Communist Party, October 9, 1971.

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III

It must also be a demythification. For we seldom manage (not only in France but also more generally in the Western camp) to rid ourselves of certain myths that obscure and distort our perception of international reality and, more specifically, the relationship between the East and the West. In particular, there are three myths that seem to me more deeply rooted, and thus more harmful, than any others.

1. Atlanticism. To begin with, a certain ambiguity must be resolved: for 20 years some people have linked Gaullism with hostility toward the United States as a matter of principle. The assertion is absurd. Only enemies of Gaullism or of the United States could find it desirable to perpetuate this fiction. It is typically one of those pointless quarrels that results from a misunderstanding of language. Indeed, those who wish to damage the relations between our two countries always hurl the term "Atlanticism" at us. However, as a Gaullist, I am not afraid of this word. In my eyes, to be an Atlanticist is neither a blemish nor a virtue. Nor is it a scarecrow.

But let us understand one another quite clearly. If being an Atlanticist means being one of the 500 million Westerners who hold a certain notion of freedom in common, then I am quite definitely an Atlanticist. If, on the other hand, an Atlanticist means being linked against one's will to a great power that tends to confuse an alliance of equals with casual hegemony, then, quite obviously, I cannot be an Atlanticist.

I will go further.

This refusal to submit is said to be Gaullist. That is true, of course, in the sense that General de Gaulle emphasized most strongly what should be the unswerving attitude of nations that respect themselves. However, this insistence on independence has deeper roots. It is as old as history. All proud nations have felt it. Americans, who justly proclaim their attachment to freedom and know the price of independence, cannot fail to understand this yearning.

This being said, if we are extremely sensitive about anything that may seem to threaten our sovereignty even slightly, we have never confused independence with isolation. Our patriotism does not imply solitude. France belongs profoundly to one camp. The very diplomacy of the Fifth Republic shows it. For instance, how could a Gaullist forget that in 1962, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, the first to affirm his solidarity with President Kennedy was General de Gaulle? How could he forget that, two

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years earlier, during a speech delivered to the U.S. Congress, General de Gaulle exclaimed: "Morally, the balance is not equal between the two camps that divide the universe. France, for her part, has chosen to be with you, on the side of freedom"? How could a Gaullist forget that President Pompidou, in the Kremlin itself, did not hesitate to reaffirm the fidelity of France to her alliance? It was an expression of common sense, and the Soviet leaders could not take offense.

But, at the same time, how could a Gaullist fail to recall that, in 1966, France left the integrated military organization of NATO because she refused to allow her future to be decided by others? And how could he not underline his attachment to the policy of détente with the Soviet Union—the other superpower—initiated by General de Gaulle? What I want our American friends to understand and to accept is that there is no contradiction here. Speaking for myself, there is only one consistent attitude: being in the camp of freedom means preserving one's own freedom of judgment.

2. Eurocommunism. Contrary to a rather widely held opinion, I do not believe in the existence of Eurocommunism. Anyway, not yet. You hear a lot about it, but you never see it!

To prove their evolution, the Eurocommunist parties, first of all, would have had to de-Stalinize themselves. They would have to modify the principle of their internal procedure, "democratic centralism." This euphemism, which includes a lot of centralism and very little democracy, characterizes the Stalinist parties. The slightest signs of dissidence are immediately smothered. Power runs from top to bottom. Their elections are nothing but ratifications. In these circumstances, how can one believe that Eurocommunists form a new variety, i.e., a more "democratic" one, of communists? And how can one hope that they would apply to others tomorrow a principle of freedom that they deny to themselves today?

It is true that the Spanish Communist leader Santiago Carrillo has sometimes denounced the excesses of "democratic centralism." But we have only to go back to his doctrinal writings to be convinced that his current declarations are not sufficient to make him the spokesman and defender of a unique form of communism.

Nor are the Eurocommunist parties detached from the Soviet Union. I have already shown this to be true as regards the French Communists. But is this not also true of the Italian and Spanish Communist Parties?

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Italian Party chief Enrico Berlinguer declares that "the Soviet Union's policy of peace is pursued in the general interest of humanity." Lucio Lombardo Radice, a member of the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party, proclaims that in the case of an acute crisis between the East and the West, the Italian Communists "would obviously choose the U.S.S.R." And Santiago Carrillo (although he is the most "de-Russified" of the Eurocommunists) insists on the "resolutely defensive character of the Warsaw Pact" and stigmatizes NATO as a "mere instrument of political, economic and military domination of Americans over Europe."

To simplify, let us say that Eurocommunism is a bet that we are urged to make on the capacity of Communists to change. As of now, nothing allows us to place this bet without grave risks.

3. The convergence of the systems. To define this myth one has to place it within the more general context of détente. Détente between the East and the West is an absolute necessity. To oppose it would be quite obviously to swim against the current of history. But it is not because détente is a concept with which we are now familiar that we should be so naive as to hesitate to question its nature. Nor should one refrain from questioning the value of diplomatic procedures just because the world, thank God, is not at war.

What is called détente has never been more than a modus vivendi in order to coexist and so to avoid the major risks of a brutal confrontation. And this is what it still is. Détente does not imply for either of the two camps any disavowal of its own personality or any acknowledgment of the superior value of the other. Undoubtedly, from time to time, an event may sharpen or, more precisely, renew fundamental differences. The struggle of the Soviet dissidents is one of these events. Thus, the meaning of détente should not be misunderstood. Virtues should not be attributed to it that it does not possess inherently. For instance, one should not expect (as certain Western politicians wrongly do) that détente will favor a convergence of capitalist and Marxist systems. This seems illusory to me. The notion that by dint of exchanges and economic and commercial contacts socialist societies will gradually become more liberal and more democratic has no solid basis in reality. Wishing it were otherwise will not change that reality.

Of course, I believe that these relationships should be intensified. But, at least in the near future, I see nothing that justifies the dreamers who imagine that parallel lines can meet! Moreover, history refutes their analysis: Did the fact that the United States

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contributed to the financing of the first five-year plan under Stalin prevent the "great purges" of the 1930s?

I am aware that this sort of language is seldom heard—at least in political circles—because idealism is a much more popular genre. I may well be wrong, but I believe that idealists are not always the ones who best serve the ideals they cherish. In any event, that is where the truth lies. It should offend no one. Indeed, the Soviets themselves have always rejected the theory of the convergence of the Western and the Eastern regimes.

The followers of the convergence thesis also quite often believe in the "diminution of the ideological competition" between the two camps. No one will be surprised to hear that this second, hoped-for effect of détente leaves me quite as puzzled as the first one. And for a simple reason. For the Soviets, the ideological struggle against the liberal camp is the expression of the superiority of their system over ours. To demand that they lower the intensity of their struggle is, in a certain way, asking them to renounce this conviction. Is it really necessary to point out that such a wish is unrealistic?

Doubtless it will be suggested that these remarks are pessimistic. I cannot help it. Westerners can successfully defend their system of values only on the basis of certain realities—even if they seem harsh and unfair—and not on the basis of foolish hopes. Freedom can progress only on the basis of truth. Every political and economic system has to risk being judged by international public opinion.

IV

The main principles that inspire the Fifth Republic's foreign policy are generally known. Nor is this policy the monopoly of one camp. On the contrary, it is deeply rooted in the whole nation. Various political headquarters sometimes dispute it for obscure, prejudiced reasons, but deep down, the masses endorse it. As Prime Minister, I personally carried out this policy. As President of the Gaullist RPR movement and as Mayor of Paris, I continue every day to evaluate its successes and possible difficulties. The task is no longer to build but to protect and to develop what has already been achieved. This implies a permanent effort of thought. Not, I repeat, about the essential choices, which are clear, but about the best ways of approaching them.

1. We must accept the notion that foreign policy often becomes enmeshed with the art of managing ambiguities. The ability to conduct foreign policy effectively consists in not being induced to

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refuse an agreement because it involves shadowy areas. On the contrary, the man in charge should understand that an agreement may—sometimes—only be a formal delimitation of calculated bets. Here is an illustration, taken from the German problem. Observers agree that when the Federal Republic of Germany finally "recognized" the reality of the other Germany, it was convinced that this was the price to be paid in order to preserve the chance for reunification in the far distant future. The German Democratic Republic reasons in the opposite direction: "recognition" by Bonn and admission to international life are the best means of reinforcing the structures of the East German state and protecting it against the risks of such a reunification. International life swarms with situations that exclude tranquil and clear solutions.

2. We are sometimes tempted to speculate over the supposed intentions of our partners and allies instead of patiently carving our own concept of the world. However, it is not from the approval of this or that foreign country that we must draw the strength to pursue our own course. Nor should fear of the reactions of others lead us to abandon it. If a line of conduct is not good for France, it should be rejected for its own defects and not because it might displease others—even if these others are "great powers."

3. We must clearly choose a method of negotiation and stick to it. I have already had the opportunity of stating that I was not favorable to the technique of "globalization," which consists of intermingling and often confusing all problems that might arise, of demanding that the Soviets show more tolerance toward their dissidents in exchange for preferential rates for their loans, of linking European commercial submissiveness toward Washington to the maintenance of American troops on the continent, etc. Indeed, there is a substantial risk, if one adopts this method, of yielding to the temptation of permanent haggling and ending up by considering negotiation as an end-point rather than as a means of diplomatic action.

Furthermore, it seems indecent, in a way, for a state to throw intercontinental missiles into the same basket with nuclear reprocessing plants, the principle of inviolability of frontiers with the cries of men fighting (in the East and in the West) for more freedom. True, some people say that the defense of human rights is a "categorical imperative" and that every pressure that can be exerted should be used to have these respected. Without question. But can we be quite certain that the method of "globalization" might not tempt a power to use it to the advantage of its immediate

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materialistic interests and so to the detriment of higher values? For all these reasons, the technique of case-by-case reciprocity seems to me, in the great majority of hypotheses, both more modest and more sensible. An economic challenge should be met by an economic counterthrust; a diplomatic pressure by a diplomatic response; an industrial bid by an industrial riposte. It is generally dangerous to mix genres.

4. Certain Western leaders (including the French from time to time) seem fascinated by the charms of a strongly "personalized" foreign policy. Indeed, I can criticize these direct contacts and frequent relations between international leaders all the less because I have myself appreciated their advantages. But diplomacy that invests too much in men and not enough in facts runs the risk of being shattered by its first psychological error. If, in Vienna in 1961, Nikita Khrushchev had not misjudged John Kennedy as a spoiled young man lacking in will and experience, would he have taken the risk of threatening America with the missiles he installed in Cuba the following year?

Moreover, an excess of personalization naturally tends to emphasize atmosphere, the "spirit" of a negotiation, to the detriment of its concrete results, the décor at the expense of the play itself. The sole explanation for the enthusiastic celebration of the "spirit of Helsinki" is that the representatives of the great powers displayed their warm handshakes and their deliberate smiles because the situation demanded it.

It would be easy to give other examples. But to what end? I have no interest in presenting a case against anyone. I simply wish to recall, through these brief remarks, that the preservation of a doctrinal heritage such as the one left to us by General de Gaulle is no small undertaking. A few brilliant improvisations and some solemn statements are not enough.

It seems to me that a great foreign policy cannot be constructed without the help of a conceptual key that permits one to decipher the nuances and the subtleties of international realities. But neither can one conduct the foreign affairs of a great nation without questioning oneself as to the best attitudes and diplomatic techniques to achieve one's aims.

What I say naturally applies to France today. What does it matter if our aims are so ambitious? France has no fear of difficulty. She has always defended something greater than her own comfort.

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Charles F. Cooper

WHAT MIGHT MAN-INDUCED CLIMATE CHANGE MEAN?

Climate has always influenced human affairs. There are now increasing signs that man may in turn be altering global climate. This could change economic, political and even military relations among nations.

Climate drives agricultural and forest production, and it largely governs the way people live and work. Unexplained natural climatic variation has characterized all of human history and prehistory. Many climatologists now believe that in the present advanced stage of industrialization the addition of carbon dioxide and particulate matter to the atmosphere through burning of fossil fuels and clearing of land has become a significant agent of climatic change that could measurably raise the temperature of the earth by the end of this century. This would bring about appreciable shifts in the global pattern of activities dependent upon climate: agriculture, forestry, residential heating and cooling, water-dependent industry, recreation, and many more. It could affect the level of the seas.[1]

Movement of climatic zones is likely to be at least as important as the global temperature change itself. The ultimate result of higher temperature, and of the more active atmospheric water circulation that will probably accompany it, could well be a net increase in global biological productivity. But the impacts will not be felt equally. Some regions and nations will gain; others will lose.

If the geophysical assumptions are correct, the process of climatic change due to industrialization is probably almost irreversible; the only practical strategy is adjustment. Technology will help

[1] For a semi-popular discussion of climatic change, see Stephen H. Schneider, *The Genesis Strategy*, New York: Plenum Press, 1976. A more technical discussion of the carbon dioxide question is given by C. F. Baes, *et. al.*, "Carbon Dioxide and Climate: The Uncontrolled Experiment," *American Scientist*, May-June 1977, p. 310. The Geophysics Study Committee of the National Academy of Sciences has produced a detailed problem analysis with much background information in *Energy and Climate*, Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1977.

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to ease that adjustment, but the institutional rigidities of our advanced societies may correspondingly make the response to changed climate stickier than in earlier, simpler ages.

No one can yet say surely that the cumulative burning of fossil fuels at high rates will alter climate significantly. The answer lies at the end of a long cascade of uncertainties. There is uncertainty about the rates at which carbon dioxide, particulate matter, and other materials will be added to the atmosphere. How much will remain, and how much will be removed by physical and biological processes? There is still some disagreement whether additional atmospheric carbon dioxide will actually increase global temperature. If so, it is uncertain exactly how much temperature change will result from a given level of carbon dioxide. There is further uncertainty about how temperature change will be translated into shifts in global climatic zones. Ecologists are unable to say accurately how the postulated climatic shifts will affect cultivated and noncultivated plant and animal communities. And the social and political implications are still more problematical.

Yet none of the uncertainties is absolute. Estimates, within some range of error, can be made for each. The sum of these estimates suggests a fairly high probability that measurable man-induced climatic change is in the offing. Thus, it seems worth taking a look at the possible long-term implications for human institutions.

II

Before one can do so, it is necessary to have some understanding of the steps in the causal chain leading from burning of coal, oil, and natural gas to alteration of global climate.

Carbon dioxide, comprising little more than .03 of one percent of the earth's atmosphere, plays a disproportionate role in global processes. All life depends upon the carbon dioxide that plants use for photosynthesis. Atmospheric carbon dioxide is also an important regulator of global temperature, through its impact on the earth's radiation balance.

The earth as a whole receives a vast amount of heat from the sun each day. If it is not to grow continuously hotter, it must on the average radiate away to outer space an amount of heat equal to that received. Energy comes from the sun predominantly in the form of shortwave visible and near-infrared radiation. Because the earth is much cooler than the sun, and because the wavelength of emitted radiation is dependent on the temperature of the radiating body, the energy given off by the earth is at a much longer wavelength than that which it receives.

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Carbon dioxide is almost completely transparent to the wavelengths of light given off by the sun. However, it strongly absorbs long wave radiation at certain wavelengths where other atmospheric gases are transparent. The earth's emitted radiation happens to be centered at just the wavelengths that carbon dioxide best absorbs. So the gas takes up some of the earth's radiant energy and is warmed. It then radiates its absorbed heat partly on out to space and partly back to earth again. The net result is that the earth is about 10° centigrade (C) warmer than it would be without the carbon dioxide envelope. Because a greenhouse is similarly transparent to incoming solar radiation but impedes outgoing heat radiation, the process to which carbon dioxide contributes in the atmosphere is commonly called the "greenhouse effect."

Water vapor also absorbs at some of the wavelengths at which the earth radiates, and is indeed apparently more important than carbon dioxide in producing the greenhouse effect. This fact is at the root of the controversy over the extent to which additional carbon dioxide will affect global climate.

The amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has unquestionably increased since the late nineteenth century. Accurate and regular measurements have been made since 1957 at the Mauna Loa Observatory on the island of Hawaii. At an elevation of 3,400 meters on a remote oceanic island, Mauna Loa is far from most industrial sources of carbon dioxide and so can be fairly said to represent a global average. The measurements are corrected for any local sources that may interfere from time to time. More sporadic measurements at other remote localities around the world confirm the reliability of the Mauna Loa data.[2]

This 20-year series of observations shows a regular cycle that reflects the annual march of photosynthesis and plant decay in the northern hemisphere. Since plants absorb carbon dioxide, its atmospheric level is greatest in mid-April when plant growth is getting started, and lowest in fall after the year's uptake is completed. Superimposed on the annual fluctuations, however, is an unmistakable long-term upward trend, now running at about 0.7 percent per year. The current value of atmospheric carbon dioxide is about 330 parts per million (ppm) compared with an estimated level of 290–300 ppm in the preindustrial era before about 1890.

There are only two plausible sources for the added carbon dioxide. One is burning of fossil fuels. The other is a net reduction

[2] Charles D. Keeling and Robert B. Bastacow, "Impact of Industrial Gases on Climate," *Energy and Climate, op. cit.*, p. 110.

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in the world's stock of organic carbon stored in plants, in soil humus, and in plant and animal material suspended and dissolved in the oceans. There is some argument over the relative size of the two sources, but no disagreement that the first is highly important. In fact, calculations based on the estimated annual release of stored carbon through burning of fossil fuels suggest that this alone is about twice the measured annual increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide. An obvious question is what happens to the rest, a point to which we will return.

Projections based on anticipated annual burning of fossil fuels, and on the fraction of the resulting carbon dioxide expected to remain in the atmosphere, lead to forecasts that atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide will range between 375 and 400 ppm by the end of this century. These models attempt to estimate cumulative levels of unabsorbed carbon dioxide under several plausible scenarios of future use of fossil fuels (coal, of course, as well as oil and gas). All assume a steady growth, at alternative rates, in overall consumption. The best analyses indicate that a doubling of the preindustrial level can be expected sometime between 2020 and 2040, depending upon which of the alternative use rates finally prevails.[3]

These models assume that the earth's plant cover—the biosphere—is constantly taking up some of the added carbon dioxide through increased growth, or at least is not adding to the total in the atmosphere. However, recent analyses present several lines of evidence that the biosphere is actually a source of carbon dioxide about as large as the fossil fuel source. The reason is that net destruction of plant life and soil organic matter releases carbon dioxide. The new analyses suggest that the rate of forest clearing, particularly in the tropics, is much greater than had previously been suspected.[4] This conclusion is still controversial. If it is correct, a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide would be much closer in time. This is an example of the kind of uncertainties that can be reduced only through a concerted international effort.

Whatever the time scale, how will the projected increase in carbon dioxide translate into changes in global temperature? Because of the complexity of competing processes in the atmosphere, it is impossible to use direct observations, relating historic temperature changes to the known historic increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide. Resort must be to complex calculations

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] G. M. Woodwell, *et. al.*, "The Biota and the World Carbon Budget," *Science*, January 13, 1976, pp. 141–46.

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based on radiation properties of atmospheric gases and the observed structure of the atmosphere. Even the most realistic of these models involve many unknown factors, omit important feedback mechanisms, and require much computer time for their solution.

The most generally accepted models all predict that increased carbon dioxide will produce an increase of temperature near the ground. The temperature response is nearly logarithmic; that is, each proportionate increase in the concentration of carbon dioxide produces about the same absolute increase in global temperature. Stephen Schneider of the National Center for Atmospheric Research has critically reviewed the models in existence up to 1975.[5] He concluded that those which best reflect current geophysical knowledge converge on an increase of between 1.5°C and 3°C for each doubling of carbon dioxide—the increase predicted in 2020 to 2040, roughly 40 to 60 years away—with lesser increases appearing in the meantime. Small as such changes may appear, they are enough to make a substantial difference in many economically important processes at the earth's surface, as will be seen later.

The general neglect of feedback mechanisms for clouds and ocean circulation in these models opens the possibility that the estimates may be substantially in error in either direction. However, Schneider concluded that there is no strong evidence that present models are more likely to overestimate the rise than to underestimate it.

There is one major problem with these model estimates. They do not precisely accord with observations over the last century. Careful analysis of worldwide temperature records indicates that global mean temperature apparently rose by a total of about 0.6°C between 1850 and 1940. Since then, instead of continuing to increase as would have been predicted by the carbon dioxide theory, temperatures have apparently dropped about 0.3°C to the present. Some climatologists believe that since about 1971 global mean temperature has been increasing again, but this is too short a time to firmly establish a trend.

A number of respected atmospheric scientists cite the lack of warming during the industrial era since 1940 as strong evidence that the postulated effect is not important, and that global cooling still predominates. However, the occurrence of an apparent trend contrary to that predicted by theory, even over a period of 30 years, is in itself neither surprising nor a refutation of the theory.

[5] Stephen H. Schneider, "On the Carbon Dioxide-Climate Confusion," *Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences*, November 1975, p. 2060.

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Temperature fluctuations, up or down, of 1°C or more per century throughout the past have been inferred from a variety of historical and paleoecological records. It is easy to argue that the period 1940-70 was one of normal cooling, on which was superimposed some warming due to the carbon dioxide effect. The cooling was therefore less than it would have been in the absence of industrial carbon dioxide. The verdict must remain "not proven." But if the warming effect of carbon dioxide over the next 40 to 60 years should be toward the higher (3°C) range in the models reviewed by Schneider, its magnitude would far outweigh the apparent 1°C range of normal fluctuation, even assuming that the latter continues to be in the direction of cooling.

III

What *is* clear is that any warming that does occur will not be uniformly distributed. That is one point on which all the experts seemingly agree. Both the climatic simulation models and past observations confirm this estimate.

Temperature increases will be greater at high latitudes than near the equator. This is borne out by experience during warming and cooling trends in the past century. A 1°C increase in global mean temperature might result in a change of 0–0.5° between 10°N and 10°S latitude, 2-4°C at 60°N and 60°S latitude, and even more than that closer to the poles.[6] The impact of a 2°C mean increase would be roughly twice as great, and so on.

This is important in two ways. In the first place, the tropics, already near the limits of tolerance for many organisms including man, will not become unbearably hotter even in the face of a considerably higher mean temperature. Neither is there likely to be much change in precipitation in the wet tropics. The greatest impact in the equatorial zone is likely to be a second-order one, resulting from changes in demand and prices for agricultural exports and imports, due to climatically induced economic changes elsewhere.

At high latitudes, on the other hand, both agricultural productivity and general livability are likely to be improved, particularly where the length of the growing season is now marginal or submarginal for crop production. Of the great subarctic land masses, those in the Soviet Union would appear to stand a better chance of reaping significant benefits than those in Canada or Alaska or the Scandinavian countries. The reasons for this conclusion will be

[6] Joseph Smagorinsky, "Modeling and Predictability," *Energy and Climate*, *supra*, footnote 1, p. 229.

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considered in more detail below.

This is a good point at which to consider the impact of higher poleward temperatures on the polar icecaps and on sea level. A complete melting of glacial ice, almost all of which is in Antarctica, would raise the level of the oceans by more than 50 meters, but this is most unlikely on a time scale of less than many centuries, if then. Even with a polar warming of several degrees, air temperatures over Antarctica would still be below freezing most of the time. Furthermore, dry air alone is a relatively inefficient melting agent compared with solar radiation, which would be little altered.

More complex scenarios can be visualized. Some have suggested that a moderate warming of the Antarctic ice, without melting, would accelerate glacier flow and discharge of ice into the ocean. Or warm polar water could induce a flow of ice from the continental shelf into the sea, possibly raising sea level by five meters in 300 years.[7] A rise of much smaller magnitude could be catastrophic for a nation such as the Netherlands, but this does not seem a major near-term threat.

Melting of the Arctic ice is perhaps slightly more likely. The North Polar ice floats on the Arctic Ocean, fluctuating in thickness from about 15 meters in winter to sometimes no more than a meter or two in summer. Because it is already floating, its disappearance would not alter sea level, but there could be drastic and unpredictable climatic feedbacks. An open ocean would absorb more solar radiation than ice. The Arctic Ocean has apparently not been open for the last million years or so, yet it appears that the Arctic ice could in fact be melted under some circumstances.[8]

As important as shifts in temperature bands may be changes in the pattern of precipitation, particularly the subtropical monsoon. From the equator to the poles, the earth is roughly characterized by an equatorial zone of heavy rainfall, a rather abrupt transition to a belt of deserts and semideserts, a relatively moist zone of prevailing westerly winds in the temperate latitudes where most of the world's advanced nations are concentrated, and increasing dryness toward the poles. This general pattern is greatly modified by continental land masses.

The annual monsoon is particularly important to some of the world's less-developed nations. During summer, the zone of moist tropical air moves north, bringing heavy rainfall to the Indian subcontinent and lesser but still essential amounts to much of

[7] T. J. Hughes, "West Antarctic Ice Streams," *Review of Geophysics and Space Physics*, January 1977, p. 1.

[8] Schneider, *The Genesis Strategy, supra*, footnote 1, p. 19.

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Africa south of the Sahara. When the monsoon rains are abundant, crops and water supplies are plentiful. When they fail, hardship follows, as evidenced by the widely publicized drought in the Sahel region of sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1970s.

Reid Bryson of the University of Wisconsin has shown that the position of the boundary between moist monsoon air and dry desert air is extraordinarily sensitive to small changes in the north-south temperature gradient.[9] What apparently happens is that when polar temperatures are relatively warm, there is a strong pattern of global circulation, and the north-south oscillation of the westerly winds that sweep around the temperate regions is confined within a relatively narrow range of latitudes. Farther south, however, the tropical wind patterns are pulled well to the north, and allow the monsoon rains to reach high latitudes. Historically, this kind of strong circulation and northward penetration of the monsoon seems to be associated with unusual warmth throughout the northern hemisphere. This is at least suggestive that the same may happen as a result of general global warming. The monsoon areas of the world could thus be substantial gainers from the climatic effects of worldwide industrialization.

In the mid-latitudes, on the other hand, the effect is more mixed. There the north-south oscillation of the westerly winds largely governs the distribution of precipitation. When global circulation is relatively weak, it is easier for large masses of cold air to spill southward, where they meet warm subtropical air and increase precipitation. Warm air is then forced northward in spinning storm systems that move eastward through the temperate latitudes. With the stronger circulation patterns associated with polar warming, these oscillations tend not to push so far south. Rainfall over the Mediterranean region and the Middle East is suppressed, and there tends to be higher than normal precipitation in the British Isles and at similar latitudes.

Because evaporation is related to temperature, global warming would tend to create a greater flux of water vapor from the land and oceans into the atmosphere. Computer models suggest that the degree of warming estimated from a doubling of carbon dioxide could increase total global precipitation by an average of about seven percent. Again, such an increase would not be uniformly distributed. Much of the added moisture might fall back into the ocean.

Finally there is the factor of variability. What we call climate is just the average, over months and years, of individual weather

[9] R. A. Bryson, "A Perspective on Climatic Change," *Science*, May 17, 1974, p. 753.

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events. Even if world climate should become warmer and wetter, there will still be cold spells and dry spells, as sharp as in the past. These will be overshadowed, though, by more frequent and perhaps more marked warm episodes.

Neither will all parts of the world warm simultaneously. Historical experience clearly indicates that warm periods in one part of the world will be accompanied by cold in another, just as the bitter winter of 1977 in the eastern United States was matched by the warmest weather in a century in Vienna.

Year-to-year weather variability is important to human comfort, to industry, and to agricultural productivity. Agriculture and industry can more easily adjust to changed conditions if the new weather regime is relatively uniform from year to year. Increased variability makes agriculture in particular a more uncertain venture. Opinions—evidence is too strong a word—differ as to whether global warming will mean more or less climatic variability. The preponderance of opinion seems to be that the increased intensity of global circulation will bring with it the possibility of more frequent and larger deviations from the mean. Fluctuations in agricultural production, and consequent wide swings in grain prices and markets, could follow. The effect on global and national economies and on inflation rates of similar swings in the early 1970s are a vivid memory.[10]

IV

The emphasis so far has been on global warming through increased atmospheric carbon dioxide. At least two other potential human impacts on global climate could be influential: discharge of particulate matter and release of heat into the environment from burning of fossil and nuclear fuels (called heat emission).

The transparency of the global atmosphere, as measured at many places, is steadily decreasing due to continued addition of fine particles. These arise chiefly from three man-made sources and one natural: burning of fossil fuels, wind-borne agricultural dust, and smoke from slash-and-burn agriculture in the tropics, plus intermittent injections into the stratosphere of debris from major volcanic eruptions. Particles reflect and scatter solar radiation back to space, reducing the amount available for heating of the surface. They also absorb solar radiation, and thereby heat the atmosphere. Recent evidence suggests that the second effect predominates in the lower atmosphere, at least up to the point

[10] See Lyle P. Schertz, "World Food: Prices and the Poor," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1974, pp. 511–37, and Emma Rothschild, "Food Politics," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1976, pp. 285–307.

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where particle loading would be a serious health hazard. Although the impact of particulate matter on global climate is not negligible, the Energy and Climate Panel of the National Academy of Sciences concluded that man-induced particulate loading is unlikely to increase to the point that it is a serious threat in this respect.[11] (The blunt fact is that, before then, impacts on human health and on agricultural productivity would require stringent control measures.)

The panel reached similar conclusions with regard to the impact of heat emission on climate. Even a future world population of ten billion people, with a per capita energy use several times greater than at present, would release an amount of heat equivalent to only a thousandth of the daily radiation received from the sun. If evenly dispersed, this would have little measurable effect on climate.

Concentrated heat emissions could, however, trigger changes in climate if, as some atmospheric scientists believe, global circulation is sensitive to small changes in inputs at crucial times and places. That this may be so is suggested by computer simulation experiments carried out by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (in Vienna) and the United Kingdom Meteorological Office. Economically significant changes in simulated temperature and rainfall were indicated almost everywhere in the northern hemisphere as a result of concentrated heat discharge from assumed large "energy parks" (specifically, centers for the production and distribution of electricity). The present models do not simulate climate in a fully realistic way, so that these results must be interpreted cautiously. Other climate simulation models, when more fully developed, should permit better prediction of the effects of carbon dioxide increase and also help to give better answers to the questions raised by heat emission.

A further reason for giving most attention to carbon dioxide is that its climatic effect, if real, will be less reversible than that of the other two factors. Particles in the troposphere—the layer of the atmosphere where active weather processes occur—have a mean residence time of perhaps 10 days. They stay a bit longer in the stratosphere, three years or so. In either case, stringent measures to reduce particle emission would be reflected in the atmosphere in weeks or at most years. The same is true of concentrated heat sources, which could be turned off instantly if one was willing to disregard other social consequences.

Carbon dioxide is different. Even if burning of fossil fuels were

[11] *Energy and Climate, supra* footnote 1, p. 2.

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suddenly to be banned all over the world—a far-fetched possibility—it would take decades, maybe centuries, for the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere to decrease significantly. To see why this is so, some atmospheric processes must be understood.

The preindustrial atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide was the result of a complex interplay over geologic time of carbonate rocks, growing and decaying plants, and solution in the ocean. On a time scale of thousands of years in the past or in the foreseeable future, the oceans are clearly dominant. Atmospheric carbon dioxide is in long-term equilibrium with that dissolved in the oceans. The carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is a minute fraction of the oceanic amount. The excess in the atmosphere will inevitably dissolve in the ocean. The oceanic reservoir can easily absorb all that will ever be added by burning of the earth's entire stock of fossil fuel. The question is one of time.

The ocean is separated into two layers that exchange water only slowly: a warm active surface layer perhaps 200 meters thick, and the colder depths that hold an almost infinitely greater amount of water. The active layer, in regular contact with the air, is almost saturated with carbon dioxide. It, and perhaps other sinks, are now apparently absorbing about half of the annual addition of carbon dioxide. Uptake of the rest is possible only to the extent that it is transferred to the depths. Best estimates by oceanographers are that the exchange time is on the order of a thousand years or so, although there is great uncertainty about this.

It appears, therefore, that a substantial fraction of all carbon dioxide added by burning of fossil fuel will remain in the atmosphere for many human lifetimes. Eventually, in the fullness of geologic time, the level will return to what it was before the industrial age. The present rate of consumption of fossil fuel, and the attendant increase of atmospheric carbon dioxide, has been referred to as the Hubbert Pimple, from the American geologist and student of mineral resources, M. King Hubbert. Hubbert points out that on a geologic time scale, the period from the start to the finish of man's consumption of the entire stock of stored fossil fuel resources is a mere blip. But it is a blip we and our children are living in.

It seems unlikely that even the most advanced future technology will make feasible the direct removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Only about a one-percent annual increase in the world's stock of plant material would be enough to take care of the carbon dioxide produced by the current rate of fossil fuel consumption. This level of annual increase would not be impossible to

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arrange, but would do no good unless the new material could be protected from decaying or being eaten, and thus discharging its carbon back to the atmosphere. Carbon could be stored for long periods in wood, but the potential increase in the world's forest volume is surely limited—by how much is not known. Or the annual increment could be placed out of contact with the atmosphere. Even if a place could be found to put it, the materials handling problem alone would be staggering. Current world consumption of fossil fuel is about five billion metric tons per year. Because organic matter contains more oxygen and water, the plant equivalent would be even heavier, and far more bulky. Similar materials-handling problems, to say nothing of the energy required, seem to rule out direct scrubbing of the air.

An imaginative engineer at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis near Vienna has proposed that carbon dioxide be collected at the source, in the stacks of power plants, and disposed of by injection into sinking oceanic currents. He has identified the Mediterranean outflow entering the Atlantic at Gibraltar as one such current which would have sufficient capacity to deal with all carbon dioxide produced in Europe even in the year 2100. A rough evaluation indicates a cost to the consumer of 20 percent of the fuel value for disposal of 90 percent of the carbon dioxide. Whether such a scheme could ever be engineered is not known. Nor has anyone shown how to attain the degree of international cooperation and discipline that would be required for it to work—a problem that plagues almost all aspects of man-induced climatic change.

V

With these preliminaries out of the way, what can be said about the impact of global climatic change on nations and regions? Any conclusions must necessarily be highly tentative and speculative; some may be wholly wrong. The principal aim is to point out directions for analysis and evaluation, assuming a 1°–2°C global warming. The emphasis in this discussion is on agriculture, forestry, and livestock production. Let us start with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet grain region lies mostly between 50° and 60° N latitude. This close to the pole, a 2°C global temperature rise would probably translate into an increase in mean temperature of 3-4°C. From a crop production standpoint, the principal impact would be on length of the growing season, since this is the factor that chiefly limits agriculture at high latitudes. Even if midsummer temperatures are high enough for optimum growth, as they often

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are in the interior of continents, successful harvests are impossible if there is too little time between spring and fall frosts to complete the process of germination, growth, and maturation.

A rule of thumb often used by agronomists is that a temperature change of 1°C causes an approximate 10-day change in length of the frost-free period. This relation, however, is dependent upon the initial length of the frost-free period. A 1°C increase in mean temperature in northern Canada apparently lengthens an 80-day growing season by about 20 days, and a 120 to 130-day season by about six days. Thus the impact in presently colder areas is accentuated.

It is apparent from these considerations that global warming is likely to make available for crop production substantial areas of the northern U.S.S.R. where successful harvests are now marginal or wholly impossible. The question is whether soils are suitable. The soils of the Soviet northern forest and forest-steppe zones are mostly heavily leached and impoverished, compared with the fertile black-earth soils of the central Soviet grain belt. Nevertheless, there are abundant opportunities for extension of agriculture toward the north, particularly in the alluvial soils of the Yakutian plain along the Lena River.

At the southern boundary of crop production almost everywhere, the limiting factor tends to be precipitation, with some of the growing season going unused. Most of the precipitation in the Soviet grain region falls in summer, and almost all originates in the North Atlantic. If global warming accentuates east-west circulation and suppresses north-south oscillations, as discussed above, it appears that rain might penetrate more readily to the easternmost parts of the grain region. However, suppression of southward storm excursions could *reduce* rainfall in the southern portions of the grain zone, especially in the already trouble-prone region of Kazakhstan and in parts of the Caucasus. This, coupled with higher temperatures and greater evaporation, could appreciably reduce yields in parts of the country.

These conclusions are partially confirmed by an unclassified study by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency on the impact of recent climatic change on grain production in the U.S.S.R.[12] On the basis of a careful statistical analysis of grain yields and weather over the last 15 years, the CIA concluded that there was a steady improvement in the climate of the Soviet grain belt between 1962 and 1975. During that time, average temperatures in the grain

[12] Central Intelligence Agency, "USSR: The Impact of Recent Climatic Change on Grain Production," Report ER 76-10577 U, October 1976.

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region increased by about 0.75°C, although worldwide temperature was continuing the downward trend that apparently culminated about 1971. The southward shift of global circulation during the period of global cooling moved the moister northern climate southward about 2° of latitude, increasing agricultural production in the new lands of Kazakhstan and central Asia. If this pattern of global cooling is now reversing itself, then the favorable effect experienced in the new lands would likewise be reversed—and production from these always-precarious areas could drop sharply.

There is a distinct difference between the impact of long-continued and generally predictable climatic change and the effects of chance vagaries in year-to-year weather. In the first case there will eventually almost certainly be a shift in production patterns; in the second case the best strategy is simply to wait out the change. Just how continued global warming would be reflected in Soviet agriculture is far from clear. A reasonable speculation would be acknowledged or unacknowledged failure of the southern new-lands schemes, coupled with highly publicized similar endeavors in the north.

The major grain regions of Canada lie in the same general latitudinal zone as those of the U.S.S.R. The scope for northward extension of grain production is more limited in Canada, however. Only in the Peace River Valley of northern Alberta and in a few other scattered localities are there extensive areas of good soils where temperatures are too low and the growing season too short for successful grain production. Most of the rest of Canada's northern margin is underlain by the vast Laurentian Shield, with thin glacial soils unproductive in any climate. More favorable climate could, however, reduce the variability of Canadian grain yields.

Similarly, local increases in food production in Scandinavia may aid those countries to feed themselves, but the area of suitable soil is too small to be important on a world scale.

The impact on the United States, the world's largest grain exporter, could be significant. The southern limit of the North American grain region is at a latitude of about 35°N, the same as the southern Mediterranean. Here the controlling factor is availability of soil moisture, not length of the growing season. The American grain belt has attained its preeminent position chiefly because of a fortunate combination of excellent soils and suitable weather. A northward movement of temperature and precipitation belts would leave Kansas, Oklahoma, and other states at similar latitudes dangerously exposed to threats of diminished yields

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because of drought. A permanent change would mean that the highly productive soils of this region would be underutilized, a loss hard for the United States to make up by shifts of production to other localities.

In terms of current major American food crops, recent research indicates that it is very hard to generalize about the effect of climatic change either on any crop or on any natural ecosystem. Upward changes in any one U.S. area are often offset by production decreases elsewhere.[13]

Both physiological studies of processes of corn growth, and observed correlations of corn crops and weather, suggest that the U.S. corn production will decrease about 11 percent for each 1°C increase in average temperature during the growing season. Warmer and drier weather, such as might occur in the American Corn Belt from a global temperature increase, is in general predicted to depress corn yields. Soybeans would also be adversely affected by temperature increase almost everywhere in the United States—which is, of course, significant because of the U.S. position as the world's chief supplier of soybeans.

Cotton, another major export crop, would not be materially affected by either a 2°C global increase or decrease in temperature, either in the United States or elsewhere in the world. Cotton tolerates a rather wide range in temperatures above a certain minimum, and its production is largely governed by other factors than weather variations.

Rice, one of the major worldwide grain crops, is of particular interest because of its importance in many developing countries. World rice production has been analyzed by J. Stansel of Texas A & M and Robert Huke of Dartmouth College. Increases in mean temperature would generally increase the areas where rice could be grown, thereby increasing world production. More significantly, however, higher temperatures might allow multiple crop-

[13] The most complete estimate of the long-term effects of climatic change on both cultivated and noncultivated land is probably that carried out as part of the Climatic Impact Assessment Program sponsored by the U.S. Department of Transportation. This three-year study was intended specifically to evaluate the environmental impact of SST aircraft, but the information compilation was designed to be broadly applicable to assessment of climatic change from any cause. Although emphasis was on the United States, attention was given to worldwide impacts. The effects of climatic change on production were assessed by means of literature reviews, by statistical regression models relating monthly temperature and precipitation to yield, by computer simulation, and by studies of how historical climatic changes have affected crop production and the boundaries of natural ecosystems. Because particulate matter from SSTs in the stratosphere was expected to lower global temperature, most emphasis was on a reduction of temperature, but temperature increase was also considered. For further detail, see *Impacts of Climatic Change on the Biosphere,* Department of Transportation, Climatic Impact Assessment Program (CIAP), CIAP Monograph 5, DOT-TST-75-55, September 1975.

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ping in the vast rice areas of the intermediate latitudes where only single crops can now be grown. This might be offset somewhat by decreases in rice yields in the tropics because of excessive temperatures, but as noted above, temperatures near the Equator will be affected relatively little. The impression that emerges from this analysis is that China might be the principal beneficiary of increased rice yields due to higher temperatures. There are too few data to permit assessment of possible compensating effects on other crops in China. India and Bangladesh would also benefit somewhat, especially if the annual monsoon became more reliable.

The productivity of noncultivated forests and rangelands is directly dependent on temperature and precipitation, but the quantitative relationships are poorly known on a global scale. As part of the Department of Transportation study, I endeavored, together with colleagues at six American institutions, to combine several computer simulation models in an investigation of possible impacts of climatic change on natural ecosystems. This experiment was designed to see whether common patterns could be discerned in the simulated ecosystems, rather than to make quantitative predictions of ecological change.

The principal conclusion was that primary plant production is expected to increase linearly with temperature increase everywhere except in the driest climates. The increase will be greatest in ecosystems well supplied with water throughout the growing season. Associated with productivity changes there are likely to be nonlinear effects on insects and other herbivores that are more severe and less predictable than the effects on the host plants. Finally, it appears that interactions among climatic variables may result in responses that are quite different from the responses expected from the sum of several independent climatic changes.

A real deficiency in these and similar models is that they address only short-term effects, on the order of four to ten years. They do not accommodate changes in species composition or other long-term responses to climatic change. Nevertheless, there is at least a suggestion that wood production might be increased somewhat in the hardwood forests of the eastern United States and perhaps in the Pacific Northwest. The same is likely to be true of the great boreal forests of Canada, Scandinavia, and the U.S.S.R. Positive effects are less likely in the pine regions of the southeastern United States and in California. Climatic impacts on the tropical rain forest are likely to be negligible.

Carbon dioxide itself may have some effect on agricultural and forest productivity apart from its impact on climate, but this is

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likely to be small. Carbon dioxide is occasionally a limiting factor in well watered and fertilized crops, and the addition of carbon dioxide to intensively managed greenhouses is a common practice among flower growers. Under field conditions, however, carbon dioxide is rarely seriously deficient. Most estimates are that any increase in photosynthesis from this source will not be nearly proportional to the amount of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere.

Water resources are highly sensitive to climatic change. Some river systems are likely to have larger and more regular flows than in the past; others will be depleted, even if, as suggested, total global precipitation increases by some small amount. Particularly hard hit could be the Colorado River system of the western United States. Any diminution of precipitation due to a northward shift of climatic zones would seriously reduce the flow of the Colorado, already developed beyond its capacity to supply the demand for high quality water in California, Mexico and the southern Rocky Mountain states. The nasty conflict between the United States and Mexico over American failure to deliver water of a quality required by treaty could become even worse.

Oceanic fisheries are sensitive to climatically induced shifts in temperatures and currents. Fisheries are not considered here, however, mostly because I am convinced that failure of national and international fishing controls will result in the collapse of most fisheries long before climatic influences are evident.

Any number of industrial processes will likewise be affected by climatic change. In an article intended chiefly to lay out the nature of the problem, these possibilities cannot be explored in detail. This is an area for future investigation, particularly the international ramifications.

VI

Carbon dioxide enters the atmosphere from so many sources that any effective social control of its emission on a global scale is most unlikely. As a practical matter, it is stoppable only at the source, by worldwide prohibition of coal mining, peat cutting, and extraction of oil and natural gas. Short-term economic and social consequences are almost sure to rule out the required unanimous international consent. Fossil fuels are so convenient for so many purposes, and so easily extracted, that they are almost certain to be used to the limit of their availability even if there should be a global commitment to emphasize nuclear, solar, and geothermal energy resources in their place. As we have already noted, because of the long residence time of excess carbon dioxide in the atmo-

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sphere, even an appreciable decrease in the rate of fossil fuel burning will only delay the time of maximum climatic effect. It will not prevent it.

If the world community is unwilling or unable to take the stringent measures necessary to stop carbon dioxide emission, society must simply adjust to changing climate. Technology may aid in that adjustment, but it also may make the transition more difficult. Witness how a moderate snowfall, little more than a minor inconvenience a couple of generations ago, ties up an automobile-bound modern city.

The official position of the U.S. Department of Agriculture has been that new and emerging agricultural technology will more than keep up with any shifts in climate. Among the suggested climate-insulating technologies are extension of irrigation, increased use of fertilizer, mechanization, improved cultural practices, and development of new seed varieties adapted to altered weather conditions. It should be noted, though, that irrigation requires water, and expansion of water supply in a time of drought is something of a contradiction in terms. Irrigation, fertilization, and mechanization are all energy-intensive technologies whose future on a world scale is far from certain.

Intensified crop breeding carries with it the danger that narrowly adapted genetic strains will be highly susceptible to unanticipated environmental stresses. This is borne out by the nearly disastrous experience a few years ago in the southern United States, with corn varieties that all carried a single wholly incidental gene that made the plants almost unresistant to a newly virulent strain of corn blight. Geneticists are well aware of such possibilities—partly because of lessons learned in the corn blight episode—but plant breeding, in the light of past experience, can hardly be considered a trouble-free panacea. In particular, there is danger that new varieties designed to accommodate temperature and rainfall outside the normal experience of the crop may lose enough genetic diversity to make them particularly vulnerable to temporary weather fluctuations.

Grain yields in the United States have increased dramatically since about 1945, mostly because of increased fertilization and better tillage, and the development of new crop varieties able to benefit from the improved practices. The year-to-year percentage deviation from the accelerating trend has also declined, at least since the mid-1950s. Thus, not only have yields increased but their relative variability has decreased. Agronomists in the U.S. Department of Agriculture and elsewhere have contended that improved

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technology accounts for most of the lessened variability, and conclude that agriculture can now readily adapt to climatic change. However, Dean Louis Thompson of the Iowa State University College of Agriculture and others point out that the time of low variability in yield coincided with 15 nearly consecutive years of unusually favorable crop weather, a pattern unlikely to be perpetuated.[14] There remains considerable controversy about the degree of protection that improved agricultural technology provides against the potential impact of climatic change.

Technology and social patterns will influence the way that human institutions react to climatic change. The extinction of the Norse colony in Greenland during the medieval cooling period is unlikely to be duplicated in an era of rapid communication and efficient transportation. One can surmise, though, that the death of the Norsemen was due in part to their unwillingness or inability to adapt to the subsistence techniques of the native population, which did survive. How much more adaptable are modern societies?

The widespread suffering during the Sahel drought of the early 1970s is at least indicative of the ways in which new technology and social change can make whole populations more, not less, vulnerable to climatic shifts. The nomadic livestock culture of that part of Africa was well adapted to periodic drought. Livestock were pastured near the few permanent watering places during dry periods, and dispersed throughout the region during wet weather. This natural rotation allowed recovery of the forage around the permanent water holes when the nomads left them, and conversely permitted regrowth of the more distant vegetation during the time that animals were concentrated around the water.

In an effort to provide for more livestock, a need brought about in part by increased population due to newly introduced public health measures, deep wells were drilled throughout the region. This permitted wider dispersion of livestock at all seasons, and increased the number that could be supported, at least for a time. The resultant overgrazing led to depletion of the forage resource, which could not recover as it had in the past because the natural rotation cycle had been broken. So when the monsoon failed for several years in a row, first livestock and then people starved.[15] It is not at all certain that the actual percentage of the human

[14] L.M. Thompson, "Weather Variability, Climatic Change, and Grain Production," *Science*, May 9, 1975, p. 535.

[15] M. Glantz, "The Sahelian Drought: No Victory for Anyone," *Africa Today*, April 1975, p. 57. See also Jean Mayer, "Coping with Famine," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1974, p. 112.

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population affected was greater than in past droughts, but there is no question that a larger absolute number of people faced malnutrition and starvation than in previous episodes.

This somewhat oversimplified account of an extreme case in a region where development was just beginning may not be representative of the situation in the industrialized world, but it is illustrative. Will social institutions in more developed regions endeavor to resist and counteract the effects of climatic change, or will they flow with the tide, making incremental adjustments as they go? The former strategy might work for a while, but eventual disruption and breakdown would seem inevitable. The difference may be important for the peace of the world.

VII

Not only is there great uncertainty about the nature and magnitude of the consequences of global warming, but its principal effects will be felt only in decades to come. Yet actions taken, or not taken, today are likely to affect significantly our children and grandchildren. What is our obligation to future generations, and how shall that obligation be carried out? That is of course an age-old question; the difference now seems to lie in the scope and rapidity of human impact on the globe. Man has apparently become a major geological and geophysical agent in his own right, able to influence the physical and biological conditions of the future, deliberately or inadvertently, in a way not open to our ancestors.

There is an urgent need for intensified research to limit some of the uncertainties which now make informed political choice almost impossible. We must learn more about the carbon cycle itself, particularly the quantitative fluxes of carbon dioxide between the atmosphere and the land and between the atmosphere and the oceans. We must be able to predict more accurately the climatic effect of increased levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide. This is now the major uncertainty in assessing the environmental impact of fossil fuel consumption. We must also learn to anticipate the ecological, economic, social, and political consequences of climatic change. This is a formidable interdisciplinary and international research task whose dimensions are only beginning to be seen. There are heartening indications of a growing international consensus on the need for cooperation to provide solutions.

But research can be only a prelude to action. What actions are called for, or even possible?

In a talk before the American Physical Society, Thomas Moss,

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principal assistant to Representative George Brown, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Environment and Atmosphere, pointed out that climatic change is a virtual prototype of a problem poorly matched to existing human institutions. Its time span is longer than a political leader's career. The potential effects are enormous, conceivably dwarfing those of normal man-made technical and social change. This kind of problem presents an almost insurmountable challenge to institutions designed for times when societies were less complex, man's abilities for doing "good" and "bad" much more limited, and thinking more restricted in time and space.

In both its spatial and temporal aspects, global climatic change stands almost alone among the world's environmental problems. Many pollution and natural resource issues do not respect national boundaries, but the carbon dioxide question is unique in that regardless of how much sources may be localized, the atmospheric concentrations will be the same everywhere. It is likewise unique in that its impact will persist long after the sources are eliminated.

And unlike most environmental impacts, this one could in the long run appreciably benefit some nations and regions while harming others. This will make international consensus even more difficult than with other forms of environmental change. Essential to a global consensus is a better understanding of the causes and consequences of climatic change, an understanding that can come only through a truly international multidisciplinary effort.

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Donald Woods

SOUTH AFRICA'S FACE TO THE WORLD

More than any other nation today, South Africa's foreign relations are linked indissolubly with the internal workings of its society. Maintaining the country's present degree of interdependence with European and American private enterprise depends on the preservation of an image of internal "stability." In addition, deflecting further international sanctions requires the muffling of Western anxieties about racial injustice and potential racial conflict. Thus the most important aspect of South Africa's foreign policy must be a public relations campaign directed toward the governments and citizens of the industrial democracies. The chief underlying theme of this propaganda campaign is the implicit alliance between white, Christian, democratic and anti-communist South Africa and the "free world."

For example, the South African government often appeals to Britons and Americans for support by arguing that: "We fought on the same side in World War II." In fact, the country's ruling National Party supported Nazi Germany in World War II. At that time the National Party was in opposition to the governing party of General Jan Smuts, and bitterly opposed South Africa's alignment with the Allies. The result was that Smuts was never able to commit all his forces to the war against Hitler, having to keep some of them at home to deal with the Nationalists and their fringe organizations.

Such effrontery is no surprise to those of us in South Africa who oppose apartheid, because we know that South Africa's external policy is based on tactics to ensure that the Western world will not probe its facade too deeply. Pretoria's campaign has two basic aims: (a) to obscure as far as possible the true nature of the apartheid regime, and (b) to present an external image of moderation and pragmatism.

A main theme on which Nationalist propaganda is based is that the 25 million people of South Africa do not constitute one nation

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but a number of "national units" each with its own language, culture and territory. The full absurdity of this is only apparent to those who know South Africa well. The so-called cultural differences between the black ethnic groups are not only minimal but are rejected by most of the blacks themselves as a political factor.

The five million Zulus and five million Xhosas, for example, have a common culture, and the Xhosa and Zulu languages are strongly similar. It would be more accurate to say that there are cultural differences between an Alabaman and a Nebraskan than it would be to talk of cultural differences between a Zulu and a Xhosa. As an English linguist, I can differentiate between the Alabama accent and the northern accent within a few words. As a Xhosa linguist, I sometimes cannot tell for several sentences whether a person is speaking Xhosa or Zulu.

The truth is that the South African government is less concerned with "cultural differences" than with the age-old political device of divide and rule. Being a white minority of five million in a country of 25 million, they simply wish to divide the black majority into smaller units comprising Zulus, Xhosas, Swazis, Tswanas, Vendas, Sothos, Coloureds (mulattoes) and Indians. To avoid according them basic civil rights, they are giving to each of these alleged "separate ethnic units" absurdly small territories along the fringes of the country within which to exercise such rights. These Bantustans or "homelands" total 13 percent of the country's territory, whereas the whites, who comprise less than 20 percent of the population, claim 87 percent of the territory—and that 87 percent happens to include the gold and diamond mines and all the developed industrial and metropolitan areas and harbors.

But that is not all. The rationale for this policy is based on two further myths.One is that the "homelands" are the "traditional territories" of each "national unit." The theory is that the white settlers arrived in South Africa at about the same time as the blacks, and settled the white 87 percent at the same time as blacks were settling "their" 13 percent. This allegation, however, has been disproved by radiocarbon dating tests showing that there were negroid communities in South Africa as far back as the fifth century, long before the first white settlers arrived in 1652. The Xhosas, for example, were well established as far south as the Gamtoos River area by the fifteenth century (considerably beyond what is now the Xhosa homeland, the Transkei). And the blacks did not live in static "areas" but were nomadic peoples, cattle-herders, moving throughout South Africa in search of ever more grazing land.

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Another notion upon which Nationalist propaganda is based is that the blacks "want" territorial separation.

The truth is that they have never been allowed any choice in the matter. There has never been a nationwide poll of blacks by way of referendum on the issue and all the evidence suggests that the entire concept of "homelands" would be overwhelmingly rejected in such a referendum. For evidence of this, we must, as Governor Al Smith used to say, "Take a look at the record."

All the nationalist leaders of black South Africa, the leaders of the banned African National Congress, Pan Africanist Congress and Black Peoples Convention (Chief Albert Luthuli and Nelson Mandela, Robert Sobukwe and the late Steve Biko) have consistently rejected the "homelands" policy. Not only that, even the "homelands" leaders themselves, such as Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, Chief Kaiser Matanzima and others, have also made it plain that they would reject it if given an alternative. Like all the apartheid laws, territorial apartheid is a white creation for the political convenience of whites. Abraham Lincoln spoke of "government of the people, by the people, for the people." Apartheid is government of the blacks, by the whites, for the whites.

II

Another frail plank of the Nationalist propaganda platform is the claim that the Nationalist regime is a bastion of Western values against communism.

On the contrary, the Vorster regime is communism's greatest recruiting ally in southern Africa. Many young blacks of South Africa, increasingly embittered by the West's refusal to sever links with the Vorster regime, are turning to the East for aid. They point out that Russia has no investments or trade and no diplomatic links with South Africa—and that only the Western states veto strong steps against apartheid in the U.N. Security Council.

South African pleas for Western solidarity are particularly ironic because government spokesmen have several different lines on this issue, turning one face to the West and another to their internal constituencies. In the recent all-white elections in South Africa, the Nationalists launched the most vicious attacks against the Western states, and in particular America. America, a government minister proclaimed in one speech, was more of a threat to South Africa than was the Soviet Union.

Another commonly heard South African argument is that South Africa is freer than most African countries and that South Africa

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has a free press.

Neither of these claims has validity. Apart from a small handful of African countries, including Amin's Uganda and Bokassa's Central African "Empire," Pretoria has the most repressive regime on the continent of Africa. The South African government: imprisons people without trial; restricts political dissidents to specific areas of the country; ordains where people may live and work, and what categories of work they may do, according to skin color; forbids marriage between persons of different race groups; reserves the vote to the ruling white minority.

In spite of all the rhetoric, the basic fact that neither the Prime Minister nor the Foreign Minister can refute is that in South Africa not one of the more than 20 million blacks can vote for the central government of the country. Finally, the mainstay of the South African economy, the system of migrant labor, breaks up family life for millions of blacks. Under this system blacks are only tolerated in the so-called white areas for their labor, and for many of them this involves acceptance of contracts that keep them effectively separated from their families for 11 months out of every 12. As Minister of Information C. P. Mulder revealed in a speech in February 1978, the ultimate aim is that every single black man and woman in South Africa be regarded as a citizen of one of the "homelands" and therefore a "foreigner" in the "white" area. In a country with more than 20 million blacks, there is not to be a single black citizen. The question of freedom becomes moot where citizenship is denied.

How many other African states proclaim residential areas according to skin pigmentation? How many African states forbid people of one color to marry or to live with or to play sports with people of another color? How many African states have job reservation based on race?

As to freedom of the press, can the government explain how, if the press is free in South Africa, I came to be banned without trial, accusation or explanation, or how Percy Qoboza came to be detained and how his newspaper, *The World*, came to be closed down overnight without any reasons being given? The truth is that press criticism of the government in South Africa is only allowed if it is ineffective—and the same goes for political opposition.

The parliamentary opposition is only tolerated because it has so few supporters. This is so because in South Africa only whites may belong to the token parliamentary opposition; it is forbidden by law to form multiracial political parties. There is no doubt in my mind that if by some electoral miracle the parliamentary opposition

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in South Africa gained enough support among whites to threaten the regime with defeat at the polls, it would be outlawed by a stroke of the pen—as so many critics of the government have been.

III

I wish I had the opportunity to challenge Pretoria with the facts of my own banning. Foreign Minister Roloef Botha is reported to have said that I was banned for "reasons other than journalistic reasons." There were no specifics. Now there are many hundreds of laws in South Africa prescribing severe penalties for any activity connected with opposition to apartheid. Surely if I had done anything to contravene any of these many complex and wide-ranging laws (several of which place the onus on an accused to prove his innocence instead of on the state to prove guilt) the obvious course of action would have been to prosecute me. With all these statutory aids behind them, could not the government representatives accuse me in open court? Did they feel I might prevail against a state prosecutor and a state-appointed judge? Or are they once again relying on secret recommendations by secret police?

Punishment without trial in South Africa has reached massive proportions, and the list of people acted against after no other process than secret police recommendation now numbers in the thousands. These include hundreds of detainees, of whom at least 45 are known to have died in the hands of security police—most notoriously, of course, Steve Biko, whose savage treatment has now been revealed to the whole world. Of these 45 deaths in arbitrary detention, no less than 27 have occurred since the Foreign Minister stated in 1974 that the regime would "move away from racial discrimination."

The most important purpose of the South African propaganda is to preserve the economic links with the West that prop up the apartheid regime. Only by preserving these economic links with the West can the whites of South Africa keep suppressing the black majority. Their central argument here is based on one main proposition—that severance of such economic links would harm blacks in South Africa more than whites.

As usual, this claim is based more on white preference than on evidence of what South Africa's blacks themselves feel. Albert Luthuli, Nelson Mandela, Robert Sobukwe, Steve Biko—all have been unequivocal on this point. They have consistently maintained that black South Africans are no strangers to worse sufferings than fringe unemployment, and would prefer this to a continuation of

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the economic links that help to maintain the system that oppresses them. Those advocating preservation of those links are either Nationalist ministers, white industrialists or Bantustan leaders.

Ideally, the best way to prove what most of the blacks of South Africa really want in this regard would be to let them vote on the issue after a campaign in which all spokesmen could participate—but unfortunately Luthuli and Biko are dead, Mandela is imprisoned, and Sobukwe and hundreds of other black leaders are banned or detained. It is important to remember, in view of statements to the contrary by Pretoria spokesmen, that no Nationalist claim as to authentic black majority opinion has ever been tested by vote among blacks in South Africa—not in more than 300 years of recorded history.

IV

Let us strip away all the obfuscations and rhetoric and look at the basic reality the Nationalists refuse to confront. It is that five million whites have to come to a realistic accommodation with the legitimate civil rights demands of more than 20 million blacks—in short, that the white minority has to accept that it is a white minority. Government ministers appear to refuse all realistic acceptance of this fact because they see it as amounting to "losing their white identity." Accordingly, they act as if their identity were the main consideration in the whole equation. Clearly, this cannot be justified. If it were, then the Welsh would have the moral right to enslave all Britons for fear of losing their Welsh identity as a numerical minority.

But it can be argued that perhaps even the Welsh, after all, have a territory within which to "preserve their identity." More to the point, then, why don't the Afrikaner Nationalists initiate negotiations with the black majority with a view to gaining their own "homeland"? Provided their territorial ambitions are less greedy, in fact considerably less greedy than the scale of 87 percent, as at present, they might find the blacks disposed to be generous in this regard. Arguably, South Africa's centrally located Orange Free State or a comparable extent of territory would be as appropriate a "homeland" for Afrikaner Nationalists as the Transkei would be for Xhosas. But that is not the present argument of exponents of apartheid. The Nationalists' position in effect decrees that they can have their territorial cake and eat it too, while monopolizing all the decisions related to the having and eating thereof.

And if they claim they have to do all these things to stay where they are because they "have nowhere else to go," this is also

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untrue. They have no more claim to permanence in their areas of South Africa, or for that matter anywhere in South Africa, than any other community there. I would say that if the whites can only preserve their identity by opposing and killing others, it is their duty to emigrate from South Africa. If they are unwilling to accept the realities of life on the African continent (most Africans being black) they should go and live where people are predominantly white—as in northern Europe. If they should reply that their people cannot afford to emigrate, my reply is that they therefore cannot afford apartheid. If they belong in Africa, as they claim, then they must accept their fellow Africans who are blacks as fellow citizens in every sense of the word.

And if they point to "what has happened to whites in the rest of Africa," my reply is: "What indeed has happened to whites?" The Mau Mau killed fewer whites in Kenya (36) than the Nationalists have killed blacks in detention in South Africa. More whites have died in the civil war caused by the policies of Ian Smith's government in Rhodesia than have died under black governments in Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Angola, and even Uganda, together. I exclude only the former Belgian Congo from this claim, and even in that case it is surely accepted by now that the Congo erupted into antiwhite violence precisely because the Belgians had for decades done what South Africa's whites are now doing—withholding from blacks all meaningful political rights.

But the final indictment of the apartheid regime is this: just as the Nationalists refuse to confront reality in their own country, so they pose and reply externally to issues that are spurious and irrelevant. No one in the West has demanded of the Afrikaner Nationalists what South Africa claims is demanded—the "suicide" of their people. Thus, when they say the West should "get off their backs" on this score, they are setting up for themselves a paper tiger that can be heroically defied.

What the West is really saying to Pretoria, what Africa is saying to Pretoria, and what most South Africans are saying to Pretoria is: "Talk to your own people. Negotiate with the real leaders chosen by your country's blacks. Determine your own future by peaceful negotiation with your own black majority. If you begin to do this, and stop imprisoning them, banning them, detaining them and killing them, there will be no more talk of sanctions, ostracism and pressure."

That is the challenge Pretoria should answer—not the ones the Nationalists themselves have devised for propaganda purposes.

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But if the South African government continues to evade their real challenges, if they continue to oppress the blacks of South Africa while continuing to present to the world an artificial facade of pragmatism that obscures such oppression, they will ultimately be responsible for the world's worst racial civil war, the effects of which will poison communities far removed geographically from South Africa. Such a racial conflagration will involve, to some extent, every country in the world where men of differing color live—not least of all the United States. It is therefore no longer invalid to describe apartheid as a threat to world peace.

Meanwhile, it is the moral duty of every person to whom the South African campaign is addressed to pull the entire debate over apartheid back from the vaguely theoretical to the directly practical and personal issues proceeding from it. During the time it took to read this article, five black babies in South Africa died of malnutrition in one of the richest countries in the world, with two-thirds of the world's gold, more than half the world's diamonds, more than three-quarters of the world's uranium, and the best agricultural land in all Africa. It is not only in detention that the victims of apartheid die.

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Richard H. Ullman

HUMAN RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC POWER: THE UNITED STATES VERSUS IDI AMIN

By the time this journal is in its readers' hands, the American Congress may have been called upon to decide whether Uganda's coffee should be barred from entering the United States. Its decision will hold great importance for Uganda, for the United States, and for the international system. At stake will be the issue of whether or not the richest and most powerful of sovereign states is justified in using its economic power unilaterally to force the government of a smaller and weaker state to alter the way it treats its own subjects. The questions raised come cascading forward: Why should rich North Americans interfere in the internal affairs of a poor African state? How would that interference relate to other American interests and policies—in Africa and elsewhere? What is the larger significance for the international system of such use of an economic instrument—a coffee boycott—for a political purpose?

II

In any contemporary lexicon of horror, Uganda is synonymous with state-become-slaughterhouse. The most conservative estimates by informed observers hold that President Idi Amin Dada and the terror squads operating under his loose direction have killed 100,000 Ugandans in the seven years he has held power. Some estimates run as high as 300,000. Many victims have been guilty of nothing more than catching the eye of the killer—a shopkeeper with coveted goods, a Christian in a Muslim village, a civil servant who questions a command, a judge with foreign friends.

Other governments, in Africa and elsewhere, rule by terror and reward opposition by death; Equatorial Guinea and Cambodia

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would belong on any list, and there are more. But the scale of official murder in Uganda, its ferocious brutality, and its terrible capriciousness all place Idi Amin's Uganda in a category of its own in which the nearest analogues may be Hitler's Germany or Stalin's Russia. Just as South Africa is unique—an entire system of political and social repression resting on racial distinctions—so Uganda is also. Each, for different reasons, deserves international condemnation.

Thus far, however, Uganda has escaped the kind of censure exemplified by the U.N. Security Council's vote last November to impose a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa. The most notable act of international censure came at last summer's conference of Commonwealth heads of government when, in Idi Amin's absence, the meeting passed a resolution deploring human rights violations in Uganda. Previously, in March 1977, the U.N. Human Rights Commission—on which Uganda sits—shelved a proposal that it should conduct an investigation into Ugandan conditions. Early last December the five Nordic governments jointly sponsored a U.N. General Assembly resolution condemning Uganda. Immediately it aroused intense controversy within the U.N.'s 50-member African group, with some members even willing to support it. But the majority urged—and the Nordic sponsors agreed—that in exchange for a commitment that the Human Rights Commission would take up Uganda once again in March 1978, the resolution would not be publicly debated or pressed to a vote.

Not surprisingly, many Westerners contrast African governments' toleration of Uganda with their denunciation of South Africa. Nearly all African leaders have been vociferous in their condemnation of the white regime in Pretoria while remaining silent regarding the black regime in Kampala. African leaders are, indeed, curiously schizophrenic regarding Amin. Many privately admit to abhorring him, and say that he has disgraced Africa. Yet only a few, such as Tanzania's Julius Nyerere and Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda, have said so publicly. The Commonwealth conference succeeded in condemning Uganda last summer only because the resolution of censure did not mention Amin by name and because it passed by acclamation: no head of government had to put his name to it. Only a short while later, at the summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at Libreville, Amin received a rousing ovation.

Many African leaders refuse to speak or act against Amin for fear of violating the OAU's cardinal rule against interference in a member state's internal affairs. The use of repressive force to

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maintain order—or power—in new, fragile states composed of multiple tribal groupings is common. Some leaders undoubtedly feel that even though the scale and the capriciousness of official violence in Uganda goes beyond any rational bounds and is fully deserving of repudiation, any effort to condemn Amin would open the door to a process that ultimately would rebound against themselves. Therefore, perhaps the most important factor determining whether or not African governments will ever join in some sort of collective condemnation or action against Idi Amin's regime will be whether they can persuade themselves, as others are already persuaded, that the slaughter in Uganda is indeed a case apart.

There are a few African leaders who purport to believe that the allegations against Amin—well-documented though they are—are fabrications by white racists designed to discredit all African governments. Throughout Africa Amin enjoys a certain popularity because of his theatrical humiliation of whites; the photograph of his great bulk, chair-borne, being carried into an OAU rally in a Kampala stadium by a clutch of sweating British businessmen—a modern "white man's burden," as Amin himself put it—will not soon be forgotten.

III

Black African states can censure Amin, and their doing so would be a gesture of great moral significance. Conceivably, they could use coercive force against him. But armed action would endanger ordinary Ugandans and the citizens of the neighboring countries from which a military campaign would come.

It is the West, more than black Africa, that holds the power decisively to affect events in Uganda. The alternative to coercion by arms is economic coercion, and only the West can provide it. Uganda's economic relations with African states consist of a fairly modest trade in foodstuffs and light manufactured goods. As in the case of South Africa, it is in the economic realm that Western states can exert leverage. South Africa's modern, industrialized economy is deeply intertwined with the economies of the West. There is no comparable interdependence in the case of Uganda, but a simple and direct dependence. Uganda depends on the West to provide a market for the Ugandan coffee crop, and coffee is now the country's only export of any significance. A decade or so ago Uganda exported substantial amounts of both cotton and copper, but under Amin its economy has been thrown into such chaos that cotton growing and copper production have virtually ceased, and in recent years coffee has accounted for more than

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four-fifths of Uganda's exports. That coffee—the cheaper *robusta* type used for instant coffee—amounts to five percent of the world's crop by value. During 1977 Uganda benefited substantially from the rise in world coffee prices brought about by the frosts in Brazil and earned some $750 million for its crop, more than double the figures for 1976. No less than one-third of that coffee comes to the United States. Another fifth goes to the United Kingdom, and other Western countries—notably West Germany, France, Italy, Japan, and the Netherlands—buy virtually all the rest.

Uganda's coffee is grown almost entirely by peasant smallholders, not on plantations. Growers are required to sell their beans to the state marketing board, and are paid, at a price set by the board, in vouchers redeemable only in nearly worthless Ugandan shillings. Sometimes they are not even paid at all. Their crop is simply seized. Thus Amin's regime, and not the growers, receives all the foreign exchange. Amin uses it to pay off loans from Libya and other Arab countries, to buy weapons (mostly from the Soviet Union), and to supply his army, police, and civil service with luxury goods. The latter are particularly important to his hold on power: Amin uses lavish material rewards to purchase loyalty.

Thus there is a direct relationship between foreign purchases of Uganda's coffee and Amin's murderous regime. Whether he would fall from power if those purchases ceased is a question impossible to answer. Many knowledgeable persons think that he would. There is no doubt, however, that he and his closest collaborators would feel the impact of a boycott of Uganda's coffee, and feel it hard.

Who else would feel it? Economic sanctions, so the accepted wisdom runs, are blunt instruments. They cannot be "fine tuned" to impinge only upon those persons whose actions deserve censure. Take the case of South Africa: Some who support Pretoria's policies (and some who do not) concede that comprehensive sanctions—especially a stoppage of all petroleum imports—might eventually bring the white regime to its knees. However, the process would take years, they argue, and while it is occurring urban blacks (roughly half the black population) would feel the pain earlier, and to a greater extent, than whites. That may or may not be the case for South Africa. But Uganda's situation is very different. The vast majority of Ugandans, more than 90 percent and including most of the peasant coffee-growers, depend in large measure upon subsistence agriculture for the necessities of life and participate only marginally in the cash economy. An effective boycott of Uganda's coffee would thus seriously curtail

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the livelihood only of the country's small urban sector, including Amin's army and police.

There is, of course, the risk that a boycott—especially one that was only partial—would misfire, and merely cause Amin to rule with greater brutality. Even an effective boycott might only induce him to hunker down, rally Ugandans to his side, and wait out the siege. That is doubtful, however. Amin might indeed be able to rally some support. But he is scarcely a popular ruler, and he would have to rely entirely upon sticks, rather than upon the mixture of carrots and sticks he now employs. Moreover, he could not threaten to bring down Uganda's economy with him. It already is down. Some specialists compare Uganda today with Cambodia, so completely has Amin allowed—in fact, hastened—the deterioration of a once fairly impressive social and economic infrastructure.

While a coffee boycott—if effective—would be quite narrowly focused in its impact, and might succeed in removing Amin from power, it obviously could not *assure* a better future for Ugandans. Amin's downfall would likely be accomplished by members of the narrow circle around him. These are men who themselves have blood on their hands. However Amin's downfall were brought about, there are plenty of Ugandans with scores to settle. In six years of rule, Amin has vastly exacerbated religious and tribal animosities. To expect an easy and bloodless transition in the aftermath of one of the most barbarous reigns of our era would scarcely be realistic, although the process could (and certainly should) be eased by rapid and generous offers of foreign assistance. In addition, many of the thousands of educated and talented Ugandans who have fled abroad to escape Amin would undoubtedly return to aid their country's reconstruction. Whoever Amin's successors might be, however, the chances are overwhelming that they would not be men afflicted with his peculiarly vicious kind of paranoia. It is scarcely likely that the lives of Ugandans—of all classes—would be worse. And there is a very good chance that they would be much better.

IV

The certainty that the Amin regime would be hurt by a boycott, and the considerable chance that he might even fall from power, has motivated Democratic Congressman Don J. Pease of Ohio, supported by 75 colleagues, to introduce legislation to cut off all American trade with Uganda. They are also sponsoring an alter-

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nate, less sweeping bill that would bar Ugandan coffee from entering this country.

Pease would, of course, prefer international action, akin to the U.N. arms embargo against South Africa. But he recognizes that, at least for the present, the chances of securing the required international consensus are nonexistent. Even if the U.N. Human Rights Commission should agree to investigate Ugandan atrocities, its inquiry would be likely, at best, to give rise to a General Assembly motion of censure, but not to punitive action. Pease therefore favors a unilateral boycott by the United States, as Uganda's largest export market and supplier of foreign exchange. If an American lead were followed by the United Kingdom, where there is perhaps even a greater awareness and abhorrence of Amin, and by only one or two other Western countries, the impact would likely be large. Even if no other Western government were to follow—and there is no sign that any contemplates doing so—a strong American lead might well stimulate consumer boycotts elsewhere. In any case, denial only of the American market would crimp Uganda's foreign exchange supply. Even that might be enough to precipitate defections from the ranks of Amin's lieutenants. And, combined with the Administration's current policy of refusing to license the export to Uganda of armaments of any sort, it would at the very least effectively disassociate the United States from a genocidal regime.

The Carter Administration has pronounced itself as opposed to a unilateral American boycott of Ugandan coffee. Douglas J. Bennet, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, wrote to Congressman Pease in September 1977 that the Administration was "not convinced" that a unilateral boycott "would be effective in bringing about an improvement in human rights conditions" in Uganda. But its reason for opposing a unilateral action was more general. Bennet stated:

> Boycott actions are not consistent with the principles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), to which the United States is committed as the basis for international commercial relations. Whenever these principles are set aside, their overall authority as a protection for our own international trade interests is undermined. Therefore, as a general matter, we are extremely reluctant to take actions which contradict these principles.

This argument is, of course, very much in the mainstream of official and popular American thinking about international economic relations that runs back to the nineteenth century. As a major trading power, the United States should oppose any effort

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to restrain trade for a political purpose. Even though a particular cause might be compelling—and Bennet's letter reminded Pease of the Administration's "unequivocal opposition to the continuing record of human rights violations in Uganda"—the more general American interest in an international economic system with minimal barriers would ultimately suffer from a boycott. As *The Washington Post* put it (November 14, 1977), a boycott would set "a dangerous precedent for more of the same political manipulation of international trade in less egregious cases."

Underlying this argument is the widely shared conviction that economics and politics belong on separate "tracks." The GATT, to which Bennet referred in his letter to Pease, is an important element in the structure of global rules and institutions erected after World War II to guard against the political intrusions in world trade relations that had proved so ruinous during the interwar years. Within this framework, economic pressure should *ordinarily* be used only to counter economic abuses by others—unilateral imposition of protective tariffs, predatory exchange rate manipulation, and the like. Human rights violations, such as Amin's, are in the political realm; they should be countered by political measures—denunciation, ostracism, and, ultimately, military force—*unless* (and here is the exception to the ordinary instance) economic sanctions are mandated by an international organization like the United Nations.

The model for such multilateral action—and one referred to by Bennet in his letter to Pease—has been economic sanctions against the Rhodesian government of Ian Smith, imposed by the U.N. Security Council following his unilateral declaration of independence from Britain in 1965. The requirement of great power unanimity in the Security Council assures that economic measures will not be taken unilaterally or, even more important, without American consent. If sanctions against Rhodesia—even though far from effective or fully observed by the United States—have been the *beau idéal* for American policymakers, the nightmare was the Arab oil embargo, imposed with varying degrees of stringency against the United States and other Western nations because of their support of Israel in the Middle East war of October 1973. A variant of the same nightmare has been the Arab boycott of selected American banks and companies for their business dealings with Israel. These visions seem to confirm the soundness of Washington's continued insistence upon the protection of a Security Council vote as necessary to justify blurring the separation between political and economic "tracks."

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American practice, however, has departed considerably from this ideal. To cite but a few examples: in 1960 the United States unilaterally imposed a trade embargo on Cuba in retaliation for the Castro regime's uncompensated expropriation of American property. Here, perhaps, was an economic response to an economic action, but the motivation—for both sides—was unabashedly political. That same year Washington obtained economic sanctions by the Organization of American States (OAS) against the Dominican Republic government of Rafael Trujillo for its attempted intervention in Venezuela. These were multilateral, but far from universal. And, later, by a majority vote in which there were a number of dissenters, it induced the OAS to put a multilateral fig leaf over its embargo against Cuba. Similarly—sometimes unilaterally, at other times through the medium of the so-called Coordinating Committee (COCOM) within NATO—the United States has restricted the sale of important equipment and sensitive technology to communist countries. Finally, the Carter Administration has taken limited punitive economic measures—a cutoff of economic aid and credits, suspension of arms sales—against several governments, Uganda's included, for their flagrant violations of human rights.

V

The truth, of course, is that the economic and political realms are inseparable, and that decisions made "solely" on the basis of economic criteria have profound political consequences. The explicit decision not to offer easier-than-market credit to a hard-pressed government, such as Peru's, means that it probably will need to repress workers protesting forced austerity—and, later, to face foreign accusations of human rights violations—in order to remain in power. Similarly, the tacit decision to allow market forces to govern the amount of Uganda's coffee American firms purchase is also a tacit decision to take no significant steps—covert measures being, presumably, ruled out—to bring down Idi Amin, nor even to disassociate the United States from support of his regime.

American policymakers are, of course, well aware of the difficulty, in practice, of distinguishing between "economic" and "political" causes and effects. They find it convenient to maintain the rhetorical distinction, however, because of a view that, on balance, American interests are better served in a world in which there is a strong presumption against the overtly political use of economic instruments. Moreover, maintaining the distinction makes it pos-

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sible to avoid some hard decisions. If unilateral (or Western) economic measures to bring down Amin are ruled out, the peculiar advantage that the United States possesses by virtue of its economic size is neutralized, and the issue of what to do about Amin becomes one of organizing a moral consensus against him. The United States thus becomes only one state among many, and the decision is passed squarely back to Amin's peers, the leaders of other African states. Washington is willing to do its part, at the U.N. General Assembly or in the Human Rights Commission, to contribute to censuring Amin, but the central role falls to his fellow Africans.

Undeniably, this is a posture that makes life easier for an American Administration for which, after all, events in Uganda—even if Americans are involved—can never be of continuing central importance. And it is one that carries no risk that the United States (or a Western coalition) will be labeled as an oppressor of a weak, black Third World state. Even African leaders who privately wish for Amin's downfall might be reluctant to see such an outcome brought about as a result of direct American economic pressure. The precedent might seem too dangerous: in other circumstances they themselves might be Washington's chosen targets.

This may be a more comfortable American posture, but it is one that is both intellectually and morally disingenuous, especially for an Administration like Jimmy Carter's, which has so forthrightly identified itself with the promotion of human rights worldwide. When it comes to dealing with Uganda the United States is not merely another small African country. African states can enjoy a luxury denied to the United States by virtue of its size and power. No matter what posture they assume regarding Amin, short of declaring war upon him, it will make relatively little difference to his ability to survive. But the United States wields great leverage over the Ugandan economy. By not using it, Washington tacitly acquiesces in Amin's survival.

VI

A peculiarity of the American relationship with Uganda is its drastic asymmetry. It is difficult to imagine a bilateral combination in which the power of the first partner to affect the second is so great and that of the second to affect the first so small. Doing without Ugandan coffee would cause scarcely a ripple in the American coffee market.

Indeed, so painless would a boycott be that the President of the

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National Coffee Association, representing the entire domestic industry, wrote last November 29 to Congressman Pease and to Secretary of State Vance stating that the Association's members awaited the government's orders. Its board of directors agreed unanimously "that the violations of human rights occurring under the Ugandan Government of President Idi Amin are abhorrent and morally repugnant." But rather than respond firm by firm to public pressures to desist from purchasing Ugandan coffee, and rather than risk being charged with antitrust violations for colluding in a boycott, the Association asked the Congress and the Administration "to declare and implement a uniform national policy" that would bind the entire industry.

The situation in other Western countries would undoubtedly be similar, for Uganda's share of their markets is comparably insignificant. Nor would there be a likelihood of significant evasion. Boycott regulations are difficult to enforce if there is substantial profit in evading them. But Uganda's coffee is so small a part of the world crop that the incentives for importers to cheat would be slight, and they could reasonably ask for assurance that coffee from other suppliers was not in fact diluted with Uganda's crop. Similarly, Amin does not enjoy such political support that other African suppliers would be much tempted to come to his assistance by palming off his coffee as their own.[1]

There is, of course, the possibility that other purchasers—the Soviet Union or radical Arab states, such as Libya—might come forward, either to buy the coffee for their own consumption or for resale. That is unlikely, however. The effort would be costly. The countries in question routinely purchase little coffee. Resales might be detected. Moscow came to Cuba's rescue a decade and a half ago and purchased its sugar crop, but there are virtually no parallels between the situations of Cuba and Uganda, nor any—other than flamboyant personal styles and anti-Western rhetoric—between Idi Amin and Fidel Castro. And even Libya's Colonel Qaddafi might find that the role of Amin's savior would carry more political costs than benefits.

The relative ease of imposing an effective boycott against Uganda, however, may become an argument against it, especially in the eyes of Africans. If Western governments want to use their

[1] Because Ugandan coffee-growers receive so little for their crop, those living near the Kenyan and Tanzanian borders attempt to smuggle their coffee out. This coffee is, of course, not identified as Ugandan. But since the proceeds go to the growers and not to Amin, their smuggling should be encouraged: it benefits them directly while reducing still more the importance to the world of Amin's "official" crop.

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economic leverage on behalf of black Africans, such an argument might run, let them use it in circumstances where they themselves would also have to pay a price—for example, against the white racist regime in South Africa. Virtue that is costless is scarcely distinguishable from opportunism. To take action against Idi Amin while continuing to conduct business as usual with John Vorster would be an affront to the rest of Africa.

The counters to this argument are not so much logical as political—and avowedly opportunistic. It is undeniably true, given the degree of economic interdependence between South Africa and the West, that sanctions against Pretoria must be costly if they are to have any chance of effectiveness. But that, in fact, may be an argument for starting with Uganda. Once Western governments and societies prove willing to apply sanctions against Uganda, at little pain to themselves, it would be politically more difficult for industries and individuals to argue persuasively that comparable measures should not be taken next against South Africa. There is now, in every Western country and certainly within the U.S. Congress, a considerable body of opinion that decries what is held to be an international double standard applied to South Africa: those who fulminate at Pretoria's abuses of human rights, it is said, are too often willing to overlook equally grave violations elsewhere, especially in black Africa. A boycott aimed at Uganda would effectively dispose of these allegations of a double standard—and perhaps neutralize those who make them as politically potent opponents of sanctions against South Africa.

There is, it should be noted, one respect in which the asymmetries of Uganda's international relationships place leverage in the hands of Idi Amin—the vulnerability of the 300 or so Britons, 200 or so Americans, and lesser numbers of other Westerners who still reside in Uganda. Amin has threatened them before. In the face of a boycott, he might carry out his threats. Westerners in Uganda may be divided into three groups. Something over a third are Christian missionaries. (Perhaps 60 percent of the Ugandan population is at least nominally Christian, while ten percent, including Amin and nearly all his inner circle, are Muslims.) The missionaries remain precisely because they hope to alleviate the hardships Ugandans have suffered under Amin. An equal number of the Westerners are either businessmen or specialists of various sorts who serve the regime—pilots, technologists, and the like. They do not feel endangered, and they stay because there are large sums of money to be made. The remainder are a heterogeneous lot, including some dependents of Ugandans. Western governments

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acknowledged possible dangers to their citizens long ago by warning them to leave Uganda. The United States issued such a warning in 1973, when it closed its embassy in Kampala, and it has frequently been repeated. Each Western resident remains for personal reasons. Clearly their situation should cause concern. But it should not ultimately be a decisive determinant of Western policy.

VII

If Congress mandates a boycott of Uganda's coffee by American importers (not to mention legislating the more drastic sanctions many Congressmen also desire), it should do so with a clear awareness of the larger implications of that action. It would indicate, of course, that the U.S. government is prepared to say that there are boundaries of decency beyond which other governments must not pass in their treatment of their own citizens, and that it will suspend official American assistance to those governments. This, in fact, is consonant with existing American policy, as has already been pointed out. Much more important, it would also indicate that Washington would order private persons and firms under its jurisdiction to cease actions that help those governments maintain themselves in power. And in nearly every instance it is the private sector's role, rather than official aid, that makes a difference. Such a posture could scarcely be confined to Uganda alone. Unless Congress were prepared to make it general and, in particular, apply it to South Africa, it would make an absurdity of any larger American policy toward Africa. That is why action against Uganda should be accompanied by economic pressure—not necessarily an embargo, but meaningful economic measures of some sort—against the present South African government.

A boycott against Uganda for its abuses of human rights would also indicate a greater American willingness to depart from the "two-track" separation of economics from politics. There have, of course, been other instances in which Congress has blurred that separation to promote human rights—most notably the so-called Jackson Amendment of 1974, denying most-favored-nation treatment to the exports of countries whose citizens are not allowed freely to emigrate. In practice, however, the Jackson Amendment and similar punitive economic measures have been applied only to the Soviet Union and its allies, countries (especially the Soviet Union) that the United States has long regarded as adversaries on a number of grounds. Human rights violations constitute only one of those grounds, and historically it has not been the most

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important. By contrast, Uganda can in no sense be regarded as an adversary of the United States—its international role is too unimportant, and its impact on this country too minimal. That is why a boycott of its coffee would represent the application of a genuinely new principle in American foreign relations.

The difficulty, of course, lies not in stating that principle but in translating it into day-to-day policy. Especially, it lies in making the judgment as to which governments have placed themselves beyond acceptable limits of decency in their treatment of their citizens. Since consistency in application over time is an essential characteristic of sound policy—especially in an area as sensitive and as emotion-laden as this one—the criteria for determining whether or not a given government deserves a place on the list of offenders must necessarily be gross and not susceptible to reasonable contradiction. To put it crudely, ordinary garden-variety oppressors—of which, arguably, there are many—would not qualify. Rather, the list would be limited to the most egregious cases, such as regimes that practiced widespread murder or the wholesale forced degradation of their subjects merely on the ascriptive basis of race. The present government of South Africa would clearly qualify under the second criterion, those of Uganda, Cambodia, and Equatorial Guinea, under the first. While it is unlikely that other states will follow South Africa in grounding an entire political structure in racial distinctions, it is all too likely that the state system will see future Ugandas or Cambodias, where extermination—either capricious or in accordance with an elaborate design—becomes an habitual instrument of national policy.

To single out this handful of existing states as deserving of special censure, and special measures, is not to suggest that the human rights performance of other governments—from the Soviet Union to South Korea, from Argentina to Indonesia—should not be an object of considerable American concern, and of American pressure. To apply that pressure, a whole panoply of foreign policy instruments—incentives, protests, public exposure of wrongdoing, denials of aid of various kinds, Jackson Amendment-type restraints on trade—are available and appropriate. But only in the most serious instances should Washington resort to measures as drastic as sweeping economic sanctions whose ultimate objective is to bring about either a total change in a government's domestic policies or else its downfall.

These are measures, it should be noted, that fall far short of war—of the employment of American military forces for coercive purposes. Yet, at the same time, their purpose is one for which

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states have traditionally employed military force. If the Congress wants to bring down Idi Amin, it might be asked, why not use force to do it? The answer, of course, is that Congress does not wish to expend American lives in order to save Ugandans. That should surprise no one. Some 30 years ago, E. H. Carr observed that in the nineteenth-century European scramble for empire, Great Britain could accomplish without force what lesser economic powers could only achieve with warfare.[2] The observation applies to the United States today. It does not apply to the Soviet Union, which has nothing like the economic leverage the United States has; neither 100 years ago, did it apply to Germany, Britain's rival.

Just as some states are more potent wielders of economic pressure, so some are more vulnerable targets. We have seen that Uganda, by virtue of its dependence on a few buyers of a single crop, is peculiarly vulnerable. South Africa—with a modern, industrialized, energy-consumptive economy—is also vulnerable to economic pressure, but in a different way, and the necessary measures would be much more costly to the states wielding pressure. By contrast, Cambodia under the radically autarchic regime of Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge, would scarcely be vulnerable at all. Vietnam—a small economy itself, of course—had to use military force when it attempted to alter Cambodian conduct. But so would the United States if it wanted to deflect the Phnom Penh regime from a path of barbarism apparently approaching Amin's. One uses—or chooses not to use—the instruments at one's disposal. The fact that economic leverage can be applied only with difficulty against South Africa, and probably not at all against Cambodia, is no argument for not using it against Uganda.

International consciousness of a shared humanity may some day reach a point where supranational authorities or states acting at their command will maintain strike forces—larger versions of the Israeli force that landed at Entebbe or the German force at Mogadishu, each to rescue its own nationals—for use against regimes that brutalize their own citizens. But that day is nowhere in sight. Until it comes, today's prevailing general proscription against the use of military force is best preserved intact. It is a proscription which, by consensus, applies especially to the two superpowers. Although each has flagrantly violated it, it remains a bulwark of a "moderate" international order. American use of military means to save Ugandans or Cambodians from their own governments would violate prevailing norms regarding appropriate conditions for using international force: judged by commonly

[2] Edward Hallett Carr, *Nationalism and After*, London: MacMillan, 1945, p. 16.

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accepted standards, no "vital" American interests are at stake. And, of course, it would risk counter-intervention by others (conceivably, Moscow on Amin's behalf, Peking on Pol Pot's).

By contrast, the use of economic instruments to promote human rights does not conjure up quite the same images of a system of small-state lambs and predatory superpower wolves. The international economy contains strong incentives that in nearly all cases constrain a giant trading and investing power like the United States to play by the "two-track" GATT rules it was so instrumental in writing. The best assurance for the Senegals or the Bolivias (or other small states that are not egregious offenders against decency) that Washington will not some day use against them the economic leverage it might apply to Uganda is the likelihood that the United States itself would be seriously injured if the use of economic coercion for political purposes became an everyday occurrence. Uganda—and South Africa—would be distinct exceptions, and exceptions often do strengthen rules; those who break rules tend subsequently to observe them precisely in order to underline the uniqueness of the exceptional cases.

In the case of Uganda today, the rules of the system, which separate the "economic" from the "political," work entirely to support the brutal regime of Idi Amin. It is, therefore, incumbent upon others who benefit from the normal working of that system—large states and small ones alike—to take action to assure that it no longer provides Amin with the instruments by which he maintains his grasp on power. If possible, that action should be collective. Its impact, not to speak of its international legitimacy, would be much enhanced. But if efforts to bring about collective action by the international community should fail, the United States—and those other major purchasers of Uganda's crucial coffee crop that elect to follow—should take steps to wield the West's large economic power against, rather than in support of, Idi Amin.

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Colonel Richard G. Head

TECHNOLOGY AND THE MILITARY BALANCE

The United States stands at a crucial point in its relationship with the Soviet Union. George Kennan's latest prediction—widely echoed by other analysts—is that U.S. domestic reaction to the impending SALT II agreement will define a watershed in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. I would argue that the continuity or disruption of the détente relationship will turn on issues going far beyond arms control alone, issues involving subjective considerations and beliefs about the origins and nature of Soviet strategic objectives and the impact of technology on the military balance.

The military balance is not the only factor affecting the U.S.-Soviet political relationship. It may not even be the most important one. But it is not possible to discuss intelligently the overall relationship without due regard for the military component and the contribution that the technological element makes to national power.

The recent historical context of the U.S.-Soviet military relationship has been one of dynamic change. For at least the last 15 years the Soviet Union has invested heavily in military-related science and technology at the expense of investments in technology for all other sectors. At the same time, the Soviets have watched the United States divert its defense resources into Southeast Asia, defer service modernization programs and cut back on military research and development. During this period the Soviet Union has made great strides in exploiting technology for military purposes, has fundamentally altered the strategic balance by the deployment of large numbers of intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and has dramatically improved the quality of its conventional forces. The purpose of this article is to examine some of the factors that determine where, how, and how well technology is being exploited to enhance military capabilities. Technology warrants particular consideration at this time, not only

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because of SALT II, but because there is widespread speculation that new weapons technology may be further altering both the strategic and theater aspects of the military balance.

Military technology is the set of skills and techniques that contribute to the production, operation and maintenance of weapons and other military equipment. Technological progress, though difficult to calculate precisely, is simply the ability to accomplish objectives that were not possible to achieve, or to reach presently achievable objectives more cheaply or more efficiently.

A discussion of U.S. and Soviet military technology is essentially a comparison of the total efforts of the two nations in the field of research and development (commonly called, in the military context, R&D). Comparison is made especially difficult because the two systems are the product of distinctive cultures, historical experiences, institutions, geography, external threats, and political ideologies. The complexity of the issue requires the candid admission that analysts do not even know with certainty the exact factors that drive the American R&D process, let alone that of the U.S.S.R. The best one can do is to highlight some of the most important elements and attempt to show how they may influence the process of weapons selection and development in the context of culture.

Similarly, any assessment of the military balance is partly a subjective comparison of two political-military systems. It cannot easily be reduced to a listing of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and nuclear warheads. Such a static, quantitative comparison omits important dynamic factors like reliability, readiness, targeting, political will, and the conditions under which such weapons would come into use. In addition, there are many semantic problems with the term "balance," implying as it often does a condition of equilibrium between the two superpowers. No such implication is intended in this article. Instead, the military balance will be treated as a useful shorthand for discussing the relationship between the military forces of the two superpowers. In the final analysis, the real measure of a nation's contribution to the military balance is its overall ability to perform assigned missions—the maintenance of deterrence, the preservation of stability, and the protection of human values.

The central themes of this discussion are that the impact of technology on the military balance may be revolutionary or incremental—depending on how it is exploited—and the military balance may be changed by improvement of older technology as well

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as by development of the new. The underlying proposition here is that the effective exploitation of technology for military purposes is dependent upon a range of essentially nontechnological factors such as military doctrine, tactics, training, resource allocation preferences, organizational processes, R&D style, budgets, and arms control. The discussion will focus on five major questions: how military doctrine can affect the kinds of weapons technology that are developed; how management of the military R&D process influences decisions on technology; how new conventional weapons technology could change the military balance; whether massive changes in the military competition are likely; and finally, a proposed framework for an American R&D "investment strategy."

II

The first set of nontechnological factors that affects weapons technology, and thus the military balance, involves the process of establishing military requirements through adherence to military doctrine. Soviet military doctrine extends from fundamentally different cultural and political roots from that in the United States. There is even great divergence in the usage of the terms doctrine, strategy, military science, military art, etc. The distinctions are not important for most Americans. Because of a unique combination of the Enlightenment, political pluralism and continental opportunity, Americans have never put much stock in "doctrines" or doctrinaire statements of political purpose, even though we have dubbed as doctrines many broad policy statements like "containment," the "Truman Doctrine," the "Nixon Doctrine," the "Schlesinger Doctrine," etc. Recently, a high policy official in the Department of State stated that in the current Administration's view:

> There is no Carter Doctrine, or Vance Doctrine, or Brown Doctrine, because of a belief that the environment we are looking at is far too complex to be reduced to a doctrine in the tradition of post-World War II American foreign policy. Indeed, the Carter approach to foreign policy rests on a belief that not only is the world far too complex to be reduced to a doctrine, but that there is something inherently wrong with having a doctrine at all.[1]

This statement also reflects the Administration's recognition of a basic truth: that the Soviet Union is only a part of the foreign policy problem of the United States. (Soviet thinking, on the other hand, appears to be preoccupied with American developments.)

[1] Leslie Gelb, "National Security and New Foreign Policy," address given at the U.S. Army War College, June 8, 1977, printed in *Parameters* (Army War College), November 1977.

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For all these reasons most Americans neglect Soviet military doctrine. Its importance, however, should be understood. Soviet military doctrine is authoritative and comprehensive, providing statements of how and with what weapons military forces are expected to fight. Military doctrine is used to define requirements for new weapons, develop operational plans and tactics, influence resource allocation for military investment, indoctrinate military members in their tasks, and mobilize popular, professional and political support. Aside from semantic distinctions, a comparison of Soviet and U.S. military doctrines reveals differences in military thought, attitudes and approaches to the problems of warfare.

There are at least six major areas of military doctrine that bear on the relationship between technology and the military balance, and in each of them the differences between the Soviet Union and the United States are significant. First is the way the two military establishments perceive the whole problem of warfare. U.S. writings convey a healthy appreciation of the role of uncertainty in battle and the need for flexible planning in operations and force posture. This approach leads to broad-gauged American R&D planning and general, rather than highly detailed, definitions of military missions. Hence, the United States traditionally builds weapons to be multipurpose, rather than narrowly specialized, and we expect operations to differ from plans.

In the Soviet Union an article of faith and ideology is that war is a science. To Soviet officers, military science is a unified system of knowledge about preparation for, and the waging of, war in the defense of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries against imperialist aggression. Its functions include the discovery and study of objective laws of armed conflict.[2] Soviet life is characterized by compartmentalization and secrecy. Soviet officers appear to be very intolerant of uncertainty and attempt to plan and prescribe every operational maneuver to the last detail. Soviet methods depend upon extremely centralized staffs, employ scientific methodology, examine the "objective" characteristics of warfare, and derive precise military requirements. Part of the traditional Russian emphasis on large numbers of troops and weapons ("mass") may be attributable to this fear of uncertainty. Mass can average out deficiencies caused by unforeseen circumstances, and mass lessens the responsibility to achieve optimal efficiency.

Second is a basic issue of whether doctrine or weapons is the more important factor in war. Despite all the writing about the

[2] General-Major S. N. Kozlov, *The Officer's Handbook (A Soviet View)*, trans. U.S. Air Force, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1971, pp. 47–48.

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"military-scientific revolution," the Soviets say they reject the thesis that weapons should dictate military strategy. A "grand debate" apparently transpired in the Soviet Union in the period immediately following Stalin's death in 1953. The issue was joined in a dispute over the strategic meaning of the surprise attack in 1941, and it paralleled a struggle for power between Malenkov and Khrushchev. The military debate centered on the dilemma posed between "doctrine" and "armament norms" (weapons quantities).[3] John Erickson maintains that the debate was resolved in 1955 in favor of doctrine: that prewar doctrine had been fundamentally correct, but it could not produce victory until the requisite "armament norms" were met. Although there is a "chicken-and-egg" quality to this argument, the current implications for technology are that military doctrine is expected to produce weapons requirements to "pull" technology.

Within this perspective, the role of military professionals is amplified. Soviet officers have traditionally been preoccupied with the problems of training a mass army. Training is made more difficult if weapons are not standardized or if their designs change rapidly. Thus, the dominance of Soviet military professionals has tended to produce a conservative design philosophy that is very "user-oriented."

Doctrine can also be forward-looking and to a degree inconsistent with current military capabilities. This was a problem in the 1960s, when some U.S. analysts had difficulty taking Soviet writings on land warfare seriously, particularly those parts that called for offensive breakthroughs and high-speed advances. Only in recent years, with the Soviet buildup in tanks, armored fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery, multiple-rocket launchers, mobile bridging equipment, armed helicopters, tactical fighter aircraft, and air defense weapons has the vision in their tactical doctrine been supported by technological capability. For the first time, the quality of these new weapons and their deployment in large numbers provide the kind of mobility and shock power so long called for in Soviet military doctrine. Although the United States also has a military requirements process, many would argue that doctrine is only one of many determinants of U.S. weapons design. Indeed, one gets the sense that military preferences for high performance and industry competition for contracts have dominated the U.S. process.

[3] John Erickson, "Soviet Theatre-Warfare Capability: Doctrines, Deployments, and Capabilities," in *The Future of Soviet Military Power,* Lawrence L. Whetten, ed., New York: Crane, Russak, 1976, p. 144.

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The third asymmetry in military doctrines is the striking difference in attitudes toward nuclear war. Western strategic theory has largely been conceived by academic theorists and places supreme emphasis on the use of nuclear weapons for deterrence of an attack by other nuclear weapons powers. Although the twin concepts of deterrence and defense (war-fighting) are linked, there is little doubt which is given preeminence. This emphasis extends from beliefs about the unprecedented destructiveness of nuclear weapons and the inability of technology to provide high-quality assurance of defense, validated to a degree by the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972.

Influenced by a different historical experience, Soviet strategic thought has largely emanated from professional military men who have never made quite the same sharp distinction between deterrence and defense. Perhaps it is the traditional search for unilateral measures of security or the deep-seated belief in "balanced forces," but both Soviet representatives in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and Soviet political leaders have consistently resisted the Western concept of mutual deterrence. The Russian language has no direct equivalent to the English "deterrence," an asymmetry that may well have affected the development of Soviet strategic thought in the past three decades.

While most U.S. officials agree with their Soviet counterparts that a war-fighting capability is essential to make deterrence credible, U.S. strategic policy often draws subtle, but definite, distinctions between the two concepts. Perhaps the clearest example of the difference was the emphasis of former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on programming forces separately for deterrence through assured destruction and defense through damage limitation. The distinction was never trivial. Whereas the weapons requirements for assured destruction are *relatively* quantifiable given certain assumptions, the requirements for security through buying a convincing war-fighting capability are much more open-ended. The arms control implications are obvious. If one side believes it has an "objective" security requirement for a well-developed war-fighting capability and high force levels, it is going to be difficult to achieve agreement that equal security can be achieved through deterrence and significant reductions in forces. Similarly, the requirements for maintaining the current U.S. policy of "essential equivalence" are much more complex and subjective than were those of assured destruction.

A related point is the contrast in the emphasis the two powers place on investment in strategic nuclear weapons. Over the ten-

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year period 1967–77, the level of Soviet spending on strategic forces measured in dollars has been two-and-one-half times that of the United States. While it is true that the United States made heavy investments in ICBM and SLBM forces in the previous decade (1957–67), the earlier U.S. investment only dramatizes the current divergent trends. In 1977, the Soviet investment in strategic systems exceeded that of the United States by more than three times.[4] Although one can discount some of this investment differential due to differences in efficiency, the magnitude of the disparity and the trends are disturbing.

Fourth, Soviet and American military doctrine diverge on the question of quantitative superiority. The United States has superiority in numbers of bombers, but U.S. nuclear policy has apparently abandoned the necessity, if not the desirability, of maintaining superior numbers of both ICBMs and SLBMs. Largely because of resource constraints, the NATO nations have not attempted to attain conventional numerical superiority in Europe. American R&D style has traditionally emphasized qualitative superiority, with smaller numbers, and U.S. military doctrine, while appreciating the value of mass, has adjusted accordingly. This preference for high-value, multipurpose weapons and the desire to substitute technology for manpower can be called an American "doctrine of quality." One of the results of the doctrine of quality and technological substitution has been a certain tendency for technology to drive both strategy and doctrine.

Soviet military doctrine, until recently, has had no tradition of qualitative technological excellence to draw upon, and so it has placed great emphasis on quantitative superiority. This tendency was reinforced in World War II when, faced with a qualitatively superior German force, the Soviet Union found quantity sufficient to its needs. Although most Westerners think of Russian military men as being preoccupied with "mass" in both manpower and matériel, a close reading of their doctrine indicates they are not talking simply about "mass," but about "armament norms." These are designed in the conventional case as planning guides to provide distinctive relative superiority, sufficient to seize the initiative, overwhelm an expected Western superiority in quality, and strike at the opponent's central nervous system.

In the case of strategic forces, the effect of "armament norms" is much less clear. While the Soviet Union has achieved an evident

[4] Central Intelligence Agency, *A Dollar Cost Comparison of Soviet and US Defense Activities, 1967–1977*, January 1978.

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level of quantitative superiority in ICBMs, SLBMs and air defense forces, its leaders are apparently committed to the principle of equal aggregates as a result of the 1974 Vladivostok agreement. Whether SALT has had a significant impact on Soviet military doctrine and the tendency to acquire "safe margins" is still open to question.

Fifth, Soviet and American views diverge on the question of the first battle in the case of a possible NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation. Despite certain weapons design characteristics like long range in tactical fighter aircraft, NATO declaratory policy, doctrine, force posture and deployment signal an intention to fight the first battle on the defensive. Soviet doctrine, on the other hand, reflects a clear belief in the primacy of the offensive.[5] Though their precise policy may be obscure, their written doctrine, professional debates, forward deployment, readiness, and ground force weapons all indicate a formidable offensive posture. Further, the preoccupation with concealment, deception, and surprise attack places a premium on preemption as the core value of Soviet military doctrine. Many Soviet officials frankly admit to having a "June 22 syndrome," which increases the credibility of Malcolm Mackintosh's dictum to "strike first in the last resort." Thus, Senator Sam Nunn can state with some assurance:

> What confronts NATO across the inter-German border today is not 935,000 Pact troops, but 935,000 Pact troops organized, deployed, trained and equipped for *blitzkrieg*, and governed by a doctrine based on surprise and a postulated rate of advance of 70 miles per day.[6]

Finally, a related, but not precisely doctrinal, precept is that of "troop control." Here the United States really has no equivalent: we emphasize command, control and communications, but that is not exactly what the Soviets mean by the term. What the Soviets apparently fear is the disorientation that comes when precise plans do not work out smoothly. They have an inordinate fear of the unknown and the unexpected, reflected in writings about "loss of bearing" by commanders. Soviet leaders attempt to deal with this in three ways: by placing a tremendous emphasis on troop indoctrination and officer education, by increased efforts at obtaining detailed intelligence for more precise planning, and by attempts to develop the "science of military management." This "science,"

[5] A. A. Sidorenko, *The Offensive (A Soviet View)*, trans. U.S. Air Force, 1974, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1970, and S. N. Kozlov, *op.cit.*, p. 65.

[6] *New York Times*, November 14, 1977, p. 17. The "June 22 syndrome," in the text, refers to the date of the all-too-successful German attack on Russia in 1941.

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Soviet military authors maintain, is the most recent of the military-scientific revolutions and is centered in the concept of military cybernetics. The characteristics of the "scientific" management of "troop control" are ever-increasing centralization, computerization, automation of control processes, "scientific" selection of engineer-commanders, repetitive training to routinize and automate human reactions, and development of mathematical models for prediction.

Troop control as a doctrinal precept appears to Western observers to be a pessimistic prediction of human behavior and an attempt at the manipulation of personality, but it is also derived by Soviet military tradition from a basic organizational evaluation of the educational quality and cultural heritage of Soviet recruits. For at least the last century the Russian Army has been conscripted from unskilled and uneducated manpower. With the dramatic decline in the birthrate among Russian nationalities, the Soviet Army is projected in the next ten years to include a high percentage of non-Russian recruits. The tremendous Soviet efforts at education have had remarkable results, but compared to Western armies, Soviet manpower is clearly less technically skilled and less oriented toward individual initiative.

The question of troop control is related to technology. Both the Soviet Union and the United States are investing heavily in command, control, communications, and intelligence systems to obtain better capabilities in the areas of warning and battle management. But the investment patterns differ. The United States is attempting to *centralize* intelligence and communications, based on the development of high-data-rate computer systems, but to *decentralize* execution of plans and operations. In contrast, the Soviets are investing heavily in systems that will centralize *both* intelligence and command, relying on highly redundant communications channels to pass orders to tactical units.

Examples of the contrasting approaches to mission areas include air defense, where the Soviet Union has traditionally chosen to centralize its technology in ground-based missile systems and in ground radar stations, while the United States allocates a greater percentage of its air defense/air superiority electronics to the individual aircraft. Soviet anti-submarine warfare doctrine stresses team tactics with many ships; American R&D design has placed more technology and more faith in the hands of the individual ship captain. U.S. enlisted men handle command and management responsibilities that are only entrusted to officers in the Soviet Union.

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III

The second set of nontechnological factors that affects weapons technology is a nation's R&D process, or style. It is popular in some circles to deride Soviet military capability and research and development by comparing the quality of selected Soviet weapons with supposed U.S. equivalents. It should be kept in mind when analyzing individual weapons, however, that such comparisons have limited utility. Differences in capabilities are exaggerated by individual comparisons, and we tend to forget that weapons are rarely used singly. Weapons are designed, developed, produced and deployed as part of a larger cultural and military matrix, involving support systems, logistics trains, maintenance facilities, allies, terrain, manpower, doctrine, training and plans about how wars are to be fought. At best, static comparisons of present technology can provide useful guidelines in contrasting approaches; at worst, they hide trends and specifically, as far as U.S. policymakers are concerned, can delude them into thinking that "technological superiority" guarantees peace. Superior arms provide real advantages, but at some point greater quantity in deployed lower-quality weapons confers the capability to overwhelm the highest quality defense.

The main difference between U.S. and Soviet R&D systems is grounded in the contrasts between a competitive market economy and an ideologically constrained, centrally planned economy. In the United States, industrial producers draw from a superior technology base, tend to conduct civil and military research and development simultaneously, and to satisfy a high civil demand for advanced technology products. In the Soviet Union, government ministries are sharply divided between civil and military R&D, and the civil market is controlled to restrict the supply of high-quality technological goods.

The Soviets have developed a distinctive national style for weapons development and acquisition that produces large numbers of weapons of increasing quality to meet the requirements of Soviet military doctrine. The R&D decision process for weapons designs includes the Politburo, the Council of Ministers, the State Planning Commission, the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, the Armed Services, and the nine defense-industrial ministries. Research and development decisions are made in a closed subsystem of the Soviet government, with the military and Party leadership composed of narrow, technically oriented professionals. The political leaders have extensive technical expertise, but are poorly equipped to review professional military advice on doctrine,

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weapons, or training against broadly based cost-effectiveness, foreign policy, or arms control advice. The compartmentalized, secrecy-dominated political system, operating largely on the principle of consensus, reinforces the tendency toward conservatism noted in the development of military doctrine. The compartmentalization reduces the flow of information and makes comparisons of effectiveness between force components (e.g., ground-attack aircraft and tanks) very difficult. Compartmentalization and continued high defense budgets also tend to reduce interservice rivalry.

Despite the bureaucratic nature of most Soviet decision-making, the lack of pluralism makes the R&D decision process perhaps less elaborate and certainly more hierarchical than that in the United States. The Soviet process is characterized by fewer reviews of major projects, less overlap of organizational responsibilities, fewer checks and balances, and more stable budgets.

The American R&D process includes a large number of industrial contractors, university research laboratories, the military departments, the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, the Executive Office of the President (including the National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget), and the Congress. Comparatively, this American R&D process is more fragmented, more open to citizen and external influences, more concerned with "due process," and more responsive to arguments over arms-control implications, environmental impact, and a fair allocation of government contracts. Responsibility is diffused, and weapons programs are subjected to multiple reviews and yearly budget cycles. The constant exposure to external influences and the intense competition for annual budget funds give the U.S. policy process a program orientation that is probably not felt to the same degree in the Soviet Union. Despite the structural deficiencies, the U.S. system operates amazingly well because of the skill, flexibility, and ingenuity of its smaller number of scientists, engineers, and technicians.

The major Soviet institutions that actually control weapons design are the defense-industrial ministries, which are vertically integrated, each one having under its jurisdiction research institutes, design bureaus, and manufacturing plants. Although nominally centrally controlled, the organizations are usually both geographically and functionally distinct. Theoretically, research and testing is done by the research institutes, weapons design and prototype construction are done in the design bureaus, and

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production is accomplished by the manufacturing plants. In reality, a complex network of inter-ministry communications, agreements, and bargaining exists.

For the more mature technologies, research institutes constrain weapons design from the very beginning by publishing handbooks for designers that specify not only research results, but an approved list of structures, design forms, components, materials, and manufacturing techniques. Designers, for their part, have a great deal of internal autonomy, but they are restrained by the research institutes, the lack of sophistication in production technology, the technical level of Soviet troops, and incentives to produce new prototypes frequently. Design bureaus exercise technical restraint, not so much because they do not have the materials or training to develop more advanced designs, but because of the influence of the doctrine that military capabilities are enhanced more by large numbers of deployed weapons with modest individual capabilities than by smaller numbers of higher quality weapons.

Soviet weapons produced from this traditional approach tend to have three main characteristics: design simplicity, interchangeable parts, and evolutionary growth.[7] Design simplicity is exemplified in the T-62 tank, which has a manual transmission, a manual, lever-type steering mechanism, and a 40-year-old engine design.

Common parts on weapons of the same type, with standardization across different weapons systems of the same vintage, is the second major Soviet characteristic. For example, many types of warships use the same auxiliary equipment and propulsion plants. In aircraft, the same turboprop engine was used in the An-22 transport as in the old Tu-20 bomber. Common parts are also used in the West, but not to the same degree. Soviet equipment is also produced by East European allies with the result that Warsaw Pact weapons—though not completely standardized—are more standardized than those of NATO.

The third traditional feature of Soviet weapons is incremental growth or cumulative product improvement as opposed to the U.S. tendency to favor whole new weapons systems. An outstanding example is the MiG-21 aircraft. The MiG-21 was first developed in the mid-1950s as a lightweight, clear-weather fighter. It has evolved with steady improvements in engine thrust, aerodynamics, fire control systems, electronics, and airborne weapons, and in 1978 performs the mission of all-weather interceptor of enemy aircraft, while other versions of the same basic aircraft have a con-

[7] Arthur J. Alexander, *Armor Development in the Soviet Union and the United States*, R-1860-NA, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, September 1976, p. 48.

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siderable ground attack capability. This evolutionary improvement of subsystems, with extensive prototype testing, has increased Soviet military capabilities, while minimizing the large expenditures on research and development and retraining that are required with wholly new systems.

U.S. weapons development, on the other hand, is primarily oriented toward high performance. Complex computer models permit the calculation of kill probabilities and weapons lethality for different systems, and technology is then applied to maximize these numbers. Given the U.S. military requirements for high performance and low attrition rates, U.S. industrial contractors tend to respond with proposals for revolutionary developments, new subsystems, and sophisticated design. All too often, however, the resultant weapons have been overly complex, less reliable than past models, and increasingly expensive. The cost per unit of these new weapons has increased an average of four-and-one-half times per decade in constant dollars since 1950. In addition, while substituting technology for manpower at the operational end of the spectrum, the sophistication of U.S. weapons has tended to generate higher support costs and increased maintenance manpower requirements.

Occasionally U.S. weapons have made good use of incremental product improvement—most notably the Boeing B-52 and McDonnell Douglas F-4, whose longevity extends from early 1950s designs to present-day operation. In addition to lowering training costs and providing a high return on investment, such improvements in existing designs have only increased cost by a factor of two per decade. But such evolutionary developments do not have many advocates in the U.S. acquisition process.

The nature of the American R&D process has produced two other problems that are increasingly being recognized. One is the trend for the large number of decision centers to introduce procedures that lengthen the time between the beginning of a weapons program and the deployment of the system (12 years in some cases). The second is the tendency for the budget to provide less than planned funding of the number of systems placed into full-scale development and production. This discrepancy between planning and implementation often reduces production rates well below what is considered efficient. The effect of both of these process characteristics is to stretch out the American R&D cycle and to greatly increase the cost of weapons development and acquisition.

Having described the central features of the American R&D

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system and characteristics of what some call the "traditional" Soviet style, an important question remains: To what degree are Soviet weapons development trends departing from the traditional pattern and adopting a more innovative style? The answer to this question is uncertain, but some data are becoming available on Soviet weapons innovations. Examples of totally new systems are not numerous, but those that exist have all appeared in the last 10 years. Many of the innovations are on systems that are better than similar U.S. systems or for which the West has no comparable items. Three examples are the BMP armored fighting vehicle, the ZSU-23/4 radar-directed, antiaircraft gun system, and the *Krivak* guided missile destroyer. The BMP contains a unique combination of innovative capabilities. It is a lightweight, armored personnel carrier with complete chemical and nuclear shielding and a low-velocity gun, firing rocket-assisted projectiles and antitank guided missiles. In service in large numbers in 1978, it is the primary vehicle (along with T-62 and T-72 tanks) that makes the doctrine of surprise attack, high-speed advance, and deep envelopment a credible threat to NATO.

Even more important, the general rule that the Soviet Union uses a conservative, traditional, incremental R&D style while the United States develops revolutionary new technology may be reversed in the ICBM case. Since 1967 when the U.S. ICBM force leveled off at 1,054 missiles, only one new strategic land-based missile has been introduced—the Minuteman III, deployed in 1970. In the intervening 11 years, the Soviet Union has deployed six major new ICBMs and several variations. In fact, it is the United States that has switched to an incremental style of development, while the Soviets, with the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19, have made dramatic increases in ICBM capability. Incrementalism has many advantages, but most analysts agree that further improvement of the Minuteman will not solve the basic problem caused by Soviet ICBM developments—i.e., drastically increased silo vulnerability.

An estimate of the contribution of better technology to Soviet ICBM capability can be obtained by examining the SS-19's improvements over the SS-11. According to one congressional analyst, the SS-19 represents a 15 percent increase in length and diameter, which produces a 32 percent increase in hard-target kill capability, or lethality. A series of technological improvements provide the SS-19 with multiple independently targetable warhead capability, increased payload efficiency, and increased accuracy. Taken together, the technological improvements of the SS-19 over

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the SS-11 increase the new missile's counter-silo capability by something over 40 times.[8] These improvements in technology threaten to alter the balance of military power much more than the Soviet achievement of quantitative superiority in ICBM/SLBM force levels.

Thus, the tentative answer to our question is that the Soviets are apparently demonstrating some signs of more, if not much, innovation in conventional weapons design and have shown a surprisingly rapid evolution in ICBM/SLBM performance.

The next question concerns the relationship of the characteristics of the two R&D systems to implications for the military balance. What is the relationship between inputs to the systems and tangible military outputs? On the input side, the Soviet investment in research and development when measured in dollars was about one-half that of the United States in 1964–68, equal by 1970, and in excess of American R&D outlays by 50 percent in 1976.[9] In the category of weapons procurement and military construction, the Soviet Union by 1976 was investing *twice* as much as the United States. This large investment in procurement activity has currently given the Soviets a six to one advantage in tank production; three to one in infantry fighting vehicles; eight to one in artillery; two to one in tactical aircraft; and slight advantages in helicopters and antitank missiles.[10] The resultant defense-industrial capacity provides the Soviets a considerable technological base, with production potential that is usually not thought of in comparisons of technology.

The combination of what may be increasing innovation with the continuity, steady quality growth, and high production rates of new and improved military systems indicates a technological trend in the balance of deployed military capability that is adverse for the United States.

IV

This review of U.S. and Soviet doctrine and R&D style has stressed how these essentially nontechnological factors influence the two nations' development of military technology. A third nontechnological factor that affects weapons is arms control. Many observers feel that the failure to incorporate sufficient consideration of technical factors into the SALT negotiations is a serious flaw. With the brief discussion of the SS-19 it can be seen that

[8] Robert Sherman, "A Manual of Missile Capability," *Air Force Magazine*, February 1977, p. 39.
[9] Central Intelligence Agency, *supra*, footnote 4, p. 6.
[10] U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report FY1978*, January 17, 1977, p. 114.

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qualitative technical factors far outweigh numerical ceilings and physical size constraints in determining the military effectiveness of intercontinental missiles. At the same time, the adoption of the principle of equal aggregates and the continued Soviet deployment of mass would seem to make it all the more imperative that the United States not constrain itself in the area where it has traditionally demonstrated a capacity for excellence.

Military doctrine and R&D style affect other areas of military preparedness, influencing both strategic and tactical programs. In the strategic area, for reasons that we do not fully understand, the Soviets are pushing hard on scientific research in antiballistic missile defense, high-energy lasers, charged-particle beams, and anti-satellite interceptors. Some analysts see in these intensive efforts (and associated reports of civil defense activity) an attempt to fulfill a Soviet doctrinal prescription to develop a complete war-fighting capability. The development of an operational capability in any one of these areas could seriously alter the military balance.

Military doctrine and acquisition style also interact with dramatic developments in new conventional weapons technology. Advances in solid-state electronics, propulsion, and computer-related fields appear to offer tactical weapons capabilities in the mid-1980s that could cause major changes in warfare. First demonstrated in combat during the 1973 Middle East War, the new technologies are clustered in the areas of tactical intelligence, precision-guided weapons, and improved conventional munitions.

While it is too early to tell whether the impact of the new conventional weapons technologies will be revolutionary or incremental, the role of military doctrines and R&D styles is going to be a key factor. While many predict that the general influence of the new weapons will be to increase the vulnerability of large ships, aircraft, tanks and armored fighting vehicles, it is not at all clear whether such changes will ultimately benefit NATO or the Warsaw Pact. The potential firepower of a "new technology" NATO defense would tend to shatter the Soviet doctrine of the offensive, but the capability of the Soviet R&D process to produce great numbers of heavily armed vehicles tends to offset high loss rates. In addition, the Warsaw Pact has begun deploying large numbers of antitank guided missiles and making other weapons and organizational changes to exploit the new technologies. Changes to date, however, have been in the direction of increasing the tactical efficiency of combined arms operations and have not indicated a revision of the basic doctrinal concepts discussed above.

In the Western alliance, there is excitement at the possibility that

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the new technologies may for the first time make possible a conventional defense of Europe. But such enthusiasm should be tempered by acknowledgment that NATO is not currently structured for the dispersed and decentralized warfare that seems to favor the new weapons. Changes will have to take place before the potential of the new technology can be fully explored. No area of defense policy in the next decade will require a more concerted effort to sort out the intermingled threads of military doctrine, organization, training, tactics, weapons design, and acquisition.

V

The context of the U.S.-Soviet relationship has been characterized by massive investments in military-related science and technology and a gradual improvement of the Soviet position from strategic inferiority 15 years ago to one of essential equivalence today. Looking into the future, there are some indications the Soviet Union in the next decade will be facing a period of economic and political crisis. Will arms limitation agreements and the scope of these emerging problems engender any change in policy priorities toward a redistribution of investment away from military programs into the civil sector?

Much as we would like to see a slackening of the Soviet military effort, there has been none to date and there are reasons to doubt any massive changes in the future. Although strategic arms limitation agreements are desirable, they are more likely to redirect than to diminish defense efforts. In the area of conventional arms, where the Soviet Union has already achieved well-defined advantages, arms control has moved very slowly and has had no discernible impact on Soviet armament levels. After centuries of lagging behind the West militarily, Russia has only recently achieved a position of parity. The confidence and self-assurance that this status breeds are only slowly becoming apparent. While militarily equivalent, the Soviets apparently still perceive themselves to be technologically and economically inferior and show every indication of continuing to strive energetically for further military gains. The major development decisions that will affect Soviet force posture in the next five to eight years have already been made—in a period of striking Soviet increases. Finally, Soviet leaders may find it difficult to renounce, or even modify, cultural beliefs that base domestic political stability on the acquisition of military power.

This discussion has stressed that U.S. and Soviet technology are driven by unique military doctrines, resource allocation preferences, and R&D styles. Soviet weapons appear to be remarkably

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well designed and consistent with Soviet military requirements, industrial capability, level of troop training, and employment doctrine. Furthermore, massive investments and a disciplined R&D strategy have permitted the technology in deployed Soviet weapons to approach that of the United States in enough specific military mission areas so that the future stability of the military balance is in question. SALT and conventional arms control may provide new boundaries and incentives for technological development, but to date there have been no signs of slackening in the long-term military competitive relationship.

In a military balance where many quantitative measures accrue to the other side, most U.S. policymakers place a high value on retaining technological superiority. Yet recent trends indicate this superiority will be increasingly difficult to maintain without an appropriate investment strategy and the associated organizational and doctrinal changes. While many agencies of the U.S. government invest heavily in research and development, it is not clear that such a strategy now exists.

VI

There are four general areas in which a U.S. strategy needs to respond to the Soviet buildup. The first is perhaps the most difficult—the need to recognize that the United States is in a long-term competition with the Soviet Union, and political leadership will have to be directed to obtain popular support for a responsible and measured position. As a corollary the United States should respond in a way that strengthens the political cohesion of the Western alliance and does not overly distort U.S. global and domestic priorities.

The second area is in the coordination and integration of several macro-elements of an investment strategy. These are government-wide policies that can only be developed and implemented in an inter-agency forum, supervised by the National Security Council and the Executive Office of the President. They include U.S. policy in the difficult areas of arms control, arms transfer, technology exports, international cooperative research and development, and the technology base. Arms control policy is critical because, more than most other areas, it influences Soviet expectations about the overall political relationship. The United States should continue to strive for reasonable, verifiable agreements, not expecting arms control to solve the entire security problem.

Arms transfer policies should be included in this framework because the volume of sales and the technological component of U.S. weapons are a vital aspect of our global influence. Similarly,

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civilian technology like high-speed computers and microcircuitry are eagerly sought by the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc countries, and unchecked exports could have an adverse effect on U.S. security. The international development of cooperative R&D policies and programs is an essential ingredient in our relationship with NATO allies. The growing cost of research and development makes it apparent that the Alliance cannot afford highly redundant and wasteful national efforts. Economies of scale, an expanded fighting capability, and increased political cohesion are only some of the reasons why NATO standardization and interoperability are essential to a U.S. strategy.

A macro-approach to a U.S. investment strategy should also include a reinvigoration of the technology base. This is essential because of growing signs of slackening in the growth of U.S. industrial productivity, a decline in private investment in basic research, and a steady reduction in the number of U.S. scientists. Scarce capital and continued high inflation have caused U.S. industry to cut back on investments in the technology base for at least the last seven years. The increases in defense and government-wide budgets for basic research submitted to Congress in January 1978 by President Carter should be supported as an investment in our "technological future."

The third major area of a U.S. investment strategy is where technology, military strategy and doctrine intersect—military mission areas. Pressed by the Soviet buildup and the altered military balance on one side and the opportunities presented by the new technologies on the other, there is a critical need to review U.S. strategic and doctrinal concepts. This has already been started with detailed mission-area analyses now being conducted in the Defense Department. When completed, these studies should provide the essential core for the development of individual investment portfolios tailored to the mission areas.

Only a few military mission areas will be mentioned here. In the strategic area, there is a growing acknowledgment that the United States will need to make a major decision to meet impending threats to the land-based missile force either by modernizing or by other means. In space, the United States has a general technological lead that should be exploited by accelerated development of both manned and unmanned systems.[11] But it is now apparent that these systems will have to be hardened and provided with essential defensive capabilities to reduce their vulnerability to interference.

[11] Two programs that could have revolutionary effects on military operations are the Space Transportation System (shuttle) and the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System, a set of 24 satellites that will permit three-dimensional positioning with accuracies of ten feet.

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In general purpose forces, the Soviet buildup requires an immediate U.S./NATO response to field more antitank, artillery, and air defense weapons. Over the longer term, the challenge of the new weapons technologies requires an especially searching review of organizational and doctrinal concepts.

The fourth major area of the framework consists of the micro-elements of a U.S. investment strategy. These elements deal with R&D management and style. The overwhelming need here is to devise new methods to accelerate the flow of affordable technology into the field forces. The number of formal steps in the acquisition process should be reduced, and those that remain should be viewed as flexible. Programs should be tailored to match need and technical risk. Innovative organizational styles should be attempted. Procedures should be streamlined to reduce the length of the R&D cycle in an attempt to reduce the effect of inflation and reduce overall costs. The number of systems in full-scale development and production at any one time should be controlled so that the selected systems can be fully funded at efficient production rates.

The military services should examine more closely the opportunities for meeting military requirements through the improvement of existing systems. New systems development should be reserved for those cases where evolutionary growth will not provide the capacity to meet the military challenge or where technological opportunity is unusually promising. Experimental prototyping can be a valuable guide in determining the feasibility and cost of shifting from an incremental improvement to a revolutionary jump. Even in completely new systems, the United States should expand the development of the so-called high-low mix. First attempted in tactical fighter aircraft, the concept should be applied vigorously to surface ships, tanks and other major programs. By developing a combination of high-quality/high-cost systems with larger numbers of adequate quality/lower cost weapons, the American R&D process should be able to fully exploit the potential of the new technologies and provide sufficient quantities of deployed systems to compete over the longer term.

Finally, an investment strategy should serve as the focal point to bring together the technical and tactical communities and to clarify the interaction among technology, the R&D process, military doctrine, and organizational changes. Only with broad public support and effective implementation of an investment strategy can American defense policy relate advancing technology to the military balance.

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Peter F. Drucker

JAPAN: THE PROBLEMS OF SUCCESS

Everyone I met in Japan last fall, during my tenth long trip to that country in 18 years, talked economics and only economics. Even the theoretical mathematician and the elderly abbot of the famous Zen temple were obsessed with the dollar/yen exchange rate, the export surplus, and the cost of petroleum. Japan is indeed undergoing traumatic economic changes. Yet the basic issues facing Japan are not economic. They are changes in social structure and social values. Social policies that have served Japan superbly well for a century are rapidly becoming untenable. These policies were designed to change Japan from a poor, and poorly educated, rural society with low life expectancies into a wealthy, highly educated, industrial society with high life expectancies. Their very success is rendering them obsolete and is turning them into dangers to Japan's social cohesion and her ability to compete economically.

This is true with respect to the Japanese seniority-wage system, under which incomes of all three kinds of employees—manual workers, clerks, and managers and professionals—are determined solely, or at least primarily, by length of service, with an employee at the entrance level getting about one-third of what the same employee, regardless of his job or title, will receive as income after 25 years of service, that is, in his forties. But equally obsolescent is Japan's traditional linkage of education to career opportunities, under which people who finish their formal schooling with "middle school," that is, at age 15, are slotted for a lifetime as manual workers in manufacturing, farming, or service work; with high school graduates becoming clerks or technicians for their entire working life; and with university graduates becoming managers and professionals—and with practically no crossover from one group into the other. The employee's lifetime commitment to one employer and one place of employment—often, and misleadingly, called "lifetime employment"—may equally turn into a serious threat to social harmony, rather than remain its strongest pillar. And equally untenable by now is the policy, as old as "modern

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Japan," of preventing social dislocation by using economic measures to shield the social order of the "old Japan" while building a radically different "new Japan."

II

The villain is not the petroleum cartel, Japan's dependence on raw material imports, or the "world recession"—the monsters of today's popular Japanese demonology. If the world recession were really the serious threat to Japan that almost any Japanese maintains it to be, Japan could hardly export enormous quantities of advanced and technologically complex near-luxuries, such as motor cars, color TV sets and calculators, to practically every market in the non-communist world. And while Japan's petroleum bill has, of course, gone up sharply since 1973, her bill for *all* industrial raw materials, including petroleum and petroleum products, has actually gone down as a percentage both of industrial production and of gross national product. For the petroleum cartel has had the impact cartels always have had, and have been known to have for over 70 years, since a German economist, Arthur Spiethoff, first studied cartels around the turn of the century. Every cartel depresses the prices of other goods competing for a share of the same income category—e.g., other raw materials in the case of petroleum—by as much as, if not by more than, the percentage increase in the price of the product the cartel controls. The drop in raw material prices is altogether a major contributory cause of Japan's record balance-of-trade surplus. Since Japan imports virtually all her raw materials, and since petroleum is a fairly small fraction of total material needs—less than ten percent—Japan, in her terms of trade and in her balance of payments, has actually benefited from the high petroleum price and from the resulting depression in the prices of all other raw materials. (Conversely, the fact that the United States is most nearly self-sufficient of all major developed countries in raw materials means that it is the country hardest hit in its trade accounts by higher petroleum prices. We pay more for imported petroleum while getting less for the raw materials that we produce for export.)

Rather, the villain in Japan's story—if "villain" be the right word—is Japan's population dynamics, and especially Japan's great success in raising life spans faster than any country has ever done before. Seventy-five years ago, the average life expectancy was age 42. Fifty years ago, it was still only 53. It was, therefore, completely realistic for the Japanese to set their "official" retirement age in government service at age 55 in the 1880s and to

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extend this retirement age to most private employees in the 1920s. Japanese life expectancies, by now, are 73 years for men and 78 for women—the same as in the West. Infant mortality rates in Japan fell sharply in the 1920s to the low levels of the developed West. But the birthrate stayed high until World War II. And after World War II, Japan, very much like the United States or Western Europe, experienced a short-lived, but sharp, "baby boom." A policy that based economic growth on a large supply of young workers—the policy that is expressed in the seniority-wage system—therefore made abundant sense as late as 1965. But the "baby boom" in Japan ended in a "baby bust" in the mid-1950s—some six years before a similar "baby bust" in the United States and ten years before the birthrate dropped sharply in Germany. And as in the West, the birthrate in Japan has stayed at, or below, the net reproduction level ever since.

As late as 1946, at the end of World War II, three-fifths of the Japanese population lived on the land and almost half the labor force worked in farming, and yet Japan had to import rice. Japan reacted by giving top priority to higher rice production regardless of costs. Japan has more than doubled her farm output in the last 30 years and has an unsalable rice surplus. Yet only one-eighth of the Japanese population now lives on the farm, and less than one-twelfth of the labor force is employed in farming.

The Japanese people have shifted drastically the educational structure of the population. As late as 1938—the last "normal" year before Japan began to mobilize for war—only four to five percent of the young men—one of every 20—went to the university, and half of the young men went to work after graduating from middle school. Today, more than half of the young men go to the university. There are literally no middle-school leavers of either sex. Practically every Japanese, whether male or female, goes on to high school. Yet Japan's social structures and policies still push heavily the expansion of college education.

In 1970, less than ten years ago, Japan was still the youngest of all developed countries. People over 65 amounted to less than seven percent of the population, which meant that only one out of every 15 Japanese was 65 years or older. And for every Japanese over 65, there were about seven to eight adult Japanese employed and working. The comparable U.S. figures for 1970 were ten percent of the population over 65 and five people in the labor force for every one past retirement age. In Sweden and France, the two oldest Western countries, the comparable figures were then 12 percent and one retired to three-and-a-half working people, respec-

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tively. By 1977, Japan had moved to the U.S. level of 1970. By 1990, just a little more than ten years hence, Japan will be beyond the Swedish level of 1970 and will have close to 15 percent of her population in the over-65 age bracket, with a ratio of only three people in the labor force to every one over 65 and past traditional Western retirement age. Japan will, by then, be one of the very oldest of the developed countries—somewhat older even than the United States is likely to be.

The overwhelming majority of Japanese who reach retirement age now are middle-school graduates who therefore have spent their entire working lives as manual workers. At least half the males entering the labor force in Japan are now university graduates and too highly schooled to be employed in any but managerial or professional jobs.[1] At the same time, the reservoir of surplus labor on the farm available for manufacturing and service jobs in the cities has by now completely dried up.

III

Similar developments have taken place in every single developed country. However, they have taken place much faster in Japan than in the West—much faster than in any country on record. The transformation of the Japanese age structure, for instance, required 25 years. The same transformation took 70 years in the United States, 100 years in Germany, and 200 years in France. The educational shift that Japan performed in 30 years took well over 60 years in the United States and a century in Western Europe. And the shift that Japan performed in 30 years, from a near-majority of the labor force employed in farming to agriculture being the employer of the smallest group in the working population, took almost a century in the United States and is not yet complete in some West European countries.

Above all, the impact of these shifts is infinitely greater in Japan than in any country in the West. For the basic policies on which Japan's society is based presume yesterday's age structure, yesterday's educational structure, yesterday's rural society, and yesterday's consumption pattern.

In particular, Japan's economic growth and competitive strength are based on the availability of large numbers of manual workers at the entrance age—that is, on the availability of young middle-school graduates. Under the seniority-wage system, productivity

[1] The best available Japanese study concludes that university graduates make up 58 percent of the males now entering the labor force in Japan. This is the highest percentage in the world. The comparable U.S. figure is 48 percent.

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automatically increases, the more young people are being employed. It makes little sense to talk of an "average Japanese wage" or "average Japanese labor costs." Two plants of the same company, using the same equipment and the same methods, turning out the same products and paying exactly the same wages and benefits to workers of the same age, may still have labor-cost differentials of 100 percent, depending on the age distribution of their work force. For every year by which the average age of the labor force in a plant goes up, the plant's labor costs rise by five to seven percent.

This explains why Japanese businesses have put the emphasis on sales volume and have seemed to neglect profitability. If sales volume goes up sufficiently so that young people in large numbers can be hired, profitability takes care of itself. Conversely, if sales volume does not go up, or goes down, so that no young workers can be hired, profitability will inexorably go down—no matter how high the profit margin. And now Japan faces a period in which the labor force will inevitably become older. The more labor-intensive any particular Japanese industry is—and even the most modern steel mill is still highly labor-intensive—the more serious will be the drop in productivity from population dynamics.

No one, to my knowledge, has tried to separate productivity increases in Japanese industry that resulted from improved working methods and modernization from productivity increases that resulted from population dynamics. The best guesses I can find credit population dynamics with about half of the productivity increases of the last 20 years. For during these last 20 years, young people were available in very large numbers, as a result of the "baby boom" and of the large-scale migration of young people from the farms into the cities. On that basis, real productivity growth in Japanese industry—as against the impact of population dynamics—would work out at no more than five to seven percent a year for the postwar period—still respectable by any Western standard, but barely enough to offset the downturn in productivity caused by the imminent aging of the Japanese labor force. And for Japan to maintain her competitive position against such newcomers as South Korea or Brazil, with their lower labor costs, would obviously require an even greater growth rate in real productivity.

This leads to what would appear to be an insoluble growth dilemma for Japan. A growth rate of six percent is the minimum for Japan to sustain her competitive position in the world, given the seniority-wage system and its impact on productivities and

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competitive position. But the Japanese population, and especially the population available for manual work—that is the middle-school leavers—is not going to grow at anywhere near that rate. A six-percent growth rate in the traditional industries is simply not sustainable on the basis of available manpower and existing retirement policies.

But the population dynamics also threaten Japan's traditional capital supply. Japan has, for 100 years, had the highest rate of savings and capital formation of any industrial country in the world, with personal savings of 35 percent of gross personal income being the norm rather than the exception. This, too, very largely rested on the simple fact that until recently few Japanese survived to retirement age. We have learned, in the West, that as life expectancies go up, capital formation inexorably goes down. A larger and larger share of personal savings becomes "transfer payments" to the older retired people and to "survivors," that is widows of retirees who have died. These "transfer payments," through social security taxes and through payments into employers' pension funds, look like savings. But older people—that is the recipients of these "savings"—do not save; they consume.

Japanese government economists calculate that the Japanese personal savings rate would be lower by at least one-third, if not a full half—that is, it would run at 17–24 percent of gross personal income—if Japan today had the same age structure the United States has, where there are 32 million people who are on social security, including eight million "survivors," as against a working population of 92 million. This would still be one of the highest savings rates in the world, and on a par with those of West Germany and Switzerland. But it would be a low savings rate for Japan, and perhaps too low a savings rate in the light of Japan's future needs. For Japan, to offset the impact on productivity of an aging labor force under the seniority-wage system, will have to step up capital investment tremendously to obtain the real productivity increases she needs to remain competitive. Yet capital formation will almost certainly drop sharply, just when Japan needs capital formation the most.

IV

There is one category of young people in which Japan will experience no shortage: university-educated people, prepared to be managers or professionals, either in the private or the public sector. In fact, there is already a surplus. Despite the sharp drop in the birthrate, the supply of university-educated young people in

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Japan during the next ten years will be many times what it was only 20 years ago. It is still likely to increase, for a university degree is the only way to have career opportunities in Japan.

Knowledge workers will thus be Japan's major, and most important, resource. And Japan's economic strategy will increasingly have to be to export knowledge work and its fruits, rather than manual work and its fruits. Increasingly, Japan will have to go in for the form of economic integration that, for want of a better term, I have called "production-sharing"—that is, for economic integration under which the developed country performs those stages in the productive process that are management-intensive, capital-intensive, and technology-intensive, while the abundant labor resources of young manual workers in the developing country perform the stages that are labor-intensive, with the final product sold and consumed in the large markets, that is in the developed countries. Japan, alone of all the developed countries, has seen the need for systematic work on "production-sharing." The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), several years ago, switched to a policy of encouraging the export of entire manufacturing plants rather than of the products of such plants. And while MITI so far still expects these plants, e.g., a petrochemical plant designed and built by Japanese in Algeria, to sell its products in other markets, MITI is increasingly willing to accept payment for such a plant in the products of the plant—that is, payment for the Japanese-designed and Japanese-built petrochemical plant in Algeria in the form of petrochemicals to be sold in Japan.

Increasingly, this will mean that Japanese managers and professionals will design, build and perhaps manage consumer goods plants in developing countries—plants for shoes, textiles, automobiles and electronic products—that are going to be paid for by their own output, to be sold to the Japanese consumer in Japan. It is hard to see any other way of finding employment for the one resource in which Japan will have a continuing surplus—that is, highly schooled people, qualified under the Japanese system only for managerial and professional work.

Such a policy is obviously exceedingly difficult in any country, and likely to run into determined opposition on the part of unions, old industries and politicians alike. It is doubly difficult in Japan because of the traditional policy under which the employee is committed to one employer and cannot easily find other employment, once he is past the entrance age. Under the Japanese seniority-wage system, an employee, and especially a low-paid and

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low-skilled employee, such as a manual worker, cannot normally find a job past age 30 or 35. At that age, he would have to be paid twice the entrance wage. But since wage is based on seniority, he can only be paid the entrance wage. He is, therefore, basically unemployable. If he loses his job, he becomes a "problem worker," very much the way in which the *samurai* of old became a *ronin* and reduced to banditry if his lord dismissed him or if the lord lost his fief. The worker of 35 who loses his job cannot, normally, expect to become a "permanent employee" anyplace. He becomes a "casual employee," who will never again have employment security, never again have seniority, never again have a good job, and never again, in fact, work for a major company.

"Lifetime employment," that is the right of the worker to his job, developed as an answer to the burden that lifetime commitment to the job imposed on the Japanese worker. At that, only about one-quarter of the Japanese labor force has the security of lifetime employment. Women, by definition, are "temporary employees," who are expected to leave the labor force when they marry—and are expected to marry by their mid-twenties. And employees in the "old industries"—that is in the service industries, the small shops, the small artisans' factories and on the farm—have no lifetime employment either. It is reserved for the male employees in government and large businesses—and is not even universal there. But precisely because of the Japanese worker's constant and nagging fear of becoming a *ronin,* lifetime employment has been the core of Japanese labor relations and the pillar of social order and harmony in Japan.

Now it is rapidly becoming a threat, both to the Japanese worker and to Japanese society. But any effort to change the system would not only cause the labor unions directly involved to fight very hard indeed in opposition, but would engage a host of other groups that are in one way or another taken care of by the economic enterprises or institutions in which they work, albeit on a basis that falls short of strict lifetime employment. In essence, the practice reflects a whole concept of responsibility in the society, as well as a symbol of fairness. Any attempt to modify or to eliminate it would strike at deep emotional roots throughout Japanese society.

Today, to deploy her one abundant resource—highly educated people—Japan needs to be able to liquidate fast the most labor-intensive and least productive stages of production, i.e., old low-skill industries. But these industries—whether textile industries or shoe factories—are, of course, precisely the industries that employ the largest number of low-skilled and older workers. Even without

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the barrier to reemployment that lifetime employment and the seniority-wage system together create, these workers, while relatively small in numbers, would present a serious economic and social problem. These workers will, of necessity, cling the more tenaciously to lifetime employment, the less productive they and their industries become. Yet, unless they can move out of their old employments and into new ones, Japan will find it increasingly difficult to find work for the tremendous potential of highly schooled knowledge workers who constitute Japan's major and potentially most productive capital investment.

The alternative—and one that is hardly realistic anymore—is dumping high-cost, labor-intensive products, at a loss, in foreign markets that are bound to have surplus capacity and redundant over-aged labor in precisely the same industries as Japan.

V

No other country has had as purposeful and as successful an educational policy as has Japan. That career opportunities are dependent almost entirely on educational attainment was deliberate and planned. It was meant to make economic progress the engine of educational advancement. A famous story is told of Shibusawa Eiichi (1840–1931), the Meiji statesman who left a high government post to become Japan's leading industrial entrepreneur and her first banker. When approached for a loan by a successful businessman, Shibusawa turned the application down because the man was not a university graduate. This was not snobbery. And Shibusawa knew perfectly well that success in business does not depend on a sheepskin. But he had decided earlier to make managerial positions the monopoly of university graduates so as to give young Japanese an incentive to stay in school and to acquire higher education.

As a result, Japan has become the only genuine "meritocracy" around, in which birth and wealth count for almost nothing and educational attainment for almost everything. By now this has outlived its usefulness. School is turning into a nightmare. There is increasingly an oversupply of university graduates. But this has not, at least so far, resulted in a lessening of the pressure on young people to get into the right educational track and to acquire the university degree that is the passport to all opportunity and preferment.

On the contrary, during the last few years the pressure has reached a fever pitch. It now begins with the child's application to

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nursery school, that is before the age of three. There is an entrance examination—and little tots, barely able to walk, are being pushed into taking ballet lessons, into learning arithmetic, and into learning a few words of English. And the pressure keeps on building up. More than half of all middle-school students in Japan attend *juku*—afternoon and evening cram schools that drill for the exams. According to a study that the Ministry of Education released last fall, middle-school students aged 12–15 spend almost nine hours each day *after* school doing homework and going to the *juku*. It is normal for a middle-school child to work until two o'clock in the morning each day, and to take a sample test of the high school examinations every Sunday for years on end. Senior high school students spend "only" eight hours a day in after-school work and *juku*. The pressure is becoming more and more intense with the suicide rate among teenagers, and even among preteens, reaching alarming proportions.

But worse, school instead of being accessible to everyone on the basis of merit is becoming increasingly expensive. To be sure, school—from kindergarten on—is nominally free. But to get into the "right" school requires larger and larger "voluntary contributions." The most expensive school to get into is medical school. A candidate, even if his father is a physician, will have to pay about $100,000 in "voluntary gifts" and "voluntary presents" to the faculty members on the admissions' committee to have his application even considered. A friend of mine, the widow of a Japanese clergyman, who is working as an administrative assistant in a small government agency, will have to find $4,000 by next April to have her son admitted to the entrance examination of a supposedly free public high school. If he fails, she will not get the money back—and only one out of every ten candidates passes. Then the boy will have to go for a year to a *juku*—at a cost of about $7,500—pay another $4,000 in "voluntary contributions" and try again. And the Ministry of Education study referred to above makes clear that these are not unusual but, on the contrary, fairly standard fees and financial contributions. For not to get into the "right" high school means not to get into the "right" university four years later; this would debar the boy forever from access to better jobs and career opportunities. Not to go to high school at all is a life sentence to manual labor, from which there is no appeal.

At the same time, the rewards are beginning to lose their luster. With the shortage of middle-school leavers, and therefore of manual workers, and the abundance of university graduates, the differential in the pay of the two groups is bound to shrink. In the

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1950s and 1960s, when the demand for university graduates was high while the supply was still low, the differential became greater than it had been traditionally. It is already back to where it was before World War II. It is bound to go down, and fairly rapidly. University graduates are already beginning to have difficulty finding "good" jobs, and in many cases jobs of any kind—especially if they have no technical qualifications. And while the salaries of university graduates, once they have found employment, still go up with seniority, the promotional opportunities are rapidly shrinking as most organizations find themselves well supplied with highly schooled people in their early and mid-thirties.

Again the lifetime employment system aggravates the problem. The university graduate can, as a rule, not leave the employer with whom he starts. And more and more of the graduates even of the "prestige" universities have to start in dead-end jobs with employers who have no future themselves—without hope of being able to switch jobs, no matter how well they perform. For the time being, these conditions are likely to increase the premium on going to the "right" schools, and with it both the emotional and the financial pressures. But there is a distinct possibility of a collapse of the system, or of an explosion—and surely a system that puts such extreme pressure on children and literally forbids them to have any leisure time, any interests of their own, any learning of their own, can hardly produce educated adults. It is likely to produce people who can take examinations, but who do not know how to learn.[2]

VI

Japan is considered the most "protectionist" country by foreigners—and of all the complaints foreigners have about Japan, this is the one the Japanese themselves understand the least. For, what to the foreigner seems to be economic protection, appears to the Japanese to be self-defense of Japanese society against the Westerner's cultural imperialism.

From the early days of "modern Japan," after the Meiji Restoration of 1867, Japan has always defined her policy as using Western instrumentalities to maintain the essence of Japan. And

[2] So far as I can tell, there are as yet few signs of the kinds of explosion of resentment and rejection that I am suggesting is possible. During this visit to Japan, I heard for the first time of apparently qualified students dropping out of the university—but these appeared to be only among members of families with such strong connections that the children would still have substantial advantages. My hunch is that the system may not show many signs of erosion up to a certain point, but that it may then change very rapidly once, so to speak, it boils over.

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economic policy is the foremost Western instrumentality thus used. "Old Japan" means the distribution system in which large numbers of people are employed at rather low wages by small wholesalers, in "Papa, Mama and Rosie" retail shops, and in small workshops making traditional goods and acting as suppliers to modern industry. It also means a system of small family farms growing rice. But while there was once a cultural rationale for the farm policy, it has long become economic insanity. The underlying economic premises of Japan's farm policy are the fear of a rice shortage; the belief that a country as dependent as Japan on imported raw materials has to keep as large as possible a proportion of the population on the farm and out of the consumer society; the conviction that as poor a country as Japan has to discourage its people from eating anything but rice and fish; and finally the notion that the fish catch is capable of being expanded indefinitely while the rice crop is finite and will always be inadequate. All these premises have been proven fallacies during the last ten years.

It has been Japanese farm policy to encourage rice growing and to discourage growing anything else. A Japanese farmer gets a larger subsidy, the less suitable his land is for growing rice. The origin of this policy was the fear that Japan could not produce enough rice for her own domestic demands—which was still a rational fear 25 years ago. By now the policy has produced an unmanageable rice surplus, while at the same time the cost of the rice subsidy has become so high that the rice subsidy fund has become bankrupt. And since the rice that the subsidy produces is grown on land not suitable for growing rice, the surplus rice is of poor quality and could not possibly be sold on the world market. In respect to proteins, Japan has similarly pursued a policy that, however rational its origins, has become bankrupt. It has been national policy to encourage fishing and to discourage and to penalize every other production of proteins, whether vegetable, such as oil-bearing crops, or animal, such as livestock or poultry. But the fishing yield has long been stagnant and is now going down fast, with the growing resistance of other nations against Japanese fishing practices that threaten to overfish and to destroy the fish population of major fishing zones. The extension of sovereignty, and with it the control of fishing 200 miles from the shore, which by now has become general, was directed in large measure against the Japanese threat to marine ecology, whether real or perceived.

These policies were designed to ensure low-cost food for

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Japan—they have had the opposite effect for at least ten years now. Japan has, without doubt, the highest food costs of any major country—twice those of the United States and perhaps 50 percent higher than those of the most expensive and most protectionist countries of Western Europe. Meat costs about four times what it costs in the United States or in Western Europe—and even twice what it costs in the Soviet bloc countries. Fish, at the same time, has become almost as expensive as meat, and food costs are still rising fast. The Japanese inflation rate in the last few years has rarely fallen below ten percent a year. Food prices have been rising at a rate of 30 percent a year. At the same time, food production—other than rice production—has remained stagnant, and in some cases has actually gone down.

The high cost of animal proteins has acted like a suction pump on the cost of all other food products. 1977 was a year of bumper harvests of such things as Japanese oranges and vegetables—with crops so large as to be almost unsalable. Yet the costs of these products have kept going up. There is now virtually no dish—even *soba* (buckwheat noodles), which used to be what peanut butter sandwiches are to the American diet—that can be bought for less than $1.50 a portion.

Food and education are basic economic costs. They are the costs of forming the human resource. Both, in Japan, are out of control. And as they keep rising, the real income of the Japanese family is going down. Even well-to-do people, during my last trip to Japan, had begun to ration food. Even well-to-do people are hard pressed to find the increasing sums to finance their children's access to education. That the basic costs of the Japanese economy are going up so fast will endanger the long-range basic cohesion of Japanese society. It is the greatest threat, both to Japan's economic position in a competitive world and to her social order.

VII

Some of the policies that Japan will have to develop—including some that only a few years ago were unthinkable—are emerging with reasonable clarity, and are beginning to be discussed in Japan. The government is beginning to press for delayed retirement—at age 60 instead of 55. There is talk of retraining redundant workers and of placing them in new employments where there is demand for labor, e.g., shipyard workers in automobile plants. There are the beginnings of mobility for highly qualified young professionals. And there is some slight movement toward tempering the

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seniority-wage system with wage measures based on productivity.

But the policies that are most needed—and needed most urgently—are still beyond Japanese political will and social imagination. What is needed most is a sharp cut in prices for the domestic consumer. Japan suffers from excess inventory, both of raw materials and of finished goods. Her policy, these last few years, has been to maintain domestic prices—if only to protect the domestic distribution system—by conducting a gigantic clearance sale abroad. That policy has to come to an end—it can only destroy Japan's capacity to export altogether. Now is the time to bring prices down in the domestic market, both to answer the charge of "dumping" and to boost the domestic economy.

There is need for a shift in agricultural policy from one that encourages the production of unsalable high-cost rice to one that, like the British farm policy, maintains farm incomes while giving the consumer low food prices. Especially there is need for a shift to a farm program that encourages farmers to take poor rice land out of rice production and to shift it into producing feed crops, oil-bearing crops, and animal proteins. Japan could probably supply far more—one estimate is at least two-fifths—of her growing demand for animal and vegetable protein, other than fish (which is likely to keep on declining), by domestic production on land that today produces rice at high cost.

There is need to encourage "production-sharing"—that is, the offshore performance of labor-intensive work, with the product sold on the Japanese market, in exchange against export of knowledge and technology.

Seventy years ago, the general manager of the Mitsui Group, then as now one of Japan's leading industrial concerns, worked out the solution to the seniority-wage conundrum. When some of the Mitsui companies had to lay off employees in the recession that followed the Russo-Japanese War, he organized their systematic placement with other Mitsui companies, in which the new employer would pay the wage befitting the employee's seniority, i.e., the entrance wage, while the Mitsui Group itself would make up the difference between that wage and the wage befitting the employee's age. The sum that the Mitsui Group had to pay was ludicrously small, yet Mitsui could maintain employment security without employment rigidity. Some such policy will be needed on a national scale in Japan, together with a policy of systematically retraining and replacing employees of industries that cannot be maintained under Japanese labor costs, population structures and education structures.

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What needs to be done is not so very difficult to discern, albeit difficult to do. The one area, however, in which no one in Japan can see a solution is that of education. At most, there is talk—and only talk so far—of loosening the linkage between the "right" university and the "prestige employments," under which careers in major companies, major universities, and practically all government agencies are reserved to the graduates of a few schools. But the "tracking" of people that reserves career opportunities to the graduate from the "prestige" university and that, in turn, creates what are increasingly unbearable emotional pressures and financial costs, is still beyond challenge, with no substitute for it in sight or even imaginable.

For the first time in 20 years, I left Japan not wholly confident about the country's future. So far, it seemed to me, few people in Japan have faced up to the fundamental issues. But Japan has shown unparalleled capacity throughout her history for the 180-degree turn and for forging, almost overnight, a national consensus to impose on herself radical change. Japan has also shown unparalleled capacity, throughout her history, for social innovation. This capacity, going back almost 1,500 years, may indeed be Japan's greatest strength. Japan may well suddenly face up to her problems of success and to the need to maintain the essence of Japan in new forms and through new policies. But also, Japan faces a turbulent, a difficult and a dangerous period—a period in which there will be surprises for Japan, as well as for the Western world, with which Japan is now so strongly linked, and on which she is so heavily dependent. The economic problems and needs—the resistance to Japan's trade offensive, the currency chaos, the petroleum cartel—may be the catalysts. But the real decisions will have to be on social structure, social policies and social values.

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Bernard K. Gordon

JAPAN, THE UNITED STATES, AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

Three events occurred in Japan in 1977 that make it absolutely clear that the long period of postwar dependence on the United States, and Japan's corollary "low posture" in international affairs, have come to an end. While their implications will affect all aspects of Japan-U.S. relations in the Pacific, it is in Southeast Asia that Japan's new posture initially will pose important questions for the United States. These three events, beginning with the broadest changes in Japan's thinking, were the 1977 White Paper on Defense—a document that for the first time expresses doubts about the future U.S.-Soviet strategic balance; a Foreign Ministry White Paper that represents a genuine departure in foreign policy thinking; and the tour of Japan's Prime Minister to Southeast Asia—the occasion for the announcement of a "Fukuda Doctrine" toward the area.

The 1977 White Paper on Defense would be notable under any circumstances because it followed within a year a similar publication, and the Defense Agency is not in the habit of preparing annual versions of these lengthy documents. Why was another required? In part because of the famous MiG-25 defection of September 1976, which has caused defense planners in Tokyo to question the nation's ability to detect and intercept low-flying aircraft. Accordingly, a long section of the 1977 volume is devoted to Japan's need to modernize her air defense equipment and procedures more rapidly. Of far greater long-term significance, however, is what Japan's defense planners have to say about the central strategic balance:

> Since the nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union are numerically superior to those of the United States and since the Soviet Union is improving the quality of its nuclear arsenal at a rapid tempo, the United States is faced with an urgent task to modernize . . . . Thus, the U.S.S.R. has greatly strengthened its military posture in Europe and the Far East; and as a result some changes are occurring

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in the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union and in its structure.[1]

Allowing for official Japanese caution and tendency to understatement, this passage amounts to a real tremor in Japan's hitherto nearly total faith in the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and of the U.S. defense posture generally.

The second event, the Foreign Ministry White Paper, was also announced during the autumn of 1977. While it contains nothing as bleak as the defense views, it too represents a significant change from the past. Up to now, Japan has carefully cultivated the image that her role in world affairs is through her economic strength, and Tokyo has been a major contributor to a variety of assistance programs. The hallmark has been to separate politics from economics, with almost exclusive emphasis on the latter. Japan has focused her international political role on her relationship with the United States, stressing that the only political activity conceivable might be in some form of a general U.N. effort. Thus, although the tone of the new White Paper is quiet, the message is not:

> In order to assure peace and development in international society it is necessary and indispensable that Japan make such contributions commensurate with the wealth and capacity of our country in various fields, not only in the field of international economics, but also *in the sphere of politics and the like*.[2]

The third and most specific of these developments was Prime Minister Fukuda's Southeast Asian tour last August. It was notable first because his visit represented a formal endorsement of the five-nation Southeast Asian group known as ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Second, on the final stop in Manila, Mr. Fukuda announced a program of $1 billion in support of ASEAN "regional projects." For years, Japan had sought somehow to relate to incipient Southeast Asian efforts in economic cooperation, and for a while tried to sponsor a forum of her own, under the title of the "Ministerial Conference for Economic Development." Tokyo gave up on that effort by 1976, and hoped instead to be invited to the ASEAN "summit" meeting in Bali that year. When Mr. Fukuda was invited to meet with his counterparts in Kuala Lumpur in August 1977, it was a major breakthrough. And in Manila he promised that "Japan will be an equal partner of

[1] White Paper on Defense (Summary), *Defense Bulletin*, Public Information Division, Defense Agency, Vol. 1, No. 3, September 1977.

[2] *Waga Gaiko No Kinkyo*, Vol. 1, p. 1 (my emphasis). The last phrase can also be translated: "but also in broader aspects such as political matters."

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ASEAN and its member countries."[3] It is the sum total of these actions and commitments that comprises what Japanese themselves have christened the Fukuda Doctrine.

The broad meaning of these three events is that Japan has become quite uneasy with her dependent status in international politics, and intends, as a specific result, to establish especially close relations with all the states in Southeast Asia. Much of the unease stems from Japan's growing uncertainty about the future of the U.S. defense role throughout Asia, and this goes well beyond the anxieties over troop withdrawals from South Korea that were described recently in these pages.[4] At the heart of the matter lies a nagging fear that the United States—despite its rhetoric and its repeated assurances—really does not regard Japan highly. Much has been written about this elsewhere, especially in the context of the so-called "Nixon shocks" of 1971-72. What needs to be said here is that ever since then many Japanese have interpreted American actions toward China as proof that Peking counts for much more than Tokyo in American eyes. And, although there may be in American eyes very little evidence to support such worries, leading Japanese increasingly and publicly doubt both the long-term reliability and capacity of the United States as guarantor of Japan's security.

Questions about the wisdom of American policy in Asia arose during the Vietnam War. Now that it is over, a substantial proportion of Japan's doubts arise from the present Southeast Asian policy of the United States. Interested Japanese believe that the United States is terminating its interest in the region, and cite two cases as suggestive of the American posture: congressional unwillingness to support "normalization" of ties with Hanoi (even if that means accepting Hanoi's economic assistance terms), and an executive attitude of "indifference" to the economic needs and significance of ASEAN.[5] The Japanese argue that Vietnam should be encouraged to maintain distance from both China and the Soviet Union; and ASEAN, they point out, represents precisely the sort of collaborative effort the United States traditionally has favored. Along with the broader doubts about the U.S. role in the Pacific, these are the considerations that led Japan, despite her notoriously slow, faction-ridden, and reactive policymaking proc-

[3] From the Prime Minister's speech on August 18, 1977.

[4] Frank Gibney, "The Ripple Effect in Korea," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1977, pp. 160-174.

[5] Japanese participants at the September 1977 "Shimoda Conference," an annual meeting of leading officials and specialists from the United States and Japan, report wide disappointment with the American posture on Asia and toward Southeast Asia in particular. The United States, one participant concluded, has "opted out." From my continuing contacts with Japanese, I believe that as of February 1978 these sentiments have not been modified by any subsequent U.S. action.

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ess, to announce the Fukuda Doctrine in the summer of 1977.

II

There is very deep continuity both in Japan's behavior and in her outlook in world politics. Its most general feature is a long-standing dislike for dependence—which in its extreme form resulted in the nationalism and autarky-seeking program of the 1930s.[6] More specifically, this continuity is found in a ratchet-like tendency to return to Asia, and especially Southeast Asia, as the principal focus for Japan's activities. In an environment in which Japan finds increasing resistance to her economic activities, Southeast Asia is the one region where the barriers are neither insurmountable nor the competition very stiff. As a result, Southeast Asia has become in the past decade something approaching a Japanese hinterland—whether measured in terms of trade, investment and assistance, or the number of people brought to Japan each year from Southeast Asia for training and education.

While the Left argues that there has been an intent, perhaps even a conspiracy, to create a postwar "sphere of influence" for Japan in Southeast Asia, a good case can be made that this was not Japan's aim—but it happened anyway. In the 1960s, when the leadership was turning its attention to long-term foreign trade and investment, there was a conscious effort to avoid a special relationship with any region. *The Japanese Economy in 1985,* a projection by the Japan Economic Research Center in 1967, concluded that the trends it foresaw would make it "impossible for Japan to confine her activities to a narrow regional basis and will force her to live as a global nation." In the same period the distinguished economist Saburo Okita wrote that "although Japan is located in Asia and has strong historical and emotional ties with other Asian countries, she will have to act as a global nation rather than as a narrowly confined Asian country."[7]

Japan, of course, has not become a "narrowly confined" country, but neither has she succeeded in avoiding a clear concentration on Southeast Asia. In investment, her role in Asia is nearly equal (23 percent of the foreign total) to her stake in the United States, and among developing areas Southeast Asia is easily the principal

[6] The current intellectual emphasis on the meaning of the Meiji Restoration is a good illustration of the ways in which continuity is cherished in Japan. Widely regarded as a clear case of a society rejecting its past in favor of modernizing "foreign" influences, the Meiji period is now pictured in Japan as much less of a break with tradition. Japan's modernization is explained as a continuing process, for which the foundations had been laid in the pre-Meiji period. The "reformers," in this view, did no more than selectively adapt those Western techniques that were considered useful.

[7] Saburo Okita, "Japan's New Global Outlook," *The Round Table,* October 1968.

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recipient. Private investment in Latin America, which ranks next, is behind Southeast Asia by $1.5 billion—and public investment figures show an even more striking pattern. Of Japan's "official development assistance" (ODA), the following recent statement by the Foreign Ministry tells the whole story:

> Japan's economic cooperation policy places great emphasis on Asia, which is a region that has close historical, geographical and economic relationships with Japan. In Japan's bilateral official development assistance in 1976, Southeast Asia accounted for over 56%; Asia as a whole accounted for 77%, and the five ASEAN nations alone accounted for 48%.[8]

By comparison, the figure for Africa was 6 percent, for the Middle East 7.8 percent, and for Latin America 6.6 percent.

In trade too, Southeast Asia generally has been Japan's second largest partner—ranking behind only the United States. The five ASEAN nations steadily account for 11–12 percent of Japan's total trade, and though many have expected this to decline, it does not.[9] With the possible exception of the Middle East, to be mentioned in a moment, no other region is even closely comparable. Japan's total trade with ASEAN alone in 1976 was $14 billion; with all of Latin America it was $7.4 billion, and if current rates of increase are projected forward, they show that Japan's present trade with ASEAN is at a level that will not be reached by that with Latin America until well into the 1980s—if then.[10]

Of course Japan will aim to export more to the Middle East, hoping to compensate for the extraordinary rise in imports since the oil-price increases of 1973. (Japan's Middle East imports rose from 14 percent in 1972 to 28 percent of her total in 1975). But even in 1975, several years after a Middle East export drive was begun, sales to that entire region had just reached the value exported to the five ASEAN states alone, and it is very debatable whether exports to the Persian Gulf states will continue to show steep growth. Part of the reason is the low population density in the Middle East and the much greater familiarity of its leaders with European and American suppliers and products. More important is the now-formal emphasis, as a result of the Fukuda statements, that Japan will put on Southeast Asia and the ASEAN states in

[8] *Japan's Economic Cooperation with Southeast Asia,* Foreign Ministry, June 1977.

[9] Computed from *Direction of Trade Annual, 1969–75,* International Monetary Fund, and other sources. Needless to say, Japan is the first trading partner from the perspective of the ASEAN countries as well as Vietnam, generally accounting for 30–40 percent of their trade, although in the Philippines the U.S. share is occasionally as large as Japan's.

[10] These figures are from the most recent (December 1977) JETRO *White Paper on International Trade,* which also shows that the rate of increase for Japan's Latin American trade was 5.2 percent in 1976, while for Southeast Asia it was approximately 25 percent!

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particular. For as every statistic on Japan's economic presence in Southeast Asia indicates, Prime Minister Fukuda was hardly venturing into a new field with his trip. It is no exaggeration to say that the true meaning of the Fukuda Doctrine is simply that Tokyo now acknowledges its special relationship with Southeast Asia.

Concretely, this means that Japan intends to enhance and intensify her already-existing special relationship with Southeast Asia, and that the vehicle will be a large-scale program of bilateral and "regional" loans. In these respects the Fukuda Doctrine is no more than a billion-dollar line of credit, particularly for projects on which the ASEAN group comes to agreement. This line of credit will further reinforce present patterns: like Japan's postwar reparations program, the loans now offered to ASEAN generally will be tied to purchases of Japanese goods and technical services. To the extent that the first wave of Japan's postwar economic presence was facilitated by the reparations program, and can now stand some reinvigoration, the Fukuda Doctrine will provide precisely that second impetus. And it should be added that this effort will have ample public support in Japan, for there is wide agreement that Southeast Asia is the nation's "special responsibility." In the words of a typical comment:

> If Northeast Asia is a "military-security" key point for Japan, it can be said that Southeast Asia is a major axis for the "economic security" of Japan. Therefore Japan should not be averse to making the utmost possible contribution to the security of this region.[11]

Although the Japanese mean, by their "contribution" to Southeast Asian security, Japan's program of "economic cooperation"—itself a euphemism for their loan programs—they intend no humor. In Tokyo's view the American contribution to Asia's security is its military presence, while Japan's is economic. Many Americans probably tend to share this view; the Japanese, after all, are already the dominant economic force in the region, and what is more, this argument runs, nobody wants to encourage Tokyo to become again an independent military factor in Asian politics. Thus it can be argued that it is a wise course for the United States to welcome Japan's economic leadership in Southeast Asia, while reserving for the United States the principal responsibility to assist in the region's security. Recently, in fact, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Richard Holbrooke, was

[11] *Sankei,* January 26, 1976. Identical comments have become common throughout the mass media since then, and recent conversations with senior editors of newspapers as diverse as *Nihon Keizei* on the respectable Right, to *Asahi Shimbun* on the moderate Left, indicate that this view of Southeast Asia is held across Japan's spectrum of opinion.

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asked about Japan's role in Southeast Asia, and he commented only that:

> Japanese economic involvement in the region is simply a fact of life and it isn't something that the U.S. is encouraging or discouraging. What we have done, however, is to tell the Japanese that it is our view that in the long run we hope the Japanese will play a constructive, larger role in terms of economic development.[12]

III

Aside from the fact that Japan hardly needs American encouragement to assume such a "larger role," the difficulty with Mr. Holbrooke's view is that it tends to compound a division of responsibility that is not in the American interest, and probably not in Japan's either. Even now, for example, there is no reason to take comfort from a comparison of American and Japanese trade and investment roles in the region, and this is *not* a matter of Japan's imports alone. Inevitably, resource-poor Japan will purchase more of Southeast Asia's commodities than will the United States, but nothing requires the United States to lag behind as an exporter as well. Yet American exports to ASEAN in 1976, as Secretary of State Vance seemed to point out with pride recently, stood at $3.7 billion[13]—while the far smaller Japanese economy sold $6 billion to the same market.

Investment in Southeast Asia, where for the last 30 years the United States has led, shows the same pattern. An economist now with the U.S. Treasury Department wrote in 1974 that "in every country the gap between U.S. and Japanese investment has been narrowed, if not turned around."[14] By now that certainly has happened, and the reason is the very steep rate of increase in Japan's investment role in the area. In Singapore, for example, in the period 1970–76, American investments more than tripled—but those from Japan increased almost eightfold.[15] In Indonesia alone Japan's investments stand at more than $2 billion; this is probably already greater than the American investment presence, and will soon be much larger.[16] In a six-month period in 1976, according to

[12] Interview in the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 18, 1977, p. 46.

[13] Address before the Asia Society, New York, June 29, 1977. The Japanese figure of $6.058 billion is as reported by the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo on the occasion of the 1977 Fukuda visits.

[14] Donald R. Sherk, "Foreign Investment in Asia: Japan vs. the U.S.," *Columbia Journal of Business*, Fall 1974, p. 96.

[15] *Asia Research Bulletin* (Singapore), Report No. 3, May 1977, p. 322.

[16] Estimates of U.S. investments in Indonesia range from $1 to $2.5 billion, but there is no argument about the recent and current rates of increase. Every source agrees that Japan's is far steeper than the American; see *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 29, 1977, p. 59. The official Japanese estimate as of the end of 1976 was that direct Japanese investments in Indonesia amounted to $2.016 billion, and direct American investments to $1 billion. JETRO, *Economic Cooperation of Japan*, 1976, p. 31.

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Indonesia's Investment Board, investments from Japan rose by $50 million, while those from the United States in the same period increased by $11 million.

There has been, in other words, an explosion of Japanese trade and investment effort in a region that to Americans represents the scene of a military defeat and political uncertainty, but to Japan represents a field day for good business. And the Japanese analysis, it has to be said, is the more accurate, for Southeast Asia is the world's fastest-growing developing region, and the economic record of the ASEAN group is particularly impressive. Its rate of trade growth, at 32 percent in 1970–74, was higher than the world average, and was second only to the oil-exporting states. Its population is expected to increase from a present 230 million to 290 million in 1985, and its very creditable per capita annual growth rates (of about four percent)[17] show that population increases are being reasonably well managed. In brief, ASEAN represents a large and attractive market, attentively nurtured by Japan but given much less attention by Americans. Two years ago John K. Emmerson, writing from the perspective of a lifetime devoted to observing Japan–U.S. relations, said that: "We may be about to witness a new burst of Japanese energy in Southeast Asia. American businessmen may be hard put to compete."[18] He was emphatically right.

Where the United States has maintained its posture has been in its security role, for despite the rhetoric about military disengagement, the reality is that the United States maintains a high defense stance in East Asia. In its military role, it has been urged to stay on by states as wide apart ideologically as Mainland China and Indonesia. Leaders in Japan, Malaysia, and in the Philippines have made the same point, though President Marcos (up to the last few months) has spoken quite differently in public. All have expressed the view that a combination of American diffidence about Asian security, along with what they see as heightened Soviet leverage in the area, will alter the basic power structure in the Pacific. They have accordingly trooped to Washington to make the point put by Prime Minister Lee of Singapore on a recent American visit: "There is no counter to a Soviet naval vessel other than a United States naval vessel."

For a variety of reasons, including plain resistance to change,

[17] This excludes Singapore's much higher per capita GDP growth rate of 11 percent. See John Wong, *The ASEAN Economies*, University of Singapore, Economic Research Centre, 1977, p. 49.

[18] John K. Emmerson, "After Thirty Years: Japan and America," *Pacific Community*, July 1975, pp. 475–486.

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the United States has responded to these appeals, and Asian fears of impending American military weakness in the Pacific are both exaggerated and premature. The story of the Korean troop withdrawals is illustrative, as President Carter knows best of all. In response to urgent appeals from Tokyo as well as Seoul, there will be a lengthy stretch-out in the Korean troop reduction, and only 6,000 are being sent home now. Similarly, in the Philippines, although the status quo concerning the U.S. bases there has been seriously questioned in the Senate, the Navy is strongly opposed to significant change and none is likely. Likewise, when a group of Japanese opposition-party members (from Komeito) met recently with Defense Secretary Brown, and reported that he mentioned "other withdrawals in the Western Pacific," Mr. Brown issued an immediate denial, and went so far as to ask for a retraction. And on February 20, 1978, Secretary Brown devoted a major speech in Los Angeles to plans for strengthening the U.S. strategic posture in Asia and upgrading the Pacific Fleet.

In East Asia generally, such reassurances are important. But in Southeast Asia American policies may have become so heavily involved with security that they threaten to lose sight of the interests that defense policies are intended to protect.

For an American foreign policy, dependent ultimately on public acceptance and support, this raises questions of balance. Until recently, the U.S. presence in the Pacific has been evident across a wide spectrum: in assistance, in trade and investment, in education and cultural effort, *and* in defense. Now there has been a decline in most of those roles, with only defense remaining a high-priority official concern. The result, accelerated and reinforced by Tokyo's own initiatives, is that Japan increasingly is the dominant presence in economic as well as other activities, while present trends will leave the United States with its military role in Southeast Asia the foremost aspect of the American presence.

If that develops, it has to be questioned whether Americans, in the absence of other functions, will accept the role of principal buttressing power in the Pacific—particularly since within the United States the constituencies that might argue for a broad-gauged American role are themselves in decline. In addition to the falloff in American business activity relative to Japan's role, there is of course disenchantment with development-related assistance programs, and there are few other elements in American society to urge any emphasis in Asia other than defense. Our colleges and universities already have given up much of their "foreign" emphasis, and Asian and all other areas of international studies have

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suffered. Were it not for Japanese industry gifts to Harvard, Yale, and Pittsburgh, and the wide support of the Japan Foundation, our ability to participate knowledgeably in Pacific developments already would be drastically impaired. With perhaps the exception of the single-issue Amnesty International, and the congressionally mandated State Department reports on human rights, no American voice today calls effectively for continued American concern with anything in Asia other than defense.

The prospect this holds out is not a good one for either the United States or Japan, or for the Southeast Asian states themselves. One aspect is the continuing fear in Southeast Asia that Japan will again become the exclusively dominant state in the region. The Japanese well remember the "Tanaka riots" of 1974—anti-Japanese demonstrations in Indonesia and Thailand at the time of the former Prime Minister's visits. While that sentiment has cooled—and those demonstrations in particular had important indigenous causes—they were facilitated by a local sense of Japan's "over-presence," and Tokyo is anxious to avoid rekindling this attitude. Developments that might lead to a too-exclusive role for Japan in the region are recognized, at least in the Foreign Office, as not in the nation's interests.

A second drawback is that Southeast Asia may come to figure in the differences on trade policy that already are such a nagging strain between Tokyo and Washington. Until recently, most complaints about Japan focused on damage to U.S. business at home, but a much older issue—the difficulties that American products face in Japan's market—has again surfaced. It is a potentially explosive issue, because protectionism in Japan is even more politically sacrosanct than in the United States. Americans should recognize that their products do encounter sales problems in Japan that do not derive from Tokyo's official policies (such as markedly different tastes and distribution patterns), but the ruling Liberal Democratic Party believes that the hard core of its electoral base rests on a number of very well-protected agricultural enterprises and industries, and it will resist in every way any true "liberalization" of Japan's imports. Consequently, while the agreement reached by Messrs. Strauss and Ushiba in Tokyo in January 1978 should be welcomed, it must also be recognized that only a persistent, steady, and quite intensive effort from outside has a chance to persuade Japan to adopt a genuine free trade posture in the foreseeable future—and only then if there is no practical alternative available. No prior challenge to Japan's protectionism has been successful; the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, on

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the day after the Strauss-Ushiba communiqué on January 13, remarked that "Japan's basic line remains completely unchanged, even if the expression has changed."[19] This and much other evidence suggests caution about the early openness of Japan's market that can be expected. As it becomes evident that American business will face increasing difficulties in the growing Southeast Asian market—owing largely to Japan's role—one likely result is even more anti-Japanese protectionist sentiment in the United States.

Yet both Japanese and American leaders seem oblivious to the dangers of their growing and too-neat division of labor in Southeast Asia. It is typified, for example, by the irony that while Japan under the Fukuda Doctrine will be extending a profitable $1 billion line of credit to ASEAN, the United States will be providing continued economic and military assistance to the Philippines, related substantially to the American defense presence there.[20] This is not to suggest that U.S. defense spending is "unproductive," nor do I want to argue the equally simplistic notion that Japan has a "free ride." The benefits realized from defense spending must always be assessed with a yardstick different from the one used to measure other social costs. Similarly, there are many cases where defense obligations need not and often ought not be shared equally, and the need to avoid Japan's rearmament is one of them. The issue is instead one of balance, for both American and Japanese postures in the Pacific are now becoming grossly imbalanced.

For the United States, the need is to avoid policies that simply acquiesce in—or even worse reinforce—Japan's economic dominance in the region. For Japan the need is to find ways that will contribute more genuinely both to the security and development needs of the area. This is neither a call for Japan's rearmament nor is it a call for the United States, in order to justify a significant defense involvement in the Southeast Asian region, to insist on directly equivalent trade and investment benefits. Americans have many times undertaken long-haul efforts, both in Europe and Asia, that would not have been justified by the wrong-headed notion of classical Marxism that great powers go only where their markets and profits dictate. But at some point even the most dedicated non-Marxist leader must be able to defend strategic and

[19] *Asahi Shimbun*, January 14, 1978.

[20] In the recent Carter Administration aid proposals for next year, U.S. military grant aid and U.S. military sales to the Philippines are set at $18 million and $18.7 million respectively. Smaller amounts would be provided to Indonesia and Thailand.

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political policies with persuasive evidence that the well-being of his people is being seen to by those policies. If present trends continue, American leaders will not be able to make that case for Southeast Asia, and in an environment in which Americans increasingly are aware of Japan's economic activities, the "free ride" thesis is certain to gain new attention.

IV

There is of course no certain cure for this condition, but it is possible to outline a policy that will do better than now to protect the interests of all concerned, improve the balance in American policy, and be more likely to hold American public support. Such a policy should be based on two assumptions: first, that a strong and genuine U.S.-Japan partnership is fundamental to all else in the Pacific, and second, that economic and security elements cannot be separated. There are three issues presently facing the United States in Southeast Asia that illustrate this approach, that need attention in any case, and that will be explored here: American policy toward ASEAN; the question of the U.S. bases in the Philippines; and the issue of policy toward Vietnam.

With regard to ASEAN, U.S. policy seems limited to generalized endorsements and vague assurances, conveyed most recently by Under Secretary of State Richard Cooper in Manila last August, that the American market will be open to ASEAN's commodity and other exports. In the light of President Carter's decision, in November 1977, to raise tariffs on imported sugar, even that has to be doubted. The January 1978 visit to Tokyo by AID Administrator John Gilligan provided an opportunity to devote thought to concrete coordination with Japan, but the meetings instead reinforced Tokyo's view that no clear U.S. posture toward ASEAN has yet emerged.

To be sure, Washington has now announced that a meeting with ASEAN representatives will be held there in June, and this could be more than a symbolic gesture. But American policy still falls well short of the program of firm American support for ASEAN urged as far back as 1975 by Senator Jacob Javits, and the contrast between American diffidence and Japan's strong cultivation of the ASEAN economies was rightly noted in December by James Reston.[21]

The problem is how to elevate the U.S. role in acceptable ways,

[21] Senator Javits' remarks were reported in *The New York Times* of September 5, 1975; Mr. Reston's appeared in the *Times* on December 11, 1977 and were reprinted in *Asahi Shimbun* on December 13.

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and at the same time improve the U.S. posture vis-à-vis Japan. One approach to this end would be to consider as candidates for joint Japan-U.S. support the five major agro-industrial projects on which ASEAN is now focusing. Although the Japanese one-billion-dollar line of credit has not been allocated, it is thought of in the region as a $200 million loan for each of the five efforts—ranging in present thinking from the production of soda ash in Thailand to urea in Malaysia, with an understanding on avoiding duplication among ASEAN nations.[22]

Projects of this sort could provide a concrete opportunity for close Japan-U.S. collaboration in a way that reinforces indigenous plans. The most suitable vehicle to achieve this would be to extend the already-existing format of Japan-U.S. consultations (dealing now with defense and bilateral trade), to include funding for the ASEAN projects as well. Nothing like this now exists, and it is quite certain that Japan's recent initiatives to ASEAN—like the Fukuda Doctrine itself—were undertaken with only the most minimal advance consultation with the United States.

A joint effort with Japan in support of ASEAN's regional projects is surely not beyond the capacity of the United States, even in this era of reduced AID budgets and skepticism toward foreign assistance. A program of credits, similar to Japan's offer of one billion dollars in interest-payable loans, is probably the most practical format, and is consistent with the present level of American efforts in the region. If we assume that the five ASEAN projects will extend over five years, U.S. credits to them might amount to some $50–100 million in each year. Nor is there any reason to expect such a program to be restricted to government loans. Japan's is not, and the viability of the projects (Tokyo insists that their "feasibility" must be demonstrated to the lender's satisfaction) is likely to make them attractive to private investment.

Such a program would have decent prospects for American support, for Congress has not been standoffish to a regional group like ASEAN. Moreover, and unlike the "multilateral" funding programs that are disliked in Congress, the U.S. role here would not be minimized, or otherwise hidden. The necessary practical step is for the United States to propose to Japan, and to ASEAN, that for every regional project of significance, Washington will consider joining with Tokyo (and perhaps with such others as Australia) in joint funding support. Some in Japan will resist this further notion, but it should also be part of an American proposal

[22] On current readings, the Philippines would concentrate on paper production, while Singapore and Indonesia are discussing types of diesel-engine manufacture as an ASEAN project.

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to insist upon a non-tied basis for loans extended, so that American firms will have the same opportunity as Japanese contractors to participate. To do otherwise, and in particular for the United States to acquiesce in a Japan-only program of support for ASEAN, will be to reduce the prospects for American business in Southeast Asia, and ultimately to reinforce the present pattern.

V

American bases in the Philippines represent the second issue on which an evolving U.S. policy is desirable. After the collapse of South Vietnam, the Philippines insisted on a renegotiation of existing base agreements (which expire in 1991), and for a time in late 1976 it appeared that Secretary Kissinger was ready to commit the United States to a billion-dollar program of military and economic aid, over five years, associated directly with the bases in a form approximating the rental the United States has provided over the years for its extensive base rights in Spain. Through 1975 and 1976, President Marcos—whether as a bargaining tactic or for more basic reasons—repeatedly made public statements questioning the value of the bases to the Philippines, doubting the validity of the American treaty commitment to the security of the Philippines, and broadly hinting that the Philippines were considering "alternative uses" for the base areas.

During 1977 the atmosphere seemed to change markedly—perhaps partly because the Philippines have been under much clearer pressure from the Carter Administration over the continued application of martial law and suppression of democratic practices and human rights. With the executive no longer fighting critical segments of the Congress on these issues, but instead putting on its own pressure, the chances of congressional approval of a large "base rental" agreement must now appear minimal to all parties. A second major factor may be the continuing security problem in Mindanao. Apparently Marcos needs—at least for the time being—a clear and visible American connection, more than he was prepared to admit 18 months ago.

At any rate, he has been singing a different tune in the past year—far less critical of the United States, far more ready (apparently) to recognize that the bases do, after all, involve spending that may amount to as much as five percent of his country's GNP, no longer raising public doubts whether the bases would be available in all foreseeable crises. And in the negotiations themselves the stress so far has been on markedly increasing the visible evidence of their Philippine character—through having a Filipino

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as base commander, among other moves, with American officers in command of designated American activities—and on reducing the area especially of the vast air base at Clark Field. It now appears likely that whatever American military and economic aid may be planned or committed for the future, it will be far less than the one-billion-dollar five-year deal being aired in 1976, and probably dissociated to a considerable extent from the actual base agreement.

These changes in atmosphere and negotiating approach are to the good. But it should not be thought for a moment that any new base agreement—assuming it is both agreed and ratified by the Congress—would simply maintain the old status quo into the future. The military need for the bases, the enlisting of regional support for their retention, and conceivably the devising of some cost-sharing arrangement involving the Japanese at least indirectly—all these should be the subjects of continuing study and effort.

For the present, there can be no question that the bases serve important purposes both military and psychological. Given the doubts in Japan and in some other parts of Asia about the future reliability of the U.S. presence, any unilateral American withdrawal from the Philippine bases could only be sharply destabilizing at least for the next several years, from a psychological standpoint alone. Militarily the bases play an important role not only with reference to the Western Pacific but also as the most reliable way station to the Indian Ocean. Finally, the naval facilities at Subic Bay perform major functions for the Pacific Fleet as a whole, being by far the cheapest overhaul and drydock facilities available.

Whether these needs will persist into the indefinite future is, however, doubtful. The Navy's reduced emphasis on carriers (as compared to submarines, which use Subic far less) and the apparent expansion of Diego Garcia are bound to raise questions. Most basically, with the experience of 1973 in Europe (including Spain) fresh in mind, one is bound to have long-term doubts about whether the bases will be reliably available in some conceivable crises. Although Marcos has now changed his line, his appeals to nationalist and anti-American sentiment could be renewed at any time he feels less vulnerable (or thinks he sees useful friends elsewhere). Many in Manila do resent the bases and feel that the United States has too long had a bargain at Filipino expense.

All these considerations suggest that any new agreement with the Philippines should be seen for no more than what it is: an

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accommodation reluctantly arrived at, and with the famous "good will" toward Americans much less to be counted on these days. This ought not to be considered a reliable foundation for U.S. policy. It would be prudent instead to bring more certainty to American assumptions about the Philippine bases, and useful to attempt that in a format that does not imply higher unilateral U.S. defense expenditures – if we want to avoid the hardening "division of labor" in the Pacific that I have already mentioned.

This is an issue that can properly be discussed by the United States with the ASEAN states. While it can be assumed that all in ASEAN want to retain an American naval presence in the region, the group has been committed since its founding to the view that "foreign military bases are temporary in nature" and must be removed. The inconsistency of the Philippines' position – as an ASEAN charter member with U.S. bases – is evident to all in this, and frankly placing this on an ASEAN-U.S. agenda would have several uses. Among other things, a more open ASEAN recognition of the desirability of the U.S. bases would help to reduce Manila's susceptibility to the charge that its independence is diluted by the American presence.

More than that, discussion of the relationship of the bases to regional security can also provide an opportunity to discuss Japan's role, for it should not be thought that there is total aversion to all forms of Japanese participation in these issues. Mr. Marcos himself said recently that Japan's defense improvements are not resented these days, and in 1973 Prime Minister Lee of Singapore even suggested that Japan – along with Australia – participate in a Pacific-region "task force." No doubt that goes too far, but it is evident that even while Japan strongly desires that the Philippine bases be retained, Tokyo contributes in no way to their cost. Even at Yokosuka and elsewhere in Japan, the present degree of "cost-sharing" between Tokyo and Washington is disadvantageous to the United States; while hard figures are notoriously difficult to come by, the evidence of Japanese and American officials in Tokyo suggests that of the approximately one billion dollars expended by the United States for its Japanese defense presence, much less than half is shared by Japan.[23]

[23] A recent decision to increase Japan's share of "labor costs" at the bases there to $24.8 million barely scratches the surface of the matter, and U.S. officials in Tokyo seem quite reluctant to move in the direction of a genuine 50-50 share for overall costs. John K. Emmerson, who was Embassy Counselor in Tokyo, reports an estimate of $573 million as the cost to the U.S. in 1970 (*Arms, Yen, and Power*, Tokyo, 1971, p. 91). Inflation and other factors have reportedly doubled the costs since then, and even Japanese specialists, who would give a "high" estimate for Tokyo's share, identify it as no more than $500 million in 1977.

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The U.S. bases in the Philippines need to be considered in that light, taking into account both the role they play in bolstering the sense of American presence in the region, and the share of Pacific-region defense costs that are now borne solely by the United States. What needs to be explored is a form of Japan-U.S. cost-sharing based on a more explicit recognition that these installations, rather than being an American imposition, are widely wanted. That is the crucial element, both in better assuring that American access to the bases can be relied on, and in helping to overcome the view that any assistance from Japan would contravene Article IX of its Constitution, limiting Japan to self-defense.

Greater legitimacy for the Philippine bases, among both Japan and the ASEAN states, would help to reduce their present image as a solely U.S. responsibility, in which therefore the United States must continue alone to bear all the costs. To accept such an image is to be resigned to the present division of labor, in which Japan's "contribution" to Asian security is measured in terms of development loans ultimately payable to the Bank of Japan, while that of the United States is in military assistance grants and a growing defense budget.

VI

The final case to be mentioned—the matter of U.S. relations with Vietnam—needs to be identified not because it warrants more attention, but because it should be given less. At the outset of the Carter Administration, relations with Vietnam were given high priority, and teams were dispatched to Hanoi to deal with the issue of U.S. soldiers still reported as "missing in action," and to Paris in connection with "normalization of relations with Vietnam." While the first met with some success, the Paris negotiations came to nothing in the face of Vietnam's insistence on large U.S. economic aid—sometimes referred to as "reconstruction assistance," and sometimes openly as "reparations." By near-unanimous majorities, Congress made clear to the Administration that it must not proceed in that direction. In the same period, some Asia-based representatives of American banks visited Hanoi to explore trade opportunities, but after some early optimism the matter has stagnated. Aside from the insistence by Assistant Secretary Holbrooke on repeated personal trips to Paris to explore "normalization"—odd, since a lower ranking official would have reflected a more appropriately relaxed American posture—the issue now appears to have settled to a low priority on the President's agenda.

A similar flurry of activity characterized the reaction of Japan

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and the ASEAN states in the wake of Saigon's collapse in 1975. By August 1976, Hanoi had achieved full diplomatic relations with all ASEAN members. President Marcos even praised Hanoi for having "taught the whole world one of the most important lessons in human history,"[24] and he was even more effusive on an earlier visit to Peking. He seemed anxious to suggest that the entire Philippine relationship with the United States had been a large misunderstanding, for which it was hoped Manila might be forgiven. Others in ASEAN seemed anxious to avoid actions that might seem provocative to Hanoi, and some hoped that Vietnam might consider cooperative relations with the ASEAN group.

Since then, a recognition has set in that Hanoi has its own interests on the mainland of Southeast Asia, and that those interests give very low priority to the kinds of economic cooperation steps for which ASEAN members are now ready. Vietnam has made this clear by stressing that it is prepared for bilateral relations, but will have nothing to do with ASEAN as a group. It continues to denounce the organization, and although the Thai are endeavoring to establish a decent relationship with Vietnam, they know that until very recently they were Hanoi's particular target for abuse.[25] Vietnam has taken other steps that underline its disinclination to move to a new era in relations with its neighbors. One was its virtual annexation of Laos last summer, and a second is its continued willingness to give strong support to Moscow at the expense of its evidently strained relations with Peking. The Soviets are by far the more warily watched in Southeast Asia; the Chinese tacitly accept ASEAN and the American presence. The combination of all these considerations has made clear to most in the region that Hanoi's perspectives are likely to remain in sharp contrast to those in the ASEAN capitals. Vietnam's self-image is not that of an Asian medium-sized state, with something to be gained from cooperation with similarly situated neighbors. Rather, it sees itself as an Asian model state, whose victory and vindication after 30 years give it a global stature well above its *comprador* neighbors, and remove any need for cooperation with them.

Nonetheless, in Japan (and perhaps among some in Washington) a fixation is now forming that close relations with Vietnam are crucial to stability and security in Southeast Asia. As many in Tokyo see it, what Southeast Asia most needs politically is "early

[24] Quoted in the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 23, 1976.

[25] In April 1977, when the U.S. military "presence" in Thailand was less than one hundred, Hanoi was still broadcasting that the "continued U.S. presence in Thailand is evidence that Thais are assisting the U.S. imperialists in implementing a neocolonial policy." Hanoi Broadcast, April 21, 1977, reported in *Asia and the Pacific*, Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

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normalization of U.S. relations with Hanoi," and second, that a "bridge" be established between Vietnam and the ASEAN states.[26]

This is a view from which the United States needs respectfully to demur, for it is not at all well supported by the evidence, but derives instead from a complex set of Japanese attitudes, many of them subjective. Not all can be explored here, but a sense of guilt for not having supported Hanoi's cause during the war is one factor. Another of course is that Japan wants to do business with Hanoi—she regularly buys its coking coal, and Japan's exports to Vietnam have risen rapidly since 1973, although Japan's ASEAN trade remains far larger. Japan has been cautioned by both Hanoi and ASEAN for her trade and assistance to the other, and Tokyo has been constrained by this double pressure.

The Japanese accordingly want to bring to their Vietnam connection the color of more "legitimacy" than they believe now exists, and normalization of U.S. relations with Hanoi would serve that goal. Without that, the Japanese fear continuing criticism from both Hanoi and ASEAN, and they tend also to think assistance programs to both may help to perpetuate Southeast Asia's "cold war" divisions. The Japanese in particular are uncomfortable in that sort of conflictual environment, and their hopes to play the role of bridge between the two groups derives from that discomfort.

The problem is that Japan's views may lend an artificial urgency to the Vietnam issue in American thinking. It is simply unrealistic to expect Congress or the American people to support any form of special economic assistance to Vietnam, and it is in that sense that Assistant Secretary Holbrooke's personal attention to the Vietnam issue has been questioned.[27] He has made only the briefest stops in Japan, while the ASEAN region has been almost entirely ignored, and the comparison with his several trips to Paris, in pursuit of "normalization" with Vietnam, suggests a disproportionate emphasis. A more prudent American policy would make clear to ASEAN, to Japan, *and* to Hanoi that in American eyes Vietnam is a developing Southeast Asian state with numerous difficulties and needs, but one whose internal organization makes it no more palatable for American support than any other communist state. A prudent American policy would also make clear to all that in

[26] There have been many illustrations of this notion in Japan; a very recent one was an article with the headline "Vietnam Becoming New Focal Point" in *Nihon Keizai*, the nation's most prestigious business-oriented newspaper. Written by the Chief Editor, the article concluded that "peaceful political and economic competition with Vietnam is the problem confronting ASEAN." *Nihon Keizai*, November 10, 1977.

[27] See for example Chalmers Johnson, "Carter in Asia: McGovernism without McGovern," *Commentary*, January 1978.

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Southeast Asia it is the ASEAN group that is given priority.

Japan's trade and assistance may indeed, as the Japanese hope, help Vietnam to become less dependent on and supportive of the Soviet Union than it is now. In time, Hanoi may come to recognize that its rigid orthodoxy, including its present agricultural collectivization program, does not serve its developmental needs. It may then seek both closer collaboration with its neighbors, and a different investment approach in connection with the United States and the West generally. But that is for Hanoi itself to judge, and the United States should not encourage anyone to expect that American actions will have much effect on that judgment. Indeed this is the *one* place in Southeast Asia where it will be best to advise Tokyo that Washington welcomes whatever unilateral economic initiatives Japan thinks appropriate. Certainly, however, Japan's assistance to ASEAN should not be contingent upon considerations relating to Vietnam, or geared to expectations of change in the U.S. posture.

Even more important, it should be absolutely clear that in the American calculation of whether and how to provide assistance to ASEAN, there is no element of "waiting on Hanoi." That would be to cater to Vietnam's view that it warrants uniquely favorable treatment—or perhaps unique suspicion. An American policy based on either assumption would serve to inflate the exaggerated importance some already give to Hanoi, and that can hardly be a sensible American goal.

VII

Japan and the United States are bound to encounter extraordinary difficulties in their close and interdependent relationship. Japan is a society that, while fundamentally distrustful of all others, has at least for a time suspended that distrust insofar as the United States is concerned. She has hitched her future to the United States in ways no major nation has ever before attempted with any other, and the pulls that would have Japan act again from fear, and from small-mindedness, are very considerable. Thus it was unfortunate that in the early 1970s, just when the Japanese were becoming more relaxed and accepting of their American connection, it was shaken. The military setback in Vietnam, and the serious political and economic convulsions experienced by Americans at home, represented a crisis of confidence in American politics that has been transmitted in magnified form to the Japanese. As Lyndon Johnson would have said, this has led the Japanese to hunker down, to return their thoughts to Asia, and to

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cultivate what they perceive as their backyard.

The difficulty is that Japan and America are not only complementary in their economies—indeed Japan is the "mother country" in the classic colonial relationship, since she is the importer of America's commodities and supplier of its manufacturers—but in such places as Japan's Southeast Asian backyard, they are deeply competitive as well. While it might be best in some circumstances to let the competitive chips fall as they might, the problem is compounded here by America's defender role, both of the backyard and of Japan herself. Thus the strands pull in many directions at once, and as I have aimed to show in this essay, the protector must at some point wonder whose interests he defends at such high cost. Very prematurely, Japan has begun already to conclude that the American protective shield is being withdrawn. Japan's fears, leading then to a need for demonstrable U.S. reassurances, represent a repeating cycle of anxiety and guarantees that is costly, irritating, and painful to the United States.

What is called for from both nations is a conscious and convinced decision that they mean genuinely to mingle their fortunes and mix their economies. If that comes, it will ultimately be reflected in a profound transformation of both economic structures. Its first testing, however, will come in the East Asian rim areas, whose continued involvement in the non-communist world structure is essential to both.

Thus the immediate and practical problem requires Americans to believe the rhetoric of their leaders that they are a Pacific power, and to establish with Japan not a condominium—in which the United States provides the security from which all others prosper—but a balanced partnership. Such a partnership would recognize America's capacities and needs as a major economy, as well as America's role as a great power. In Southeast Asia, with almost 300 million people in the very near future, American business should make the investment and marketing decisions that will add up to a serious and growing stake. In education, major changes will be required to train Americans to deal both with Japan and with the regions where Japan now leads.

For Japan, what is required is a trust that Americans have now certainly earned, and a generosity that Japan as a nation has never demonstrated—but to which Americans are now also reciprocally entitled. For Japan, accustomed to think and act essentially in terms of rank and hierarchy, equal partnership with the United States will be most difficult. It might be said to require that Japan extend an open and outreached hand to the United States in

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Southeast Asia, where Americans have stumbled. Japan's goal must then be to synchronize her steps with the pace of the United States, and this will certainly stretch Japan's capacity for generosity, because the United States is a competitor now lagging or about to fall behind.

If Japan can practice this moderation, and if the United States can make the efforts necessary to catch up, the results will be worthwhile. For there is in the five ASEAN nations, and in Southeast Asia as a whole, an opportunity both for regional betterment and for satisfying enterprise that can only be beneficial in the long run to all the nations involved. If Japan attempts the effort alone, as she began to do in 1977, she will surely be resented and rejected in the long term by Southeast Asia, and the Americans will be much more liable to drop out from precisely that defense presence on which Japan and much else in the Pacific so largely depends.

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Joseph S. Nye

NONPROLIFERATION: A LONG-TERM STRATEGY

During his election campaign, Jimmy Carter dramatized a broad but inchoate popular concern when he promised that curbing the spread of nuclear weapons would be among his highest foreign policy priorities. Perhaps it is hardly surprising that public attention during 1977 tended to focus on his initial highly visible actions and especially on their confrontational aspects. Both critics and sympathizers tended to score what they saw as the Administration's policy as if it were a football game with clear-cut winners and losers, and in the process the wider outlines of policy were sometimes obscured.

In fact, nonproliferation policy is much more like a large construction project than an adversary contest. It may, to be sure, never follow the precise blueprints of its architects, which will always need a degree of improvisation and adjustment. But it is to be judged by whether it is in fact advancing toward the kind of result laid out as its long-term goal. In the recent words of a perceptive critic, it is such long-term strategy that provides the "wider canvas" against which the merits of individual actions can be judged.[1]

So I shall try in this article to fill in and to put into focus the key elements of nonproliferation policy as they have emerged during the past year—sometimes in complex and little-publicized actions and negotiations—and to assess these elements in a long-term context. What are we (as a nation) really trying to do for the long pull, and how are we making out?

II

The goal of our nonproliferation policy is to slow the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities—preferably to zero—and to mini-

[1] See Stanley Hoffmann, "The Hell of Good Intentions," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1977–78.

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mize, and keep under control, any destabilizing impact of the diffusion of nuclear technology (i.e., any impact tending in the direction of conflict between nations or other forms of violence). Obviously, these are not tasks for the United States alone; they require for their achievement the highest possible degree of consensus among nations that now have or might in the future wish to have nuclear technology. Thus, the long-run task can be defined as the development of an international regime of practices and institutions for governing the split atom that will be widely accepted as legitimate, equitable, and reasonable, and hence can operate effectively in the face of continuing technical and political change.

We are sometimes told that the goal is hopeless because the nuclear "horse is out of the stable." But proliferation is a matter of degrees, not absolutes. Our policy can affect the number of horses, which horses, and when horses leave the barn. Of the 20 countries with relatively advanced nuclear technology, all but a handful have chosen not to develop nuclear weapons. As basic nuclear technology spreads to some 40 countries over the next two decades, it could make an enormous difference whether this kind of situation persists.

Skeptics might challenge this goal. Some have argued, for example, that proliferation does not matter or could even have a stabilizing effect on world politics. Just as nuclear weapons have produced prudence in U.S.-Soviet relations, they argue, so may nuclear weapons stabilize regional balances. But this assumes stable governments with established command-and-control systems; the absence of strong destabilizing motivations such as irredentist passions; and the discipline to resist the temptation for preemptive strikes against adversaries during the early stages when new nuclear weapons capabilities are soft and vulnerable. Such assumptions are heroic and myopic. On balance, the risk of increased regional instability seems far greater.

And if one thinks of private groups, the destabilizing impact seems even more conclusive. Whatever the actual chances of successful acquisition of a nuclear device by a terrorist group, even threats of such action may create difficulties that could dwarf the present serious problems from this quarter. And, as we have seen in other connections, terrorist groups may be in league with maverick states, and thus not dependent solely on their own limited technological capabilities.

Globally the wide or rapid spread of nuclear capabilities could affect both the central strategic balance and prospects for the

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gradual evolution of a peaceful and just world order. To illustrate both points, take the cases of the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan. One of the striking and constructive features of the world since 1945 is that these two great powers of the prewar period have been reintegrated into world coalitions and institutions as the third and fourth most powerful states in economic terms without their feeling it necessary to develop equivalent nuclear military power. This makes the central strategic balance more calculable, and is a major stabilizing factor both in Europe and Asia. And both offer models of countries achieving major influence in world politics without nuclear weaponry.

Any further significant increase in the number of nations with their own nuclear weapons tends exactly in the opposite direction. At a certain point—especially if it were to call into question the basic decisions hitherto maintained by Germany and Japan—widespread proliferation would surely have profound consequences. Over the long term, if countries are able to achieve their goals of security, status, and economic well-being without the necessity of developing military nuclear power, the prospects are much greater for the evolution of new forms of effective power, coalitions and institutions, and for a more peaceful world less dependent on real or assumed military balances.

In fact, this Administration's soundings of the past year have confirmed the conclusion of past Administrations. There *is*, we find, a widely shared, indeed a general, sense that proliferation is likely to be destabilizing and that nuclear weapons will not significantly enhance the power or security position of most states. This provides a common international interest upon which nonproliferation strategy can be based. As long as countries can be made better off without a bomb than with one, then a policy of slowing the spread of nuclear weapons technology rests on a realistic formulation of common interests, and there are serious prospects for gaining agreement on a legitimate and stable international nuclear regime.

III

While the Carter Administration has taken a number of dramatic new nonproliferation initiatives, there is more continuity than difference with the past.

At the end of World War II, it was recognized that the civil and military aspects of nuclear energy were closely related, and that the American technological monopoly would not last. In devising

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what became the Baruch Plan, David Lilienthal's committee informed Secretary of State Byrnes early in 1946 that "to 'outlaw' atomic energy in all of its forms and enforce such a prohibition by an army of inspectors roaming the earth would overwhelm the capacity and the endurance of men, and provide no security."[2] Yet the Baruch Plan to create a strong international authority to develop nuclear energy was a more ambitious step than international realities would permit.

With the rejection of the Baruch proposals by the Soviet Union, American policy turned temporarily to a posture of seeking to protect its monopoly by severely restricting the export of any nuclear technology. But this did not prevent the Soviet Union and Britain each from obtaining a bomb, and in December 1953, President Eisenhower launched a third approach with his "Atoms for Peace" program. The idea of the Atoms for Peace approach was to assist countries in their development of civilian nuclear energy, in return for their guarantees that they would use such assistance only for peaceful purposes.

The Atoms for Peace approach has been criticized for promoting nuclear energy in some instances before it was economically justified. Some sensitive technologies were declassified prematurely; and guarantees of "peaceful use" were sometimes too loosely written. In practice, the early Atoms for Peace policy failed to achieve the right balance.

Nonetheless, the philosophy of the Atoms for Peace program made sense as a long-term strategy. Essentially, the United States was offering to share the fruits of its then-long technological lead at an accelerated pace, in return for the acceptance by other countries of conditions designed to control destabilizing effects from such sharing. The policy may have been oversold, and not fully thought through in its execution at a time when too little was known about the pace and cost of peaceful nuclear development. But it was not a selfish policy, or so regarded, and it served to create an initial consensus on which to build.

Specifically, a seminal accomplishment was the institution of a system of international safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), established in Vienna in 1957. Under the IAEA safeguards system, countries must file with the Agency regular detailed reports on their civilian nuclear activities and must allow international inspectors to visit their nuclear facilities to verify the reports and to ensure that there has

[2] *A Report on The International Control of Atomic Energy*, Washington: GPO, 1946, p. 17.

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been no diversion of materials from civilian to military purposes. Essentially the safeguards system is part of a bargain in which countries are assisted to meet their peaceful nuclear energy needs in return for their accepting the intrusion of safeguards into their sovereignty.

In the mid-1960s, the objective of limiting the spread of nuclear weapons was explicitly codified in the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) signed in 1968 and entering into force in 1970. By then peaceful nuclear technology, while still going forward, had come to seem somewhat less attractive than had seemed likely in the 1950s. Cheap oil dominated the energy picture, while in the area of nuclear weapons, the number of weapons states had stabilized at five after the Chinese test of 1964. In these circumstances, an initial group of 98 nations was prepared to sign the Treaty, undertaking not to develop or aid development of nuclear weapons or explosives. In addition, non-weapons signatory states agreed to put *all* their nuclear facilities under safeguards, not merely those imported from abroad.

The NPT was surely a major step forward, even though a number of weapons states and potential weapons states refused to sign it, so that significant facilities remained outside the safeguards system. And for a few years, the problem seemed quiescent. In the early 1970s neither the Nixon Administration nor most expert outsiders felt it necessary to give a high priority to reinforcing nonproliferation policy. The IAEA and NPT seemed to be working reasonably well, and the achievement of even the limited SALT I agreement seemed to carry out the NPT obligation of the major weapons states to negotiate seriously toward a reduction in what the Third World calls "vertical proliferation."

This complacency was, of course, shattered by two events in 1974. One was the Indian explosion of a "peaceful" nuclear device using plutonium derived from a Canadian-supplied research reactor—an event viewed as violating the spirit if not the letter of the loosely written 1950s-vintage Canadian safeguards agreement. The other was the oil embargo and fourfold increase in oil prices, which created widespread insecurity in energy supply. Problems with oil led to a sudden surge of expectations about the importance of nuclear energy and raised questions about whether there would be sufficient uranium fuel.

The net effect was to accelerate governments' plans for early commercial use of plutonium fuel, particularly—it was hoped—through the spread of breeder reactors. Plutonium is a man-made element that is produced in uranium-fueled reactors, but must be

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extracted from the radioactive spent fuel rods if it is to be used as a fresh fuel. Unlike the low-enriched uranium currently used as fuel in most reactors, plutonium is a weapons-usable material. Because of the high cost of reprocessing plants for extracting plutonium from spent reactor fuel, it is unlikely to be an economically superior fuel until there are severe shortages (and much higher prices) of uranium. Yet in some cases, reprocessing plants were offered to countries that were only just building their first uranium-fueled power reactors and lacked any serious economic justification for reprocessing.[3]

Recovering from a late start, the Ford Administration undertook important initiatives in 1975-76. It began to organize the nuclear supplier governments to agree on a code of conduct for nuclear exports. Meeting secretly in London, the new Nuclear Suppliers Group began the process of developing a set of guidelines for nuclear exports.[4] And in the final days before the 1976 election, President Ford accepted the recommendations of an internal study and announced a moratorium on commercial reprocessing of spent fuel in the United States pending further evaluation.

At the same time, a number of congressional initiatives were undertaken that were designed to tighten the conditions for nuclear exports from the United States, and several private studies of the nuclear fuel cycle, notably the so-called Ford-Mitre Report and the American Physical Society Report, were coming to the conclusion that the commercial use of plutonium was economically premature and dangerous. By the time the Carter Administration came into office, there was considerable activity, uncertainty and public anxiety about nuclear energy and proliferation, and several critical choices had to be faced at once.

IV

Over the past two decades, a general international consensus had developed on the legitimacy of the IAEA and the international safeguards system, and on the policies reflected in the NPT. The new Administration made the basic choice to build upon this consensus. The alternative of curtailing nuclear power or cutting

[3] For a description of the nuclear fuel cycle, and the economics of reprocessing, see Spurgeon Keeny, ed., *Nuclear Power Issues and Choices: Report of the Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group*, Cambridge: Ballinger, 1977 (sometimes called the Ford-Mitre Report); and "Report to the American Physical Society by the Study Panel on Nuclear Fuel Cycles and Waste Management," supplement to *Reviews of Modern Physics*, January 1978.

[4] The original seven suppliers were Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada, and Japan. The current membership also includes the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Italy, and Belgium.

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off all nuclear exports, though suggested by some, would not be successful in the long term.

Specifically, one of the most poignant notes in the 1976 congressional hearings on nonproliferation had been David Lilienthal's plea for a total export moratorium. However, the Administration rejected this not because of concerns about losing business or balance-of-payments revenues, but because it would fail as a long-term nonproliferation policy. A moratorium would have aroused nationalistic resistance to our policy; others would quickly step in to fill the order books; and we lacked the means to induce other nations to follow our policies. It was also important that we not turn our backs on other countries' energy needs. While a moratorium might make us feel pure, it would not make us safe. In a world where other sources of supply exist, a score of countries have nuclear technology, and a half-dozen are already involved in plutonium technology, nuclear isolationism would be a "Pontius Pilate policy" producing clean hands but disastrous overall effects.

The Carter Administration thus reaffirmed its commitment to the basic philosophy of Atoms for Peace and the NPT. But it could not ignore the way that technological change was threatening to erode the political value of the international safeguards system. Thus the second decision the Administration had to face was how to deal with the growing diffusion of reprocessing facilities.

Where reprocessing plants operate under national control, there are possibilities for clandestine diversion or sudden taking over of substantial quantities of weapons-usable plutonium by the operating nation. With sufficient advance preparation in the design, testing and fabrication of the non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons, a nation conceivably could have a nuclear arsenal soon after the plutonium became available. In such cases, even if the international inspectors promptly notified the IAEA of a diversion, the warning would not be timely.

How much time constitutes "timely warning"? There is no simple answer. Weeks are better than days, and years better than months. The longer the time available for diplomatic efforts, the better the chances of bringing about a favorable outcome. Critics have argued that opposition to the spread of commercial reprocessing is pointless because a potential proliferator could acquire plutonium anyway by secretly building a small covert reprocessing plant. They argued that this would take only six or seven months. But such a route would be very risky, with an uncertain probability of successful operation combined with a high probability of detection. Deciding to construct a secret (as opposed to an open commercial)

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plant would be a difficult decision for most governments, and could provide clear evidence to the world of an intent to build nuclear weapons.

Thus, the Administration saw many nonproliferation benefits in delaying the premature spread of commercial reprocessing plants. On the other hand, it was well aware that for the past quarter-century the nuclear industry in this and other countries has proceeded on the assumption that reprocessing would begin when there were sufficient light water reactors to justify the large-scale facilities needed for economic operation, and that plutonium would be recycled in light water reactors until the fast breeder reactors were introduced. Foreign nations without our fossil fuel and natural uranium resources were even more strongly wedded to the belief that reprocessing and plutonium stockpiles would be needed at an early date.

The Administration believed that a second look was required at these assumptions of the past. We could not be dogmatic about the long-term prospects for the breeder reactor (which requires reprocessing, though not necessarily the current type). We realized that countries such as France, Germany and Japan lacked the natural resources we possessed and were much more heavily dependent upon energy imports. Consequently, we carefully avoided criticism of other countries' breeder reactor research and development programs. We believed that there was time to develop information, technology and institutions for a safer fuel cycle before breeders became commercially competitive. On the other hand, *recycling* plutonium for use in light water reactors represented a clear and present danger, with at best marginal economic advantages. By challenging assumptions about recycling while keeping an open position on the breeder reactors, the Administration sought to buy time and to focus on an area where a consensus might be developed.

I shall not try here to review the technical arguments in detail. Proponents of reprocessing argued that plutonium recycling would reduce uranium needs by a third and thus make a significant contribution to energy "independence" of resource-poor nations. But if one applies this one-third fraction to any reasonable estimate of the proportion of total energy needs that will be met by nuclear electrical-generating capacity, one can quickly see that such recycling makes at most a marginal contribution to replacing other energy resources and at a very uncertain cost. For example, if Japan achieves its maximum efforts goal of 60,000 megawatts of electricity from nuclear sources by 1990, this will represent 11

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percent of Japan's energy needs. Using recycled plutonium in those reactors would reduce total energy imports by less than four percent. Moreover, there are other potential ways of stretching uranium resources. There is also evidence that waste disposal problems could be exacerbated, rather than alleviated, by reprocessing.[5]

The question was whether the world had come too far down the plutonium road or whether there was still time for a second look. Our conclusion was that there is still time to examine fuel cycle alternatives that minimize proliferation and physical protection risks. This was the basis for the President's April 7 decisions to extend the previous Administration's moratorium on the commercialization of reprocessing, and to restructure the U.S. breeder reactor program to emphasize safer fuel cycle technologies rather than early commercialization. The intent was *not* to turn the clock back, nor did we expect resource-poor nations to automatically follow our lead. The purpose was to escape the prevailing inertia in order to explore ways to shape nuclear technology and institutions to reinforce rather than erode the international safeguards system.

The fact that President Carter's first statement on April 7, 1977 focused on issues relating to plutonium led critics to charge that the Administration's nonproliferation policy was technical rather than political, and ignored problems other than reprocessing. In fact, the Administration had focused on the plutonium and reprocessing issue because that issue was immediately before us for decision. We never believed that stopping reprocessing would stop proliferation. Nor did we believe that using reactors designed to generate electricity was the best source of weapons material for a country openly dedicated to building a bomb. The concern was to preserve the existing distance between commercial and weapons uses of nuclear energy.

For the past two decades, the barriers to misuse of commercial nuclear energy have worked. But we saw the premature diffusion of plutonium technology as reducing those barriers, eroding the international system of safeguards and, consequently, threatening the delicate political balance of the international nuclear regime. The Administration also rejected a number of proffered solutions (such as allowing commercial reprocessing in the United States while attempting to deny it to other countries) because it was economically marginal, and because such an overtly unilateral solution would have negative effects on important political instru-

[5] See *Nuclear Power Development in Japan*, Tokyo: Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, January 1978, p. 5, for figures on energy savings; see reports cited in footnote 3 on disposal problems.

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ments such as the Nonproliferation Treaty—which promotes nondiscriminatory behavior in the commercial aspects of nuclear energy.

Looking to the future, the Administration could envisage three components of a solution to the reprocessing problem—time, technology and institutions. If reprocessing is deferred until it is economically necessary, the world gains considerable time to develop reprocessing technologies that do not provide ready access to weapons-usable materials and to design possible international facilities for reprocessing. Early commercialization of reprocessing in national (or multinational) plants could deprive the world of the time to develop safer technologies and institutions.

These, then, were the reasons for the Administration's early initiatives. The outcomes of these initiatives are, obviously, still unclear, for they were taken in the context of a wider strategic canvas. And to that I now turn.

v

A year ago, it was not uncommon to encounter debates between Europeans and Americans over the merits of a "controls" versus a "denials" strategy for nonproliferation. Europeans accused Americans of overemphasizing denial of access to technology. They argued correctly that technology would eventually spread and indigenous unsafeguarded facilities could be developed. From this they concluded that it was better to transfer technologies under international "controls," i.e., safeguards. "Controls," of course, was something of a misnomer. What was at issue was international monitoring and timely warning of the possible misuse of a transferred technology, and whether monitoring was sufficient for technologies where warning time was negligible. And "denials" too was a misnomer for what can only be restraints.

Such debates were sterile exercises, since each side had only part of the answer. *Both* safeguards and restraints are necessary but by themselves insufficient elements of a nonproliferation strategy.

Technology transfers cannot be delayed forever, but they can be postponed until national energy programs really require such transfers and until we have time to develop more proliferation-resistant technology and more effective international institutions. In the interim, the question is whether restraints on the transfer of sensitive technology are consistent with our undertakings to contribute to "the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes" under Article 4 of the Nonproliferation Treaty. Clearly there is a degree of tension, but so long as it

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is temporary, we believe that restraint is consistent with the fact that under the Treaty, we also undertake to avoid steps that would lead to the spread of nuclear weapons.[6]

The long-run solution to these difficulties must be an international consensus both on the undesirability of the further spread of nuclear weapons and on the nature and management of the nuclear fuel cycle. And this is the essence of the Carter Administration's six-pronged nonproliferation strategy, which starts with but goes beyond simply monitoring and restraints on transfers. Its six elements are:

(1) Making the safeguards system more effective by insisting upon comprehensive safeguards;
(2) Self-restraint in the transfer of sensitive technologies and materials that can contribute directly to weapons until we have learned to make them more safeguardable;
(3) Creation of nonproliferation incentives through fuel assurances and assistance in the management of spent fuel;
(4) Building consensus about the future structure and management of the nuclear fuel cycle through cooperative studies;
(5) Taking steps at home to ensure that our domestic nuclear policy is consistent with our international objectives;
(6) Taking steps to reduce any security or prestige motives that states might have to develop nuclear explosives.

Let us look at the Carter initiatives in each of these six dimensions.

1. *Safeguards*

Starting from our basic decision to build upon the existing consensus about the legitimacy of international safeguards, we felt (along with others) that safeguards had to be improved. One means of improvement has been technical work and assistance to the IAEA. Safeguards do not have to be perfect to be effective as a deterrent. They merely have to ensure that there is a high probability that IAEA inspectors will detect a diversion. The United States is contributing some ten million dollars over a three-year period for training, information processing, and new measurement and surveillance technology such as special cameras and seals.

Even more important, the Congress and the new Administration have now agreed that the United States should insist that all countries that receive American material or facilities must place *all*

[6] Specifically, Article 4 of the Treaty cannot be taken out of context, but must be read in conjunction with Article I in which we agree "not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. . . ."

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their nuclear facilities under safeguards. (Such comprehensive coverage is sometimes called full-scope safeguards.) The Administration proposed such export conditions last April, and has consistently supported the legislation recently passed by the Congress that mandates their application to any supply of American materials after an 18-month transition period.

Full-scope safeguards can plug a serious loophole in the international safeguards system. They also remove what is at present a source of discrimination against nations that have, by signing the NPT, already accepted as a legal obligation the placing of all their facilities under safeguards. Currently, under the types of agreement previously accepted by the United States and other suppliers, a *non*-NPT recipient country has to submit only imported materials to safeguards. It may retain or develop a similar facility of its own alongside, without safeguards. This loophole, obviously, could be plugged by recipient countries all adhering to the NPT. But because some countries have historical objections to the Treaty, the new legislation makes it clear that the United States will continue supply so long as the recipient country, in practice, accepts international inspectors to safeguard all its facilities. This condition, called "de facto full-scope safeguards," in fact exists today in all but five non-weapons states that have received (or might receive) U.S. nuclear materials: India, Egypt, Argentina, Israel and South Africa.[7]

In relation to India, President Carter resisted suggestions that the United States should adopt a punitive attitude based on the 1974 explosion—by immediately withholding cooperation. Such action would probably have alienated India and generated sympathy for it among Third World countries. In addition, it might have provoked domestic Indian opinion toward developing weapons. Instead, he accepted India's position that it did not intend to follow up with the further steps to make nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Desai publicly pledged no further explosions.

In addition, the United States hoped India would reassure its neighbors by allowing international inspection of *all* its facilities. In practice, all but a few of India's currently operating facilities are internationally safeguarded. On the other hand, under the new nonproliferation legislation the President would have little alternative but to seek an amicable disengagement in our nuclear cooperation if India cannot take this step within the 18-month

[7] In addition, the Vandellos reactor in Spain is not under IAEA safeguards, but is jointly operated with France, which controls the plutonium produced.

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transition period. In either case, the seriousness of our commitment to an effective international safeguards system will be clear to all states interested in developing nuclear energy.

2. *Restraints on Sensitive Transfers*

The second aspect of the strategy is restraints on transfers of weapons-usable materials and sensitive facilities, particularly the enrichment and reprocessing plants that can give countries direct access to weapons-usable material.

First, more specific controls were placed on U.S. exports of highly enriched uranium. Many research reactors fueled with weapons-usable highly enriched uranium can be converted to use non-weapons grade uranium. To encourage such conversion and minimize flows of weapons-usable material, the Administration requested justifications for use of highly enriched material and set limits on the amounts that could be transported or accumulated in one place. Exports of such material were made subject to presidential approval. Exports were not prohibited (though this was misunderstood by some at first), but more stringent transfer conditions were established.

Another important choice in the restraint dimension concerned the role of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. This Group had made considerable progress in moving toward a set of guidelines for exports, including restraints on sensitive transfers. In December 1976, France announced that it would henceforth not export reprocessing plants, and Germany's similar announcement in June 1977 meant that, leaving aside the earlier arrangements with Pakistan and Brazil, there was general supplier agreement about the undesirability of further transfers of reprocessing plants.

At the same time, the Suppliers Group cannot alone solve the proliferation problem over the long term. At some point, countries will be able to design their own sensitive plants. Perhaps they will be less efficient, more costly, and take a longer time, but eventually they could be built. A position of trying to hold back other countries without giving them anything in return would, over time, erode. In the meantime, it would create considerable resentment of the kind that could make countries want to speed up their indigenous efforts in the very direction that was contrary to general nonproliferation interests. Thus restraint can only be an interim policy until the world develops technologies and institutions that make the sensitive parts of the fuel cycle as safe as the reactors that are currently sold.

In addition, we wished to avoid bitter divisions along rich-poor,

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North-South or supplier-consumer lines that would interfere with development of broader consensus in the nuclear area. The Suppliers Group had already become such a source of friction. Many consumer countries saw it as a "secret cartel" that was at odds with the IAEA system. In fact, while the early meetings of the Group were secret, its purpose was quite the opposite of a cartel. Rather than discussing ways to raise prices, the members were seeking guidelines to prevent commercial competition from undermining safeguards obligations.

In order to make their purposes clear and to underline their support for the IAEA, the supplier countries have now published their presently agreed Guidelines by each submitting them to the IAEA, in January 1978. (The Guidelines set forth safeguards conditions, urge restraint on sensitive transfers, and establish consultation procedures in case of safeguards violations.) The Group left the possibility of further refinements of the Guidelines as well as possible expansion of membership for future meetings. Publication of the Guidelines helped to correct misperceptions of the Suppliers Group and showed that the Group's activities will be supportive of the IAEA safeguard system. London did not become an institutional antipode to Vienna.

3. *Incentives*

The third component of our international nonproliferation strategy is the creation of nonproliferation incentives. If nations are to forego their own enrichment and reprocessing facilities, they must have an adequate, timely, reliable, and economic supply of nonsensitive nuclear fuels, and they must be confident that there will be adequate disposition of the spent fuel from their reactors.

To be successful, a program of assured fuel supply must assure access to adequate supplies of natural uranium and enrichment services at reasonable prices. In this connection, the President announced on April 7 that the United States would increase production capacity for enriched uranium. By 1988, a fourth U.S. enrichment facility will be in production at Portsmouth, Ohio, to help assure that there will be no U.S. or global shortage of low-enriched uranium fuel.

In addition, on April 27, the President sent a legislative message to the Congress that supported more stringent export criteria, while carefully avoiding provisions that might lead to a broad export moratorium. One of the aims of the policy on exports is to make the export criteria clear and U.S. fuel supply predictable.

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Another essential feature of such a program is the development of an international institutional arrangement to ensure vulnerable countries against interruptions in bilateral supplies. Internationally controlled stockpiles of low-enriched uranium could be available for release under carefully defined conditions to countries in compliance with their nonproliferation undertakings. In October, President Carter announced our willingness to contribute to such a fuel bank and to join with others to study its establishment.

The problems related to the need to ensure adequate spent fuel and nuclear waste storage are equally urgent. The Department of Energy is presently studying a wide range of solutions. In October, it announced our willingness to make a limited amount of storage capacity available for spent fuel from other nations. We are also studying with other countries the development of international centers for the storage of spent fuel. (Both fuel assurances and spent fuel storage are subjects of intensive study in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, discussed below.)

Finally, in the area of energy planning, the Administration established a program to provide assistance to developing countries in assessing their energy needs. Many developing countries lack the planning basis for judging the relative roles of nuclear and non-nuclear energy. Consequently, investments are sometimes ill-advised and premature. By offering assistance in energy planning, the United States can help them lay a more appropriate groundwork for energy investments.

4. *Building Consensus*

The first three elements would not be sufficient unless it were possible to hold out the prospect of moving in the future toward a somewhat more equitable and more satisfactory system. That fourth part of the strategy—building consensus on the shape of the nuclear fuel cycle—is one of the purposes of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE). The President called for such a project in his April 7 statement and after careful negotiations it was set up and held its opening conference in Washington in October 1977. The idea behind INFCE is to have both the supplier countries and the consumer countries come together to study the technical and institutional problems of organizing the nuclear fuel cycle in ways which provide energy without providing weaponry.[8] The 40 countries that assembled in Washington to

[8] The first detailed international exposition of INFCE was at the IAEA Conference on Nuclear Power and Its Fuel Cycle on May 2, 1977 in Salzburg, Austria. See J.S. Nye, "United States Policy on Nuclear Technology: Combining Energy and Security," *Department of State Bulletin*, May 30, 1977, pp. 550–54.

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establish INFCE included consumers and suppliers, rich and poor, East and West, and 11 countries that had not signed the NPT.[9]

The purpose is to evaluate scientifically various aspects of the fuel cycle, and lay an agreed factual basis upon which a consensus might be built. Participation in the program does not commit a country to its future course of action. There will be no votes in INFCE. A Technical Coordinating Committee, which meets in Vienna with the assistance of the IAEA, oversees eight Working Groups, each of which is concerned with an important element in the effort to strike a balance between the benefits of nuclear energy and its proliferation risks. Over the next two years, INFCE will explore a variety of ways to make the nuclear fuel cycle safer than is currently believed possible in the transnational nuclear fraternity. INFCE is not a quest for a single solution, but as the following description of the Working Groups indicates, INFCE can provide better international understanding of the elements from which solutions can be composed—time, technology and institutions.

The first two groups deal with natural resources and enrichment capacity. If the facts support the Administration's view that uranium and thorium resources are more plentiful than is commonly believed, there will be less time pressure to move to next-generation fuel cycles before we have solved their proliferation risks.

At the same time, it is not enough merely to prove the existence of sufficient uranium, thorium and enrichment. One must also establish an international system of assured fuel supply. That is why the third group specifically addresses institutional ways to assure supplies for resource-poor countries.

The fourth group will examine the economic and proliferation implications attendant on various reprocessing alternatives. The United States is especially interested in reprocessing techniques that would avoid producing pure plutonium. At the same time, however, the groups will also explore the feasibility of technical and international institutional means of increasing the safeguardability of conventional fuel reprocessing methods. Similarly, the fifth group, which will deal with breeder reactor systems, will focus on whether there may be breeder systems that are economical and at the same time minimize the presence of weapons-usable material.

[9] Without burdening the reader with all the 40 participants, it may be helpful to list the countries chairing the eight Working Groups described in the text. The Co-Chairmen of the Working Groups are: (1) Canada, Egypt, India; (2) France, Federal Republic of Germany, Iran; (3) Australia, Philippines, Switzerland; (4) Japan, United Kingdom; (5) Belgium, Italy, U.S.S.R.; (6) Argentina, Spain; (7) Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden; (8) Republic of Korea, Romania, the United States.

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The sixth and seventh groups will examine problems associated with spent fuel and waste disposal. Clearly, a growing nuclear economy requires responsible storage and disposal programs. Some argue that reprocessing alleviates the waste management problem by removing plutonium before disposal. However, reprocessing and subsequent fuel fabrication themselves produce wastes that must be disposed of. Scientific evidence will be brought to bear on the conflicting claims that reprocessing increases or reduces the environmental risks involved in nuclear waste management. The development of international institutions in this area may create a precedent for international cooperation in other aspects of the fuel cycle.

The eighth group will look at advanced reactor and fuel cycle concepts including ways to improve the efficiency of uranium utilization in current types of reactors. There is credible evidence that it may be possible to more than double the utilization rate through various techniques.[10] This effectively would double the existing uranium resource base, resulting in a longer lifetime of the current fuel cycle, yielding more time to design proliferation-resistant future fuel cycles.

What the United States hopes INFCE will do is to lay the basis for a longer term consensus. We do not expect that INFCE will produce one agreed document at the end. It is quite unlikely that everybody is going to agree over that short a period. However, many of the disputed technical problems and possibilities will be clarified. We do not expect to find a simple technical fix. But we hope to find combinations of time, technology and institutions that can produce a more safeguardable fuel cycle. Then it will be the task of diplomacy to get wide agreement to adopt such safer technologies.

5. *Domestic Nuclear Policy*

Budgets speak more clearly than speeches. For this reason we felt it essential to our nonproliferation strategy that our domestic policy be consistent with our international policy. We did not expect other countries to quickly follow suit; we were sure they would not do so if our domestic actions undercut our international policy. Thus, the President took two decisions that were not widely popular in the Congress; indefinite deferral of commercial reprocessing and restructuring of the breeder program.

[10] On the possibilities for improved efficiency of thermal reactors, see Y. I. Chang, *et. al.*, *Alternative Fuel Cycle Options: Performance Characteristics and Impact on Nuclear Power Growth Potential*, Argonne National Laboratory Report, ANL 77-70, September 1977.

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The Administration rejected proposals to make the partially completed Barnwell, South Carolina, plant into a multinational reprocessing center. Accepting such a proposal would have tended to undercut our argument that commercial reprocessing is premature, while an inadequate proposal at this stage could spoil a multinational approach which might hold promise in the long term. We felt that if we were telling other countries that going ahead now with the current type of reprocessing has marginal economic benefits and great security dangers, we had to apply that same logic to ourselves. The President announced this on April 7, and in talking to other countries about deferring reprocessing, we have pointed to the fact that we are not claiming any commercial preference for ourselves.

Similarly, we took the position that the breeder reactor program should be restructured to emphasize development of a safer fuel cycle rather than early commercialization. This meant cancellation of the Clinch River project, which was not the safest or most advanced design, but was oriented toward demonstrating early commercialization. We felt that it was inconsistent for us to urge caution and deliberation on entering into the plutonium generation, while at the same time proceeding with a design that had been explicitly created to provide early commercialization of the plutonium breeder. When the Congress did not agree with the President on the Clinch River breeder reactor, the President exercised his first veto since entering office.[11]

In another, less visible aspect of domestic policy, the Department of Energy has been working on the safeguardability of the next generation of enrichment technology. This includes not only centrifuge technology, which is under active development in several countries and is scheduled for deployment in the United States in 1988, but also longer term projects such as laser isotope separation. We will ensure that safeguardability criteria are included at the laboratory stage before going to the engineering stage.

6. *Measures to Affect Motivations*

The last but most basic dimension of the nonproliferation strategy concerns efforts to reduce the motivations that countries

[11] Contrary to some interpretations, the Administration did not try to kill all breeder programs. As President Carter told the Newspaper Farm Editors on September 30, 1977, "I have no objection to breeder reactors. I don't think the time has yet come." The Department of Energy 1979 budget of $367 million for breeder research and development is the largest breeder budget in the world. It is also about the same as the budget for solar research and development.

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may develop to build nuclear weapons—chiefly military security and the quest for political prestige.

In the bilateral context, the security guarantees that the United States provides to its allies are among the most important nonproliferation policy instruments we have. Critics who argue that the Administration failed to pursue disputes over reprocessing with our allies because it feared to destabilize the alliances miss the point. Any policy pursued to the point of severely shaking those alliances would be a failure *in nonproliferation terms*. A cooperative approach with our allies is not only good alliance policy, it is also good nonproliferation policy.

In other parts of the world, new bilateral security guarantees are less feasible in the post-Vietnam era, but the existing ones still have value. Countries with a security relationship with us have to ask whether their security would really be enhanced by the introduction of a vulnerable nuclear capability, if that would have the effect of removing the residual American security relationship. To the extent that other nations rely on the United States for the supply of the conventional arms for which they have reasonable needs to assure their own security, there is no question that our conventional arms sales also play a part in affecting motivations to turn to nuclear weapons.

We also have multilateral instruments to address the security motivations. Most important is, of course, the Nonproliferation Treaty, which 103 nations have now ratified. The Treaty has helped to create an international regime in which states agree that their security interests would be better served by avoiding the further spread of the bomb. It provides important reassurances that potential adversaries are confining their nuclear activities to peaceful purposes.

The NPT is a delicate international arrangement. Countries without nuclear weapons have accepted an explicitly unequal status in the military area, on the condition that they be treated equally with regard to civil nuclear cooperation. Thus we have to avoid, to the greatest extent possible, discriminatory policies on the civil side that would weaken the fabric of the Treaty as one of the key nonproliferation institutions.

Another multilateral instrument is the nuclear weapons free zone. The Administration has supported the establishment of such zones wherever the states in a region can agree. The most important example is the Latin American Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, which was established in the 1960s by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, but which lacked several adherents, including U.S. ratifica-

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tion of its first protocol, before becoming fully effective. Early in his term, President Carter announced that the United States would ratify the protocol, and later in the year Argentina declared its intent to ratify the Treaty. Once these ratifications are completed, only Cuban, Russian and French actions would be necessary before the Treaty enters fully into force.

As for prestige motivations that might lead states to acquire nuclear weapons, the best answer is to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in world politics. This was a goal that President Carter stated in his Inaugural Address. Efforts to control the vertical proliferation of nuclear arsenals through the SALT and Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations have an important effect on nonproliferation policy. At the same time, we must avoid military doctrines that imply that nuclear weapons have more than a negative or deterrent role.

Above all, we must be careful not to reinforce any notion that being a nuclear weapons state provides unusual privileges or position in international affairs. Over time, we want to show other countries that the weight of their voice in international gatherings—on the Law of the Sea, exchange rates for their currencies, resource transfers, or any other issue—really does not have much to do with whether they possess a nuclear weapon or not. There are much more usable and directly effective forms of power. The clear corollary is that the United States must be careful not to try to use its own nuclear status to win games in other areas.

Disincentives are also important. A temptation to go nuclear can be counterbalanced in many cases by the prospect of severe adverse reactions. The general heightened concern that has accompanied the Administration's high priority for nonproliferation has raised perceptibly the probability of a strong international reaction to any violation of international safeguards or other proliferation event. Peaceful nuclear cooperation helps to provide disincentives for proliferation. Temptations toward proliferation are counterbalanced by the cost of disrupting expensive nuclear electric-generating systems. The new U.S. nonproliferation legislation inscribes in statute strong sanctions against those who would violate safeguard agreements. Moreover, under the Suppliers Guidelines, members agree to avoid commercial competition while consulting about cases of possible safeguards violations. Over the past year, it has become increasingly clear that the international response will make safeguards violations, and violations of the nonproliferation regime generally, very costly actions.

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VI

The Carter initiatives on nonproliferation stirred up a degree of turmoil at home and abroad. The nuclear industry had been proceeding internationally on a set of fixed assumptions about moving as quickly as possible from uranium to plutonium, with only secondary attention to the proliferation problem. But the turmoil has started a process of rethinking. It is no longer business as usual. In recent years, the industry had examined and rejected a series of measures that could have been used to make the use of plutonium more proliferation-resistant, albeit more expensive. Now the industry at home and abroad is looking at those ideas again.

Similarly, countries that currently plan to use plutonium are beginning to look at ways to reduce the proliferation risk—such as introducing radioactivity to prevent plutonium fuels from being stolen or misused. As one high European official has put it: "We don't agree with all your answers, but we admit that you've raised the right questions." One of the major accomplishments of the first year was raising a concern, making nations realize that proliferation is a priority issue that deserves serious measures beyond business as usual.

But beyond the posing of a challenge, the first year also saw the beginnings of an international institutional response. The supplier countries maintained their unity, agreed on a moratorium on sensitive transfers, and published common export safeguards guidelines. A brand new dialogue was begun in INFCE, and the broad participation in that effort represents the first step toward a common consumer-supplier approach. While dramatizing the challenge that technology was posing, the Administration took careful note of the energy concerns of other countries. We were careful to avoid any comment on other countries' breeder research and development programs while focusing on the dangers to their security and the dubious economic benefits of reprocessing for recycling in the current type of reactors.

The situation was aptly summed up by Rudolph Rometsch, Deputy Director General of the IAEA, who said that as recently as a year ago it was hard to find either utility or government officials interested in ways to internationalize plutonium control and other aspects of the fuel cycle in order to make them more proliferation-proof. Now "quite a number are willing to go a long way to make that possible." He added that "this may be the most positive point,

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if properly exploited, to emerge from the renewed U.S. concern over proliferation."[12]

The objectives the Administration has set out to accomplish cannot be achieved quickly. International institutional responses take more time to develop than does an initial national challenge. Basic assumptions change slowly. Consensus can only be developed over time. New problems and temptations continually arise and require responses.

To repeat, nonproliferation policy is not a game where one can easily score victories and defeats. If one country defers reprocessing or another sets off an explosion, that alone does not constitute the success or failure of a nonproliferation policy. Our goal, which we share with others, is to strengthen an international regime of norms and institutions that rests on shared interests and thus to strengthen the presumption against proliferation. Both the technological explorations and the specific institutional innovations examined in INFCE are designed to reinforce and expand the consensus on the regime that is centered on the IAEA. A strong international regime can consist of many institutions, so long as they are complementary.[13]

In summary, one can view three decades of American nonproliferation policy as an attempt to resolve the tension between national interests—our own and others—in nuclear technology, and the shared international interest in the avoidance of nuclear war. Increasingly, nations have come to understand that the potential or actual undertaking of nuclear explosions, in their own country or elsewhere, is a matter of legitimate concern to the community of nations. Our efforts toward strategic arms limitation and a comprehensive test ban respond to those concerns, and our nonproliferation policy reflects an appreciation of the need for an international rather than a unilateral solution.

Thirty years ago, the Baruch Plan proposal for internationalization was rejected, in part because it was seen as an attempt to perpetuate what was then an American nuclear monopoly. The succeeding period of strict export controls on civilian as well as military technology emphasized U.S. self-sufficiency to the neglect of the common interest in peaceful nuclear development. The Atoms for Peace policy used the promotion of nuclear research and

[12] *Nucleonics Week*, July 7, 1977.

[13] For example, the four types of institutions being examined in INFCE—an international stockpile of low-enriched fuel, international spent fuel depositories, international enrichment facilities, and international reprocessing facilities—could have the effect of reinforcing the IAEA-centered international regime without necessarily being part of the IAEA or having exactly the same membership.

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civilian applications to build an international regime of safeguards. In recent years, with civilian nuclear power becoming at once more widespread and overlapping with the technology and materials used for nuclear weapons, the international community has entered a period of reexamination and redirection.

For the period ahead, our aim is to work with the international community in minimizing the weapons potential of civilian technology, and building institutions to manage the remaining areas of overlap. The development and diffusion of nuclear technology requires of all involved nations a dual commitment to caution and to shared benefits: that which cannot be effectively safeguarded or postponed must be jointly controlled. The alternative would make us all poorer.

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E. Drexel Godfrey, Jr.

ETHICS AND INTELLIGENCE

The three-year public agony of the Central Intelligence Agency may be coming to an end. Richard Helms has been convicted, the President has issued a new set of regulations restricting certain surveillance activities, and the torrent of public exposés by "insiders" seems to be abating. What remains to be seen is whether the traumas suffered since the sweeping congressional investigations began in 1975 have made any significant impact on the heart and guts of the Agency.

There are some suggestions, of course, that nothing much has changed. When Mr. Helms returned from receiving a suspended sentence, he was given a hero's welcome by an indulgent group of ex-colleagues. Simultaneously the announced intention of Admiral Stansfield Turner, the present Director, to reduce Agency operational personnel by several hundred was met by smear campaigns so powerful that the President soon felt obliged to publicly declare his continuing support for the Admiral. These responses from traditional intelligence officers may not be all that significant, however. Angry reactions to reductions in force are not, after all, new in Washington. Any pruning of career public servants can result in mid-level bureaucrats making high-level mischief.

The Helms case was quite another matter. Far from resolving any of the deeper issues of recent Agency conduct, it did not even address them. The case did, however, expose the persistent failure of several administrations to establish appropriate congressional arrangements for the exercise of intelligence operations. All post-war Presidents have permitted Directors of Central Intelligence to appear before congressional committees in the full knowledge that they would be closely questioned about secret operations approved and placed under tight security restrictions by the National Security Council. A long tradition had been built up over the years with the leaders of the Congress itself, that the facts concerning political operations (or clandestine intelligence operations) should be revealed only to selected members of Congress, and denied to

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formal committees at least in open session.

From time to time efforts were made by individual Presidents, or their staffs, to reach an accommodation with Congress that would reduce the vulnerability of CIA officials, caught between the professional obligation for secrecy and the legislative thirst for candor. No true resolution of this dilemma was achieved until President Ford declared for candor and so instructed Mr. Helms' successor. By then, of course, Mr. Helms had presented the testimony on operations in Chile, to a Senate committee, which a federal judge subsequently found to be not only misleading but false.

Not unnaturally many intelligence officials felt their ex-Director had been victimized. In a narrow sense he had. Lacking a presidential mandate to reveal the full nature of the U.S. involvement in the Chilean elections, Mr. Helms opted to give testimony that was less than truthful.

The irony of the case, however, is not that Mr. Helms was forced to choose between two ethical imperatives, one honoring his oath of secrecy, the other telling the truth. Far more significant is the fact that because it focused on such a narrow issue—and one where responsibility for the sorry turn of events could be laid as much at the doors of a succession of Presidents and leaders of Congress as to the Agency Director—the trial and judgment ignored a whole range of ethical problems concerning intelligence practices in a free society.

II

To some the mere juxtaposition of ethics and intelligence may appear to be a contradiction in terms. But at heart intelligence is rooted in the severest of ethical principles: truth telling. After all, the end purpose of the elaborate apparatus that the intelligence community has become is to provide the policymaker with as close to a truthful depiction of a given situation as is humanly possible. Anything less is not intelligence. It may be useful opinion—in some cases it may even be more accurate than prevailing intelligence—but if it is, the opinion maker is lucky, or in the particular instance possessed of more facts and sharper judgmental skills than the professional intelligence officer. Even the CIA has long recognized the centrality of truth telling. As a contributor to *Foreign Affairs* observed several years ago, the motto of the CIA, chosen by the doughty old Presbyterian, Allen Dulles, is "And the Truth Shall Make You Free."[1]

[1] Chester L. Cooper, "The CIA and Decision-Making," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1972, p. 223.

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Even as the motto was being chosen in the mid-1950s, however, the point was being lost and the purpose of the Agency corrupted. Perhaps because of the personality of Mr. Dulles and his operational successes in Switzerland during World War II, emphasis on activities having little or nothing to do with the pursuit of truth grew to preoccupy the CIA. The Church Committee's excellent report on intelligence activities makes it abundantly clear that foreign operations won top priority under Mr. Dulles' leadership; worse, foreign operations expanded from a tiny "psych warfare" section of the clandestine collection division to absorb a major share of the Agency's budget, its personnel, and skills. Operations both foreign and domestic, with a host of concomitant and now familiar malpractices, became the bread and butter of the Agency during the 1950s and 1960s.[2]

To accept the approximation of truth as the purpose of intelligence is one thing. To accept the methods by which truth can be obtained poses ethical dilemmas. The truth, after all, is often a set of facts, or concrete physical entities, or intentions, which the party with whom they are entrusted will guard jealously as a precious, not to say sacred, element of the national preserve. Ferreting out the truth under these circumstances often requires means and techniques not ordinarily employed in human intercourse.

At this point the ethical absolutist is compelled to say: "Exactly, an ethical society should renounce foreign intelligence altogether; given the new Administration's emphasis on human rights, domestic intelligence might best be scuttled, too." In this formulation the argument that other nations will not cease intelligence gathering activities simply because the United States renounces them, carries little weight. Ethical conduct is a force of its own; powerful nations lead by example; renunciation of intelligence gathering would be an act of moral courage with untold beneficial international consequences, etc.

But we are not all ethical absolutists. Value trade-offs are probably the best that most people in an uncertain world will accept. And it is because intelligence offers security that bizarre methods to obtain it are acceptable to most. Foreign policy making without an intelligence input of some kind would be capricious; in the uncharted waters of world crisis situations it would be scandalously foolhardy. It follows that the more ambiguous the international situation, the greater the value of intelligence in the decision-

[2] *Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities*, U.S. Senate, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., April 14, 1976, seven volumes.

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making process. Put another way, of course, this means that where intelligence does not add to international security, but rather, say to the obsessive comfort of knowing more about Ruritania than even the Ruritanians, or where it merely facilitates the feeding of salacious tidbits about foreign leaders to inquisitive Presidents, questionable methods to collect it are not acceptable.

The security returns of intelligence are probably inestimable, and they are welcomed by both world superpowers and tacitly condoned by almost all active participating nations on the world stage. Satellites monitor the missile developments of the superpowers; microwave telephone messages between foreign embassies and capitals are intercepted for critical information. Without technology of this kind in the hands of both the United States and the Soviet Union, there would of course have been no SALT talks; there would not now be any form of SALT agreement. Nikita Khrushchev implied just this when he half seriously suggested to President Eisenhower in 1958 that the two countries exchange intelligence chiefs. Both leaders recognized that inspections in each other's countries would probably be out of the question for many years to come; each knew that in order to make any progress on arms limitation he would have to rely on the safety of his own intelligence monitoring system and avert his eyes to monitoring by the other.

In a world where the two great powers can no longer guarantee international stability and where weaponry is no longer the exclusive currency of power, intelligence monitoring must sweep targets other than the principal antagonist—e.g., China or the Middle East. It must also be as concerned with economic and energy considerations as missiles. But the principle governing the choice of targets remains the same. Intelligence must promote international security, or the ethical compromises necessary to accommodate the requisite collection methods cannot and should not be stomached.

Intelligence monitoring substitutes for full faith and credit between nations, and technology provides a pitiful but workable substitute for the joyful conditions of a distant One World. The tensions of the nation-state system are, in other words, held in bounds not only by diplomacy and by mutual common sense but by carefully calibrated monitoring systems.

Assuming, then, that intelligence can help toward security in a dangerous international order, how can the intelligence function be carried out at the least risk to other values in our society? To put this most succinctly, how can a professional intelligence service

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operate so that officials within it perform their roles in an ethical manner? Most public officials would prefer that this be the case; certainly most private citizens expect nothing less.

The traditional easy answer, of course, is that in international affairs a double standard operates. What is unacceptable human behavior at home or in one's own society can be forgiven in dealings with foreign societies or with the representatives abroad of those societies. War is the ultimate expression of this double standard. But the assassination of foreign leaders in peacetime stretches the standard furthest, beyond, as is now wholly agreed, its breaking point. Under the shelter of the double standard, self-justification usually takes the form of: "Someone's got to do the dirty work"; or "Distasteful as the task was, it served the national purpose." On examination both statements contain implicit assertions by the makers of ethical standards. This, then, is the nub of the matter.

Foreign intelligence is not, by and large, conducted by people lacking the capacity to recognize ethical standards, but standards are lowered to accommodate the perceived national purpose. Once lowered, they can be more easily lowered a second time, or they can be lowered further and further as routine reduces ethical resistance to repugnant activities. This is the area of human dynamics where yesterday's managers of the intelligence community have been the most irresolute. Management rarely blew the whistle on subordinates. When subordinates succeeded in operations of questionable morality, they were as often rewarded with promotions as reprimanded for using dubious methods.

A high management official of one intelligence agency—in this case the FBI—blurted out to the Church Committee an incredibly candid confession of amorality. In response to questions as to whether any supervisory official of the Bureau had voiced reservations about the legitimacy of the infamous Operation Cointelpro (active disruption of citizen groups) he answered:

> We never gave any thought to this line of reasoning, because we were just naturally pragmatists. The one thing we were concerned about was this: Will this course of action work; will we reach the objective that we desire to reach? As far as legality is concerned, morals or ethics, it was never raised by myself or anyone else. I think this suggests really that in government we are amoral.[3]

To disagree with this official's conclusion is easy; to refute the implicit charge that government itself contributes to, if not insists

[3] Testimony of William Sullivan, *Final Report, op. cit.*, Book II, p. 141.

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on amorality, is more difficult. Presumably, the official, like most Americans, entered government service with some sense of ethics and acceptable norms of moral behavior. He came to believe, apparently, that the responsible intelligence officer *should not* concern himself with such matters. They are, he said, irrelevant to the conduct of his government business.

III

Most professions, such as the law and medicine, have for centuries provided themselves with fail-safe systems to ensure that ethical norms are not compromised out of existence, or rusted from misuse. Some of these systems work better than others, some are susceptible to corruption themselves and a few are mere shams, but the fact that they exist and generally are taken seriously by the members of the profession is critically significant. At the very least, it means that there are limits to a professional's freedom and that those limits are defined by ethical codes sanctioned by colleagues.

A profession whose end purpose it is to root out the truth cannot afford to resist asking where its limits should be set. However, the intelligence professional has in the past operated under the simple guideline, "don't get caught." Recently there have been signs that suggest that the intelligence community is busily, if somewhat ponderously, groping towards a limit-setting policy for its professionals.

The business of limit setting will not be easy, particularly for the centerpiece of the community, the CIA, and specifically for its large clandestine services element. It will not be easy because of the grim ethos of clandestine collection and operations, developed long before orbiting photographic satellites or sophisticated interception systems were ever conceived. That ethos is rooted in a concept as old as human society: the weak or the vulnerable can be manipulated by the strong or the shrewd. Human intelligence collection is a major preoccupation of the clandestine service. Simply put, this is the process of extracting from others information or national assets they would not willingly part with under normal circumstances.

In some cases the creation of appropriate circumstances is relatively easy. This is where the source is a willing volunteer acting out of his own sense of patriotism. Anti-Soviet emigré Hungarians providing detailed information on Russian military units occupying their country fall into this category. The clandes-

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tine officer must provide the means whereby the emigré can return to his country. By and large the clandestine officer can content himself with the knowledge that the Hungarian is as anxious to reenter his homeland illegally as he is anxious to have him make the effort.

But the highest art in tradecraft is to develop a source that you "own lock, stock and barrel." According to the clandestine ethos, a "controlled" source provides the most reliable intelligence. "Controlled" means, of course, bought or otherwise obligated. Traditionally it has been the aim of the professional in the clandestine service to weave a psychological web around any potentially fruitful contact and to tighten that web whenever possible. Opportunities are limited, but for those in the clandestine service who successfully develop controlled sources, rewards in status and peer respect are high. The modus operandi required, however, is the very antithesis of ethical interpersonal relationships.

Sometimes the information obtained by these methods can be important. It is, however, rarely of critical importance. At best it may provide a measure of confirmation of some already suspected development or fill in a missing piece of a complex mosaic of facts. There have been occasions when controlled sources have been successful in snatching internal documents off high-level desks in their own governments, but even in these instances the "take" has not been earthshaking. Perhaps the faintly disappointing record of achievement by clandestine operatives is explainable in bureaucratic terms. Well-placed officials with immediate access to critical policymaking circles—and for the most part this means they are part of the policymaking process—are generally well rewarded by and well satisfied with their own governments. If they were not, they would not hold powerful positions. The main targets for clandestine collectors are usually second- and third-level officials who may not be fully privy to policy developments.

Finally, there is the human consideration. Most controlled sources are ambivalent about the roles they are obliged to play. On the one hand, there may be gratification that their retainer fees enable them to reduce some crushing personal debts, or to meet other expenses incurred as a result of weaknesses or personal misjudgments. On the other hand, they will almost certainly feel a sense of guilt in betraying trusts they are expected not to betray; they may also feel more than a little self-loathing that they have been too weak to resist being used by those who pay them or blackmail them. How these feelings subconsciously affect what they report and how they report is anybody's guess. It is at least

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possible that the clandestine officer who "owns" a controlled source may not have the extraordinary asset that his "tradecraft" teaches him he should have.

Quality of information obtained aside, a fundamental ethical issue concerning clandestine human collection remains. That issue is the impact on the clandestine officer of his relationship with his source. The former's bread and butter is the subversion of the latter's integrity. The officer is painstakingly trained in techniques that will convert an acquaintance into a submissive tool, to shred away his resistance and deflate his sense of self-worth. Of course, the source may be thoroughly cynical, even a venal merchant of his country's privacy, and in that case the task of the clandestine officer is less burdensome—although he may come to find the relationship just as repellent as if the source had slowly and resistingly been bent to compliance. Whatever the chemistry between the two individuals, collector and source, or perhaps more pointedly, dominant and dominated, the biggest loser is the one whose ethical scruples are most damaged in the process. Depending on the techniques he may have to use to bring the source under control and maintain that relationship, the biggest loser may be the clandestine officer.

Another prime concern of the clandestine services is the development of methodologies and devices to thwart the defensive measures of other intelligence agencies and other national political systems. While much of this activity is purely technical electronic engineering, a significant investment has also been made in such exotica as "truth drugs," complex psychological warfare strategies, bizarre bugging devices and the like. Some of these devices and techniques have been used with profit and success by clandestine officers operating overseas; others have proved impractical in the field or have stalled on the drawing board as development costs got out of hand. But the search for new ways to penetrate other societies goes on. Today's drug experimenters (if there are indeed any left) may become tomorrow's experts in long-range behavior modification processes.

Whatever the state of these arcane arts, they have two things in common. First, their purpose is almost always to facilitate the manipulation of man by man. In this sense they are not dissimilar in effect and impact to the process of controlled source development. Secondly, the practitioners of these arts and the "psych warfare" experts are obliged by the very nature of their trade to presume that they are operating in hostile environments. The end point of their efforts, after all, is to bypass normal authority, or at

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the least, to use semi-legal means to overcome obstacles placed in their path by the authorities of other nations. The professional premise of the officers engaged in these practices, then, is the constructive use of illegality. While revolutionaries around the world have lived long and comfortably with this paradox, it is quite another matter for sober and presumably accountable U.S. public servants to be exposed to its temptations.

In this connection it is important to note that over the years officers whose careers have primarily been spent in clandestine activities have occupied the preeminent roles in the management of the CIA. At least until recently, when heavy reductions in clandestine staff were ordered by the current Director, Admiral Stansfield Turner, roughly two-thirds of the highest executive positions at any given time were filled by officers whose careers blossomed in the clandestine services. Years of hardening in the ugly business of source control and penetration of foreign capitals have surely taken their toll. Little wonder that the CIA's top leadership did not traditionally spend much time setting "limits" on the Agency's activities. Little wonder that management developed a process of compartmentalizing what it recognized to be questionable activities. The most bizarre operations, such as Chaos (to be discussed below) and human drug experimentation, have been traditionally walled off even from other Agency colleagues whose questions might have been embarrassing. Mr. Helms himself testified before the Church Committee that in many instances the CIA's General Counsel was simply excluded from knowing of the existence of particularly exotic activities and operations.[4] The inference is inescapable that he was shut off out of fear that he would, as he had occasionally done in the past, advise that the operations overstepped legal limits. Similarly, the Church Committee report makes clear that even the recommendations of the Agency's elaborate Inspector General system could be, and sometimes were, rejected by the Agency Director.[5]

Thus, a picture emerges of a highly compartmentalized bureaucracy whose direction has been largely controlled by officials with long experience in the seduction of other human beings and societies. Not immoral or even without ethical standards themselves, they had lost the habit of questioning where they should set limits on their official conduct. And other officers who might have been expected to remind them of these limits were kept in ignorance. This state of affairs is particularly distressing when it

[4] *Final Report, op. cit.*, Book I, p. 282.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 286.

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involves an organization where high premiums are paid for inventiveness, for "outsmarting the opposition."

In an organizational context where the edge of possibility is bounded only by the stretch of the imagination, special arrangements for limit setting are necessary. Each management level of the clandestine services, from the most immediate and parochial to the highest, should have an officer who plays the role of "nay-sayer." His task would be to review operational plans for their ethical consequences and occasionally to remind the imaginative subordinate that daring and innovativeness must sometimes bow to prudence. Every organization has informal "nay-sayers" seeded through its ranks. In traditional bureaucracies they are almost always negative influences, cruel stiflers of initiative and zeal. In intelligence organizations, institutional "nay-sayers" could have just the opposite effect: they could be critical to a rediscovery of ethically acceptable limits of activity.

IV

That element of the CIA whose job it is "to tell the truth," as opposed to collecting the truth overseas, is the overt Intelligence Directorate. It would appear at first glance to have the easier job. But this is not necessarily so. For one thing, truth is rarely simple fact; it is almost always a combination of fact and judgment and as such almost always subject to second guessing. The intelligence analyst has no monopoly on wisdom and prescience, but he does have one advantage. He is not subject to the policy considerations of the operating departments, such as State and Defense. He is, in this respect, free to call the shots as he sees them, whether or not they substantiate or confirm some fundamental premise of U.S. policy. Ignoring the policy assumptions of the Administration in a search for the most defensible judgment can be an unhappy affair, as those analysts who toiled through the Vietnam years can testify. While support from Agency superiors for the views of the analysts was strong during the Johnson and Nixon Administrations, the analytic product—that is, the truth as the analysts saw it—was not always palatable to higher consumers. The "truth" more often than not implicitly cast doubt on the outcome of the U.S. efforts in Indochina. Reaction to such judgments at White House and National Security Council levels was at worst unfriendly, and at best indifferent.

Nevertheless, the obligation remains for the analytic component of the CIA to produce what it believes to be the least assailable version of a given situation and its consequences for the future

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course of events. In this lonely and sometimes scorned pursuit, there are ethical pitfalls no less severe than those encountered by the overseas clandestine collectors.

A case in point is the unusual episode surrounding the studies of radical youth produced by the Agency at the demand of both Presidents Johnson and Nixon in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The original order for such a study coincided with one of the peak points in protest against the Vietnam War, protests conducted in Europe and the Far East as well as in the United States. When the order was first relayed to the Agency by Walt Rostow, then National Security Special Assistant to the President, it was accompanied by the hypothesis that the protest actions were so vociferous and so universal that they must be orchestrated by communists. Dubious at best, this became the principal theme of the first study and the several successive versions that were subsequently ordered. The Agency undertook, in other words, to determine whether communist instigation lay behind the worldwide protests.

The first edition of the study concluded that there had been no discernible communist involvement in the student protests, with a purely theoretical aside that, at least as far as U.S. student protests were concerned, there were a variety of justifications for protest that made communist intervention unnecessary. The study was ill received by the White House. In effect, it was rejected out of hand with the pointed question: "Are you sure of your conclusions? Have you turned over every rock?" These injunctions were to be repeated twice more as the Agency, confident of its original judgments, tried to produce the evidence, or demonstrate the absence of evidence, that would similarly persuade two reluctant Presidents and a host of presidential advisors.

The costs to the CIA of "turning over every rock" were shatteringly high. The dearest cost was the decision to expand greatly the patently illegal "Operation Chaos," which had begun modestly with the intention of collecting evidence for the analysts preparing the first version of the student paper. To this end U.S. agents under control of the Clandestine Services, counterintelligence component were infiltrated into student groups within the United States and abroad. Once again the operation was carefully compartmentalized so that few even of the most senior Agency officials were aware of its existence—including those responsible for the production of the study. When the first study was rejected, Chaos was built up into a sizable operation, with access to computer technology and a network of overseas and domestic employees keeping book on many thousands of U.S. and foreign students.

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Not only was the Agency's legislative charter, which mandates *only* overseas espionage, violated, but so too were privacy rights of thousands of young Americans.

The second cost was a natural concomitant of the first. As more and more "rocks got turned over," the pursuit of evidence became an end in itself. A tendency developed among the collectors to believe that if they hunted long enough and assiduously enough, some communist involvement might be found, and if it were, the President would be satisfied. In short, the collection effort lost perspective. Had it found communist affiliations—say, in the leadership of a particular student organization—it would not have been of much significance given the overwhelming negative findings elsewhere in the great majority of student movements. The notion that an assertion can be converted to a truth if there is one scrap of positive evidence to support it is dangerous nonsense—in this case nonsense entertained by desperate Presidents and abetted by officials who might better have said: "We have turned over enough rocks, Mr. President." Thus, at the end of the unhappy affair called Chaos, one side of the Agency was unwittingly engaged in what was a corruption of the search for truth, to say nothing of extensively illegal activities, while the other side of the Agency was frenetically trying, under heavy fire, to stick to its best judgment.

In retrospect, it can be rationalized that all the actors in this unhappy drama were victims of the curious political climate of Washington as the Vietnam conflict ground to a conclusion. The psychological ingredients were all there: bureaucratic weariness with a clearly failing U.S. policy to which the Agency had already committed much of its manpower energies for a decade was one. Presidential frustration as various ways out of the dilemma were closed off was another. When all is said and done, however, there can only be one satisfactory explanation for the Agency's plunge into massive illegal activities. Top management had the means, the manpower and the mind-set to do the President's bidding and to do it without arousing suspicion or inviting investigation. Only in the waning days of Chaos (and the War) did complaints from lower echelons of the Agency begin to be registered around Washington. What top management lacked was the habit of limit setting, the reflex that warns of dangerous consequences—not of being found out, but of transgressing minimal ethical standards. Presidents can perhaps be forgiven for obsessiveness, but for the servants of Presidents, particularly those whose business is truth, the first duty is to guard against those personal and institutional

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frailties that make a mockery of the search for truth.

V

Is it possible, then, to introduce, or better to revive, a sense of ethics in the intelligence community? Certainly much can be accomplished simply by strong leadership that sets an appropriate tone. Presumably some efforts are being made in this direction now. But rhetoric alone cannot do the job that is required. Some specific prescriptions are offered in the following paragraphs.

The time would appear ripe, from the perspective both of history and the complexities of a world where energy resources, food supply and technological sophistication carry as much, if not more weight than weapons superiority, for the intelligence community to get out of political operations. The massive investment in these activities in recent years has paid off only rarely in terms of advancing U.S. interests. At times, as in the Congo, they have done more to confuse and unsettle an already fluid situation than to stabilize it. Some operations have probably cost the United States goodwill for years to come. Cost-benefit factors apart, political operations are often, although not always, illegal activities in which the greatest skill is to thwart the established authorities of foreign countries. To live clandestinely, to manipulate others, to distress the political ecology of another society—these are all activities that induce an amoral view of life. While they may or may not produce critical effects in the countries where they are undertaken, they almost certainly will affect those who engage in them. They are, finally, activities that have little or nothing to do with intelligence.

It can be argued that there are occasions, or there may be occasions, when political action of a clandestine nature may be the only feasible way to produce a desirable circumstance beneficial not only to the instigating country, but to a larger portion of the world's peoples. One can imagine, for example, such operations, mounted in South Africa, that might have positive consequences throughout the southern part of the continent. U.S. policy interests could be served at the same time as the interests of South Africa's neighbors. Indeed, there have been occasions when massive infusions of U.S. funds and skills have turned the tide in tightly balanced and critical political contests. Support for the noncommunist parties in Italy and France in 1948 comes to mind as does the far less obtrusive (and, one gathers, predominantly European) support in 1975 for democratic elements threatened by hard-line (and Soviet-supported) Communists in Portugal.

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The opportunity for U.S. intervention in political events of high international significance would not be lost by the abolition of a political operations capability. Private citizens recruited for the occasion have carried out such tasks for Presidents before and could again. On the other hand, there could be two salutory consequences for the United States in abandoning political operations as an ongoing activity of the CIA. First, Presidents would have to shoulder the burden themselves and create ad hoc arrangements for each instance. This would almost certainly sharpen their discrimination and force them to concentrate on interventions with the highest chance of success and the least chance of exposure. Second, the elaborate network of clandestine operators currently in place could be drastically reduced. No longer would it be necessary to nurture and maintain agents around the world on a contingency basis. The temptation to indulge in operational mischief of low or ambiguous priority for the sake of keeping agents alert would be foreclosed.

Many of the arguments used to question the efficacy and suitability of political operations can be applied to the process of human clandestine intelligence collection. The product is not all that impressive; the moral damage to the collectors is high; intelligence tends to be collected as an end in itself; and there is always the risk of exposure. Nevertheless, intelligence must be collected in selected areas and against specific subject targets. Technology is now the workhorse of the collection business and it should remain so. The present Director has in effect recognized this evolution in collection methods; he has justified his reduction of covert officers on this ground. Photographic and audio satellites and other interception devices are immensely expensive, but they have the advantage of doing only minimal damage to the ethical standards of the operators and processors. As noted above, technological intelligence collection is in at least one highly significant area—that of arms limitation control—tacitly accepted as essential to security by both superpowers.[6]

Of course, even with the phasing down of clandestine human collection, the need will remain for residual capability in certain esoteric collection techniques. Atmospheric conditions in some geographic locations may be so unfavorable that short-range

[6] Harry Rositzke in "America's Secret Operations: A Perspective," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1975, pp. 334–51, has presented a sophisticated view of the remaining need for clandestine human intelligence and counterintelligence collection. And Herbert Scoville, Jr., writing from a consumer's viewpoint (as I do) has laid I think the right stress on the predominant need for technological methods today. "Is Espionage Necessary for our Security?," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1976, pp. 482–95.

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collection devices will be needed to supplement "stand-off" equipment, such as satellites. There will always be the need for personnel skilled in the techniques of situating these devices. Similarly, there must be those who can exploit the defector or the "walk-in" source.

Counterintelligence is another field of clandestine intelligence activity which probably cannot be dispensed with for some years to come. But if counterintelligence is to survive, it should be organized on a purely defensive basis as a protection against foreign penetration of the U.S. intelligence services and their technical capabilities. It should be a small, lean component with a sophisticated understanding not only of the technological capabilities of major foreign intelligence services, but also of those countries' political dynamics. Far from being walled off from other Agency components as in the past, it should be a vital part of Agency life, as much to gain from exposure to varying points of view as to influence those points of view.

A vigorous reexamination of the entire collection function, both in terms of techniques and targets, would be salutary at this point in the intelligence community. Collection that goes beyond what the satellite and the intercept station provide cannot be forsaken altogether. Indeed, it should be improved with renewed emphasis on (a) analytic collection and (b) the old-world expertise of the open dialogue replacing the controlled source. Collectors with the training to mine and exploit technical materials in archives and specialized libraries or statistical centers could be the intelligence pick-and-shovel men of the future.

For those tightly closed societies where access to such material is almost completely denied to the United States, a different methodology will be necessary. Third-country officials with some access privileges in the host country must be assiduously cultivated, but (breaking with past practice) in an open and reciprocal manner. Collectors with substantive knowledge of their data targets should be authorized to disseminate "trading materials" to their foreign counterparts in exchange for hard-to-get data and technical material. This will be a delicate business. Maladroit handling of such negotiations could result in even tighter controls over information by the host country. Needless to say, negotiations could not be conducted *in* the target country without risking the expulsion of third-country nationals. New expertise in content evaluation both of the materials desired by the United States and the data to be used as trading currency will have to be developed.

At the higher levels of intelligence collection—that is, gaining

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insight into the sensitive complex of issues concerning political, economic and military developments in a target country—emphasis should be on the old-fashioned method of diplomatic dialogue. Reports that contribute to an understanding of social or economic trends or that sort out shifting national priorities are almost always more significant and useful than the one-shot item that reveals a specific decision or records some finite act. "Think pieces" have traditionally been the preserve of the ambassador or senior Foreign Service official. Their quality has, however, been uneven; they suffer from irregularity. Part of the problem is that few Foreign Service officers stay long enough on a single posting to become in-depth analytical experts. Only a few of the largest embassies have enjoyed the luxury of having one such person on their staffs for a number of years. What is being proposed here is that CIA officers fill the roles of permanent in-country experts. These would be senior officials, chosen for their substantive familiarity with the political and economic cultures of the countries to which they are posted. They would be expected to cultivate openly the widest circle of acquaintances and to report selectively both to headquarters and the ambassador. Clandestinity would give way to substantive expertise.

The finely trained and highly skilled clandestine collection officer with years of service in the field is likely to scoff at these suggestions. It has always been the contention of the clandestine collector that overt techniques could indeed uncover immense amounts of data about the capabilities of a foreign nation target, but that the intentions and plans of the same country could only be unlocked by controlled penetrations. There is, of course, some truth to this proposition. Final and critical decisions—e.g., to go to war with a neighbor, to begin the development of nuclear weaponry—are so tightly held and originate from such complex motivations that they do not suddenly spring off printed pages being turned by a lonely researcher. On the other hand, neither have such decisions been revealed with any great degree of success by penetration agents in the past.

Once the CIA has begun to turn itself around by the actions suggested above, it will have taken the most painful steps. But backsliding into old habits and behavior patterns will surely occur unless other, less dramatic moves are made. The influence of the clandestine service in the Agency remains strong and, given the sheer weight of numbers, it will have a significant voice in internal Agency affairs for years to come.

Something of the flavor of how that voice might express itself

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can be inferred from the hero's welcome given to Richard Helms when he appeared at a reception of recently retired covert officers fresh from his conviction in federal court. The old methods of compartmentalization and tightly controlled operations have become a way of life not easily shaken in the insular bureaucracy of an intelligence service. Radical rearrangements of traditional procedures must be considered.

At the least the Inspector General's function should be strengthened, as the Church Committee has recommended. Specifically, this officer's role should be expanded beyond its traditional one of internal control and response to employee complaints. One ex-Agency official who is a careful student of its recent history has suggested the creation of an ombudsman accessible to employees who felt they were being used in improper activities.[7] This would be a helpful addition to the Inspector General's staff, freeing him for the vital task of constructively intervening in questionable plans and programs throughout the Agency.

Similarly, the Legal Counsel must be given more steel to put under his velvet glove, particularly when his rulings are ignored or overturned by the Director. Traditionally matters of legal propriety have been referred to the Legal Counsel by other senior officers when and if they chose to do so; in effect his role has been passive. It should be a relatively simple internal matter to reverse this pattern. President Ford followed up one Church Committee recommendation by giving the Legal Counsel access to the Executive Oversight Board in the event that one of his rulings was ignored by the Director. This is a significant step in strengthening the legal review function in the Agency.

VI

A more sweeping structural change for the Agency has been suggested from time to time. This would entail a complete divorce of overt and covert intelligence activities. Overt functions (analysis, reporting, estimates, etc.) would be aggregated under one organizational roof and covert functions (collection, operations, counterintelligence, technical development of human control devices, etc.) under another. The objective behind such proposals has usually been to remove from the intelligence end product the taint of the methods used to obtain the raw data, in other words to strengthen the dignity and credibility of the Agency's truth-telling function.

[7] See Harry Rositzke, *CIA's Secret Operations*, New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1977, Chapter 13.

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There are merits to these suggestions, but perhaps the optimum time for divorce has passed. Indeed, if political operations were now eliminated and clandestine collection minimized, the temptation to breach ethical standards by the clandestine services would be reduced significantly. Moreover, cutting the clandestine services adrift would result in the concentration in one organization of most of those officers—now at high positions—who have been exposed to the highest ethical risks. Backsliding would be a great temptation, managerial control an administrator's nightmare.

But the measures discussed above will amount to little more than tinkering if not buttressed by a radical new personnel policy that places a premium on ethical values. Beyond native intelligence, recruitment criteria have in the past emphasized such psychological factors as stability, intellectual curiosity and phlegm. Once selected on the basis of favorable readings on these counts, the candidate had, of course, to survive the polygraph test—a final screening against the possibility of penetration by a foreign agent or a duplicitous adventurer. To this battery a test of ethical values should be added.

Law enforcement agencies in a few communities have provided something of a model in an area almost as contentious. A handful of larger police departments have been including in their selection procedures a "violence test" for rookie candidates.[8] The tests are basically psychological, designed to determine which applicants, in the normal course of their duties, would resort too readily to heavy-handed or bullying tactics. The results are not yet wholly clear—in part, one suspects, because there is little or no reinforcement of the desired value level as the new patrolmen become acculturated by their older colleagues, who possessed badges years before consideration of behavior patterns became a professional concern.

An ethics test could be constructed from an array of situational choice problems inserted into the Agency's selection instruments. Such problems would present difficult ethical decision choices for the test-taker in a variety of interpersonal and organizational settings. To prevent the job applicant from tilting his answers toward problem solutions he presumes the testers are seeking, the questions would have to be scattered throughout the various portions of the questionnaires used—psychological, intelligence,

[8] The "Machover DAP" test is one frequently used to detect overly aggressive personalities. Sophisticated screening instruments are described in the publication *Police Selection and Career Assessment*, issued by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, U.S. Dept of Justice, 1976.

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etc. All ethics questions could then be selected out of the various test parts and reviewed separately. One hopes that a rough profile of the applicant's personal ethical standards could be obtained by this device, but at best it would probably do no more than single out applicants with unacceptably low or hopelessly confused ethical standards. Follow-up tests for those who enter the Agency and have served for several years would be considerably more difficult to design, but they are not beyond the skills of Agency psychologists.

Surely this is slippery ground. One man's ethical floor may be another's ethical ceiling. Who is to define what the acceptable level of ethical beliefs should be? How would Agency management keep its ethical sights straight in a period of rapidly changing moral values? The issues raised are immensely difficult, but dismissing the concept will not solve the problem of the current low estate of the Agency in the public mind. Tackling the problem head on would, if nothing else, constitute a clear signal of top Agency management's concern to current employees, prospective recruits and the general public.

VII

Finally, the real purpose of intelligence—truth telling—must be placed at the center of Agency concerns. This is a harsh prescription; it is certainly the most difficult objective of the lot. But it must be the principal purpose of Agency leadership to establish beyond question the capacity of its experts and its facilities to seek out and find the truth, or the nearest approximation of the truth possible. Public cynicism will have to be dispelled before this is possible; it will take time. There are no easy paths to this objective. Indeed, the present mood of the public toward the Agency militates against its succeeding. The best graduate students do not gravitate to the Agency; its name is suspect in much of academia; business and professional groups are fearful of association.

Where such circumstances exist they must be met with new and probably at first none too credible approaches. Insistence on being primarily in the business of truth telling will not automatically convince the skeptic that it is so. But CIA leadership that condones no other competing role and that demands that ethical questions be asked before internal Agency policies are decided upon will have made a beginning in the long journey back to public accountability. None of these steps, of course, would avert the damage that an unscrupulous President, intent on misusing intelligence talents, could produce. Only loud, angry public resignations by intelligence leaders could in such a case underscore a professional's ethical commitment to truth.

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COMMENT AND CORRESPONDENCE

GEORGE KENNAN ON CONTAINMENT RECONSIDERED

To the Editor:

Regarding the exchange of communications between Mr. Mark and Mr. Gaddis concerning my views as of 1947,[1] I have no desire to comment on this argument. Your readers, so far as I am concerned, may judge it as they like. But I do not like to have my views misrepresented, and it seems to me that Mr. Mark has done just that at two points in his treatise.

The first, and less important, is the statement that "In December 1947 (if we may trust a rapporteur's notes) he contemplated the use of American forces in Greece." This assertion is not based on any words of my own. It is derived from the minutes of a joint State-military discussion of the situation in Greece and of possible courses of action in the event that the communist guerrillas should have such successes as to threaten a complete takeover of that country. I was strongly averse at all times to any dispatch of American forces, and voiced at this meeting my misgivings about the suggestion that we should send some. The rapporteur chose unfortunate and somewhat misleading language in summarizing my views; but an examination of his entire sentence, and not just the first phrase of it, makes it clear that my words were meant to convey that we should consider very carefully before embarking on any such course. Here is what the rapporteur said I said: "Mr. Kennan suggested that we should give very careful consideration to sending American combat troops to Greece, especially if they were to go as part of a mixed United Nations force; we might find ourselves in a difficult position from which it would be hard to withdraw, and equally hard to keep other nations from withdrawing the contingents they contributed." Mr. Mark had no excuse for misinterpreting this passage, for I had explained all this in a comment on an earlier attack of similar tenor that appeared in the *Slavic Review* (March 1976) and with which Mr. Mark was evidently familiar.

The other charge is more serious. It is to the effect that on March 15, 1948, I warned Secretary Marshall that a Russian invasion of Western Europe might be imminent. I had, it is said, previously supposed that the Soviets would avoid a "military contest" with the United States, but the recent coup in Czechoslovakia had led me to revise that estimate. It now appeared to me "that they might resort to outright conquest."

What Mr. Mark is here referring to was the following. While I was on an official mission in the Far East, General Lucius Clay, then in Berlin, sent to Washington a message to the effect that whereas he had previously felt and held that war was unlikely for at least ten years, he had now, in the past few weeks, felt a subtle change in the Soviet attitude "which I cannot define but which now gives me a feeling that it may come with dramatic suddenness." This message was relayed to me by the Department of State, with a request for my comment.

I was taken aback by this, for I had not thought there was any such danger. But in the light of the general situation then prevailing in Europe, I found

[1] Eduard Mark, "The Question of Containment: A Reply to John Lewis Gaddis," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1978, pp. 430–40; John Lewis Gaddis's rejoinder appears on pp. 440–41.

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General Clay's words very disturbing, and was obliged to reckon with the possibility that things had been happening there, during my absence in the Far East, of which I was not aware. Here was my reply:

> I have always felt that the Russians neither wanted nor expected a military contest with U.S. and that no military complications were likely to occur in our relations with them unless: (a) their political fortunes were to advance too rapidly in Europe and they were to become dizzy with success; or (b) they were to become really alarmed for security of their power in eastern Europe and to take foolish and precipitate action to prevent its dissolution.
>
> Strangely enough, in their recent actions in Europe I think there is something of both these elements. I suspect that many of the European Communists, partially victims of their own propaganda, are excited by recent successes and by prospect of seizing rich prizes in western Europe. On the other hand, the savage abruptness and cynical unconcern for appearances of recent action in Czechoslovakia leads me to feel that Kremlin leaders must be driven by sense of extreme urgency. They probably realizing that they are basically over-extended in eastern Europe and that unless they can break unity of western Europe and disturb ERP pattern it will be difficult for them to hold on in eastern and central Europe, because resulting material contrast, added to the incurable desire of all eastern and central European peoples to be considered part of western civilization, would probably prove decisive in the end.
>
> If this analysis is correct, then there is indeed a real and new element of danger in present situation, and we must be prepared for all eventualities. Top priority is of course due to effort to improve our basic military reserve position at home. As far as Europe is concerned, Italy is obviously key point. If Communists were to win election there our whole position in Mediterranean, and possibly in western Europe as well, would probably be undermined. I am persuaded Communists could not win without strong factor of intimidation on their side, and it would clearly be better that elections not take place at all than that Communists win in these circumstances.
>
> For these reasons I question whether it would not be preferable for Italian Government to outlaw Communist Party and take strong action against it before elections. Communists would presumably reply with civil war, which would give us grounds for reoccupation Foggia fields or any other facilities we might wish. This would admittedly result in much violence and probably a military division of Italy; but we are getting close to the deadline and I think it might well be preferable to a bloodless election victory, unopposed by ourselves, which would give the Communists the entire peninsula at one coup and send waves of panic to all surrounding areas.[2]

In the light of retrospect, I find nothing to be ashamed of in this message. This was a moment of great uncertainty for the Soviet leadership. Unbeknownst to the Western world, they were already in a state of dangerous conflict with Tito; and my observation that they were basically overextended in Eastern Europe could not have been more right. They were at that moment preparing to mount the Berlin blockade, as an almost desperate defensive action. On the other hand, that faction, headed by Zhdanov, which saw chances for a peaceful conquest of Western Europe by infiltration and subversion was much excited by the possibility that the Italian Communists might succeed, by various tactics, in achieving a sufficient success in the Italian elections to capture certain of the key positions in that country.

It was, therefore, indeed a delicate and dangerous moment. But you will note that not only did the initiative for this message not come from me but there

[2] This reply was published in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948*, III, Washington: GPO, 1974, pp. 848–49.

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is in it not the slightest reference to any "Russian invasion" of Western Europe; nor did I say that the coup in Czechoslovakia had led me "to revise my estimate" that the Russians neither wanted nor expected a military contest with the United States. I said merely that this coup led me to feel that the Kremlin leaders must be driven by a sense of extreme urgency, which indeed they were. Finally, the message made it abundantly clear that I viewed the prospects for a communist political success in Italy as the principal danger of the moment.

I consistently opposed, throughout that period (and ever since), the view that the Soviet leaders wished to invade, or were planning to invade, Western Europe. Mr. Mark would have had no difficulty finding, even in the same volume to which he here refers, clear expressions of this view—expressions so obviously at odds with the impression he has labored to convey that I think he ought, in all fairness, to have quoted some of them, too. As an example, let me just cite this passage from a formal Policy Planning Staff paper, drafted by myself, submitted later that same year (November 24, 1948), at a moment of particular tension in view of the rapid intensification of the Berlin blockade.

> A military danger, arising from possible incidents or from prestige engagement of the Russians and the western powers in the Berlin situation, does exist, and is probably increasing rather than otherwise. But basic Russian intent still runs to the conquest of western Europe by political means. In this program, military force plays a major role only as a means of intimidation.
>
> The danger of political conquest is still greater than the military danger. If a war comes in the foreseeable future, it will probably be one which Moscow did not desire but did not know how to avoid.[3]

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Mr. Mark replies:

To consider the documents at issue in Ambassador Kennan's order:

1. I did indeed read his reply to an "earlier attack" in the March 1976 issue of the *Slavic Review*. My "excuse" for nonetheless stating that he "contemplated the use of American forces in Greece" is that I was not persuaded by it.

I invite the interested reader's attention to the document in question and bid him observe the following: in the discussion of aid to Greece, Ambassador Kennan asked a general "whether the introduction of a United Nations force to occupy strategic points in Greece would be effective in enabling the Greek forces to clean up the guerrillas." When the officer replied that it might be good for Greek morale but would prove ultimately ineffective if pressure on Greece were increased from the north, Kennan then inquired "if it would not be feasible to throw a cordon of foreign troops right across northern Greece." The general replied that it might in certain circumstances, whereupon another officer and Under Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett, stated that an American corps of two divisions in Thrace would have a useful effect. At this point in the record there occurs the sentence Ambassador Kennan quotes above—that "very careful consideration" be given to the sending of American forces, especially if they were to be accompanied by allies. Then we find another the Ambassador chose

[3] This, too, was published in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948*, III, p. 285—the same volume to which Mr. Mark refers.

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not to quote: "He [Kennan] also thought an area in southern Greece, such as the Peloponnesus, might be easier to defend and therefore a better place for our troops from a strategic point of view.[4]

Since it was Ambassador Kennan who raised the question of sending troops to Greece, and who evidently thought enough of the idea to restate it when a difficulty was raised, and even to suggest two locations where American forces might be deployed, it seems quite reasonable to state that he "contemplated" military intervention in Greece, even though he also discussed some of the possible political complications that might attend such a course. His denial calls attention only to this latter circumstance and ignores utterly the entire structure of the conversation.

2. Context is again crucial in the case of the second document. In this regard two considerations must be borne in mind. The first is that this message—as Ambassador Kennan states above—was a solicited response to a recent cable from General Clay, in which that officer stated that various developments had led him to fear that war might come with "dramatic suddenness." The second is that those who feared a war in February–March 1948 believed that it might come from a rapid Soviet thrust to the west. Swollen Soviet forces in advanced positions in Germany had generated the concern in Western Europe that led to the signing of the Brussels mutual defense pact on March 17, 1948; the very same day President Truman, moved by a similar fear, asked Congress to reinstitute conscription. The Russian radio, moreover, had been warning West Germans for some months not to cooperate with the United States because "the unavoidable withdrawal of the Allies which will come about very suddenly" would leave them open to reprisals. The Red Army, finally, was known to be practicing—and capable of executing—the rapid occupation of Western Europe in the event of hostilities. There was, in short, a "real war scare" (as the Ambassador recalled in his memoirs).

It was in this superheated atmosphere that Ambassador Kennan was asked to comment on Clay's warning—and thereby, of course, on the general situation. It will be observed that there is not the least effort to urge a calm reassessment nor even the hint of a suggestion that Clay had exaggerated the dangers of the moment. He rather wrote that he himself, like Clay (see the précis of the general's telegram given by Ambassador Kennan above), had theretofore thought a "military contest" or "military complications" with the Soviets unlikely unless either condition (a) or condition (b) developed. Unfortunately, he continued, both had in some measure matured, and that the United States should be prepared for "all eventualities" and "foolish and precipitate actions" by the Soviets, such that it should look to its "basic military reserve position at home." To this last recommendation the Ambassador assigned "top priority."

In context, I submit, this document is most plausibly read as a cautious endorsement of General Clay's concern *as well as* a specific warning about Italy. The references to the Soviets seem to contemplate dangers beyond an attempt by the Italian Communists to win an election in their own country, and the proposed preparations something more than the possible occupation of a few airfields.

As for the charge that I should have cited documents in which the Ambassador minimized the likelihood of a Russian attack, I can only say that I was at pains to show that it was his general opinion that the Soviets would be deterred

[4] Memorandum of conversation by John D. Jernegan, December 26, 1947, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947*, V, Washington: GPO, 1971, pp. 466–69.

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from such a course by the superior power of the United States, and that as long as they were so deterred the immediate military danger lay in "nominally domestic" civil wars waged by "stooge forces" in such places as Greece and Korea. (This is a distinction, I might add, that also escaped Professor Gaddis in his rejoinder to my article.) I am quite prepared, accordingly, to believe that Ambassador Kennan's fears of March 1948 (assuming the correctness of my analysis) were atypical, as indeed were those of General Clay and President Truman. Indeed, Ambassador Kennan seems to say almost as much when he writes, ". . . I found General Clay's words very disturbing, and was obliged to reckon with the possibility that things had been happening there [in Europe], during my absence in the Far East, of which I was not aware."

THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA

To the Editor:

Like good debaters, Ambassador Clyde Ferguson and Mr. William Cotter commence the argument in their article ("South Africa—What is to be Done") in your January 1978 issue, by setting the stage in a fashion most favorable for themselves. The issue, as they pose it, is whether the policy of "communication," which they say has been dominant in our policy toward South Africa during the past decade, has a chance of fostering "the major U.S. objective regarding South Africa—a transition to a just power-sharing with a minimum of violence." Mr. George Ball is singled out as the most distinguished advocate of "communication," of maintaining and increasing the points of contact and interchange with South African leadership rather than intensifying their sense of isolation and hence their obdurate determination to maintain apartheid.

Mr. Ball's views on this issue are shared by a great number of observers, including myself, and it appears to be the main purpose of Messrs. Ferguson and Cotter in this article to refute and discredit them. This is achieved by attributing to those in Mr. Ball's camp claims that few if any of them would make for their preferred strategy of "communication." Furthermore, they point out that the repressions and tightened segregationist restrictions have continued despite much communication with more democratic countries and during a period when external pressure was relatively absent. Since "communication" clearly has not overturned the Nationalists, we should step up the level and intensity of external pressure through resort to some of the 41 steps that the authors list in their article.

It is important to recognize the assumptions which are made.

1. The authors appear to assume that social and political developments in South Africa are entirely—or at least chiefly—determined by external influences, particularly the actions and pronouncements of Americans. One is reminded of the warning of the British scholar, Denis Brogan, in "Illusion of American Omnipotence" (*Harper's*, December 1952), addressed to those in the United States who, in the early 1950s, were debating the issue, "Who Lost China?"

2. They would have us believe that there has been an unmitigated deterioration in the status of the non-whites during the past decade, whereas in fact there has been a very mixed and confusing picture, but with some important indicators showing an improvement. Thus, some of the more humiliating aspects of "petty apartheid" have been removed and blacks are now accepted in many occupations previously reserved for whites. Afrikaner as well as English-

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speaking businessmen are heard demanding the elimination of racial discrimination throughout economic life.

3. There is also an implicit assumption that the past ten years have been marked by friendly interchange and an absence of external pressure and condemnation. The fact of the matter, however, is that since 1952, when the U.N. General Assembly first took up the purely domestic issue of South African "race conflict," there has been a steady escalation in the rhetoric of condemnation. U.S. policy, moreover, has tended (with occasional setbacks) to move toward the position of the Third World majority in the General Assembly, namely of singling out South Africa for selective condemnation for social sins shared at least in degree by most multiracial societies, including our own.

The fundamental assumption of the authors is the first of those listed above. If we accept the notion that American statements and actions are primarily responsible, and if it is apparent that events within South Africa have not progressed toward what most of us would agree to be our objective—i.e., "transition to a just power-sharing with a minimum of violence"—then it would follow that an abandonment of "communication" in favor of harsher sanctions might succeed. Throughout their article Messrs. Ferguson and Cotter repeat the suggestion that the Vorster government refuses to take our chiding seriously because we continue to permit normal trade and investment relations and have not yet accepted the notion that "South Africa's internal situation itself—not merely the supply of arms to South Africa—constitutes a threat to peace under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter."

But if one rejects, as I do, this basic assumption and the two kindred assumptions, then the burden of responsibility for South African events does not lie with American policy, whether that policy be communication or confrontation. Perhaps the South African situation is analogous to that which we confronted 30 years ago in China and which led Dean Acheson to conclude, in his introduction to the White Paper of 1949: "It was the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to influence but could not."

To suggest this admittedly imperfect analogy is not to imply that nothing that the United States or its friends can do will affect the outcome of the present debate within South Africa on race relations. It is rather to suggest that the relevant test for policy options is not whether one policy or the other on our part will of itself lead that country away from apartheid and head it toward the goal of fuller participation by all ethnic groups. The more relevant test is to satisfy the injunction of the Hippocratic Oath: above all else do no harm. We would hope that the options we choose may contribute, if only marginally, toward a cure—toward a peaceful resolution of tensions and a greater willingness on the part of South African whites to share power.

It was with this hope in mind that, as the desk officer responsible for South African Affairs in the State Department 25 years ago, I promoted a government-sponsored visit to South Africa by a leading theologian of the American Dutch Reformed Church. The object was to improve communication, to reduce the intellectual and religious isolation of the Afrikaners. Perhaps no foreign churchman could really succeed in breaking down the dogmatism that led these hard-shell Calvinists to find scriptural sanction for their apartheid doctrine. But if anyone could dent their armor of self-righteousness it would be a theologian trained in their own tradition but whose interpretation of Christianity led him to quite different conclusions on race relations.

Perhaps this particular seed fell on stony ground. But perhaps it may have

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contributed, however slightly, to the fact that the younger leaders in the Afrikaner community are notably more liberal, or at least less bigoted, than those of an earlier generation. But it certainly met the test of the Hippocratic Oath: it could not have done harm.

This could not be said, however, for the Ferguson-Cotter recipe of 41 graduated steps for increasing the external pressures on South Africa. The authors disparage Mr. Ball's warning that this approach will merely increase the *laager* complex (the feeling of being besieged) and rally support for Vorster from more liberal elements in the white community. Yet this was the same warning conveyed in a 1977 editorial in the *Economist*, captioned "How to Make Diehards," which quoted expressions of despair from South African liberals that the Carter Administration had played into the hands of Nationalist Party election strategy with its demand for "one man, one vote." The *Economist* correctly predicted that the English-speaking community would agree that this was a recipe for national suicide and would rally behind the Nationalists. The prediction was vindicated in the November 30 election landslide.

The effect of stepped-up external pressure and condemnation on the eve of the 1977 election was reminiscent of a similar pattern of events in 1952. In the 1948 elections, the Nationalists won a majority of the legislature but were still in a minority in the popular vote. But in 1952 they received massive assistance from abroad, in the form of the Arab-Asian resolution in the U.N. General Assembly, which denounced South Africa (but no other multiracial society) for its harshly discriminatory treatment of the African majority. (There had been previous debates and resolutions on the treatment of Indians, but that had been an issue with a history of international negotiations and hence not shielded by the domestic jurisdiction clause of the U.N. Charter.)

I can recall my efforts, as a young member of the U.S. delegation staff, to persuade the Indians, who were the prime movers of this new "race conflict" resolution, to switch to a U.S.-Scandinavian resolution that deplored segregation and discrimination in *all* multiracial societies, and not merely in South Africa. We warned them that a resolution such as theirs most clearly offended against the Article 2(7) prohibition against U.N. intrusion into "matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any member state." We predicted that if it were adopted, their resolution would be counterproductive not merely because of its selective morality—supported by states such as Yemen that still practiced slavery—but also because it would be perceived as illegal (in violation of the Charter) by the country it sought to influence. And we warned that they were gratuitously handing the Nationalist Party an ideal whipping boy for the 1953 elections.

As it developed, the General Assembly passed both resolutions, the Arab-Asian and the U.S.-Scandinavian. But the latter was entirely overshadowed, in the media, by the one drafted by the Indians, and it was this text that Nationalist candidates quoted so gleefully at election rallies the following year. It would be attributing too much to external influences to conclude that the impressive Nationalist victory in 1953 was determined primarily by the U.N. resolution. But as a contributory factor, which put the United Party opposition on the defensive, it clearly violated the Hippocratic precept.

This digression into past history is relevant because it bears on the assertion of Messrs. Ferguson and Cotter that "It is significant that the rigid structure of separation and repression was solidified during years when South Africa was

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comparatively free of external pressures." This misreads the record. The language of U.N. condemnation became annually more shrill and intemperate. While the United States (together with the United Kingdom and France) might veto the most extreme demands for full sanctions, which were in obvious defiance of the Charter, we gradually joined in the selective condemnation of South Africa, and the United States was among the most rigid of all member states in applying the arms embargo.

The action of Henry Kissinger in supporting Option No. 2 of National Security Study Memorandum 39 in 1970 has sometimes been interpreted as a "tilt" toward Nationalist South Africa. Messrs. Ferguson and Cotter more accurately describe it as a clear expression of preference for a policy of "communication," and I would myself interpret it as a move back from a futile and ineffective posture of coercion and selective morality. As such, it seemed to herald a return to our traditional position seeking to reconcile the human rights articles of the Charter (55 and 56) with Article 2(7), which protects areas of domestic jurisdiction. This was the position expressed in our U.S.-Scandinavian resolution of 1952 (Resolution 616B), which affirmed that "government policies of member states which are designed to perpetuate or increase discrimination, are inconsistent with the pledge of the members under Article 56 of the Charter."

Ambassador Moynihan also appeared to be reverting to this important distinction during his address, in November 1975, in which he presented the U.S. resolution in favor of amnesty for political prisoners. In proposing this resolution as applicable to *all* member states, Mr. Moynihan contrasted it with prior resolutions on the same subject but limited specifically to South Africa and Chile. He noted that among the sponsors of the resolution on Chile, 16 states held political prisoners, while no less than 23 of the sponsors of the resolution on South Africa were in this same situation.

But Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Cotter would have American policy shift to the other extreme. They would have us ignore Article 2(7) altogether and endorse the ultimate "Third World" position that the internal situation in South Africa is itself a threat to the peace and an occasion for U.N. sanctions under Chapter VII. But we should consider the precedent this would create. The argument for this course states that since apartheid policies have provoked a violent reaction on the part of some black South Africans, international peace has been threatened. Would U.N. intervention be justified because some Americans have reacted with violence to efforts to enforce court orders in the field of civil rights?

In sum, the burden of proof, as to the efficacy of U.S. policy options, should not rest with those of us who would stick by the present U.N. Charter and the traditions of American diplomacy. It should rest rather with those who would contend that détente may work with the Soviets but not with South African whites who are somehow devoid of our common humanity. The logical conclusion of such reasoning is that peaceful change is impossible and that we should encourage the early outbreak of an inevitable race war. Those Americans who have reached this grim conclusion should realize, however, that South African whites are not counting on American or European intervention to save them from retribution at the hands of their blacks. They have an overwhelming preponderance of power and are increasingly self-sufficient in munitions and other resources. No true friend of South African blacks could encourage them

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to take the hopeless path of violent confrontation. The best that we can ask is that U.S. policy avoid counterproductive actions and postures and seek instead to encourage an atmosphere where the internal forces can continue to work for change.

ARMISTEAD M. LEE
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Mr. Lee, a former Foreign Service officer, served as the desk officer for Australia, New Zealand and South African Affairs from 1952 to 1954, and was an advisor to the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations in 1952.

To the Editor:

In their article on South Africa, authors Ferguson and Cotter conclude that more vigorous pressure from the United States will be necessary to achieve meaningful change in South African society. Their justification for interference in another sovereign nation's internal affairs is that the continuation of apartheid represents a threat to international peace.

Few people question the need for change within South Africa. The debate concerns itself essentially with the means by which to achieve that change, and the time frame available to achieve it with a minimum of suffering for all peoples involved. The assumption that apartheid represents a present threat to peace has become very popular in certain quarters in the past several years since it presents those who seek to carry out rapid change in South Africa with a justification to call for international action. However, such an assumption contains a large amount of wishful thinking, is highly questionable and merits much closer examination before being adopted as the basis for Western policy toward South Africa.

The economic and social realities of southern Africa tend to deny that apartheid, however objectionable, represents a threat to international peace in the near future. There is, in the first place, the unfortunate fact that most of southern Africa outside of South Africa, Namibia and Rhodesia, is in desperate economic straits. Most countries in the area are to a considerable degree dependent upon South Africa, and their economic relations with their southern neighbor are much more significant than official trade statistics indicate.

Man may not live by bread alone, but the willingness of countries such as Zambia, Botswana and Malawi to become involved directly or indirectly in military action against South Africa *in the near future* is very difficult to imagine. Also difficult to imagine is the willingness, or logistical capability for that matter, of the U.S.S.R. to support all of Africa south of the Congo River as a platform for war on apartheid.

A very long-term view of southern Africa could present different economic and social situations, and a threat to international peace could very well emerge. However, if we are dealing with a ten-year time frame, for example, it is very questionable that any such threat exists.

The foregoing does not suggest in any way that there will not be an escalation of unrest *within* South Africa. In fact, no matter how much is done in the way of concessions toward black power-sharing, an increase in civil disturbances seems inevitable for some time to come. Even without outside interference, all elements of South African society can look forward to a turbulent decade in the 1980s.

If, therefore, we cannot support the contention that South Africa's racial

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policies represent an immediate threat to international peace, but we do foresee escalating internal unrest in that troubled land, what should the policy of the United States be?

Prominent among the listed possible courses of action proposed by the authors are various economic measures that merit closer review. The authors' step 26 in their list of possible actions is the discouragement of further investment by U.S. business in South Africa. In this connection, they cite "seven [companies which] are actually planning to pull out," and state that "Polaroid has just pulled out." To cite the Polaroid case with no further elaboration is a disservice to the reader who may not be aware of the fact that Polaroid had no operating company or investment in South Africa. The reference to seven unidentified companies supposedly planning to leave South Africa gives the impression of an impending exodus of U.S. investors from South Africa that is simply not the case, as a recent *New York Times* survey indicated.

The proposal to discourage U.S. investment in South Africa echoes the debate that has gone on for years at annual shareholders meetings—that is, whether the presence of U.S. corporations in South Africa is a force for or against the maintenance of the status quo, i.e., apartheid.

Without attempting to deal with all of the pros and cons of this question, several points must be stressed:

1. *Six Principles.* Over 50 U.S. corporations have adopted the Six Principles governing employment practices under the initiative organized by Dr. Leon Sullivan. Accordingly, they have pledged to integrate eating, comfort and work facilities, to improve black employees' living conditions, to equalize wages for comparable work, to improve training programs for blacks, and to step up promotions of blacks. If faithfully carried out, this program will eliminate apartheid in work places throughout South Africa. This must be regarded as a positive factor.

2. *Economic Strength.* The purpose of an investment ban by U.S. business would presumably be to slow down the South African economy. Such an eventuality would *reduce* black economic and social advancement in the factories, banks and offices of South Africa. To draw a parallel with the United States, the Equal Opportunities advances of the 1970s would simply not have been possible in the economic conditions of the 1930s. The last vestiges of "job reservation" in South Africa could probably largely disappear in a few years of sound economic growth, but will be grimly retained indefinitely in a depressed economy.

3. *U.S. Companies' Employees.* It has always seemed supremely arrogant on the part of those who press for investment moratoriums or disengagement by U.S. business to ignore the opinions of the black South African employees of those companies on the subject, or not seek them in the first place as being irrelevant. South African blacks, in and out of U.S.-owned factories, generally want a continued and growing U.S. presence in South Africa because *that presence means communication with a more liberal outside world.*

Before leaving economics and U.S. business involvement in South Africa, it is necessary to correct a false impression as to the source of profitability of much U.S. business in South Africa.

The claim is made that the "wellspring of. . . profitability" of South African business is "cheap black labor," the implication being that low labor costs have made South Africa attractive to foreign investors. There is no question that South Africa's extractive industries, which sell their products in international markets, have benefited greatly from the relatively low cost of black labor. This

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is not generally the case, however, in South Africa's growing industrial sector. Commerce and industry in South Africa have in the past achieved generally good returns on investment, not due to "cheap labor," but due to government economic policy that has created a protected economy. Whether sound economically or not, almost all industry in South Africa is comfortable behind the protection of either high tariffs or import restrictions. Support for the principle of protection for import substitution industries may have been partially motivated by strategic considerations, but the fact is that this policy, and not "cheap labor," has been the prime contributor to returns on investment higher than international averages. The average American company with a manufacturing subsidiary in South Africa was not attracted to that country by low labor rates, does not have significant exports from its South African subsidiary, and could not serve the South African market on a finished goods export basis from the United States.

Furthermore, a comparison of average hourly wages for blacks in South African industry will show them to be considerably higher than those prevalent in Brazil, India, Korea and Taiwan, just to mention several significant Third World economies. This fact does not imply that South African wages are presently just or unjust, but does indicate that foreign investors in manufacturing do *not* go to South Africa to take advantage of "cheap labor" in order to more competitively produce goods for export to other markets.

The implications of the possible economic actions cited by the authors go beyond the attempted damage to the South African economy, if that were not a frightening enough prospect.

Further on the list of possible steps is the remarkable step 40, which would have the U.S. government pressure the International Monetary Fund to depress the world gold price to reduce South Africa's foreign exchange earnings. The authors presumably consider that the possibility of ruining the South African economy is worth the possible side effects of such an action, such as the wrath of other nations with large gold holdings, many of which are important trading partners of the United States; devaluation of the private savings of millions of small gold holders around the world; and touching off unknown international trade dislocations, to mention a few. Such a proposal is reminiscent of a manipulative style of foreign relations that hopefully the present Administration has rejected.

Perhaps equally disturbing is Step 41, which would have the U.S. government, which so recently suffered and denounced an oil boycott, encourage Iran to impose one upon South Africa. The reader may question such an initiative on the part of a government that has recently passed anti-boycott legislation applicable to private business dealings. He may also reasonably ask what the U.S. government would offer Iran, which has refused to participate in earlier boycotts, in return for this "favor."

A further economic question not to be found in the preparation of the authors' list of "steps" is the effect of successful action against South Africa on the other economies of southern Africa. Is the United States prepared to provide unlimited economic support for the economies of Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana and Malawi, all of which depend heavily upon South Africa, as well as Mozambique, Zambia, and Zaïre, as well as the future states of Zimbabwe and Namibia, all of which rely to a considerable degree upon South Africa regardless of their political posture toward their southern neighbor?

Aside from these external implications, any manipulation with the intent of

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damaging the economy of South Africa can have no other short-term result but human misery. The suffering that will result from South Africa's economic difficulties will be borne largely by the blacks, who can eventually be expected to react violently. Is this what the people of the United States want? Is such a policy in keeping with our traditions? Our nation was founded in revolution but of a far different kind.

There is an implication in the very ordering of the authors' long list of possible actions open to the United States that the government of South Africa would eventually bend as the economic pressures began to affect the white South African way of life. Those who know South Africa well, including author Alan Paton, warn that this is not true because of the character of the Afrikaner. While the urban Afrikaner of the 1970s may seem a far cry from the rugged rifleman of the Boer War, as a people they still place their beliefs before their pocketbook and they will not be intimidated. A course of action to force social change in South Africa through economic pressure is a collision course.

If economic pressure will not encourage nonviolent social change in South Africa, what will? I would suggest: Economic *growth*, *expanded* contact with the outside world, and *time*.

Economic growth will accelerate change. Economic growth will accelerate the rate at which blacks assume more responsible positions in the economy and in the process acquire greater self-confidence, greater disposable income, and greater expectations, all of which will in turn accelerate social change. Economic growth means greater emphasis upon industry and mechanized agriculture, and the inevitable growth of the black urban population. These developments give the blacks increasingly disruptive power over the economy, and at the same time lead toward "detribalization," which facilitates their organization in support of *black* causes, as opposed to Zulu, Xhosa or Tswana causes. Economic growth will in fact diminish the government's ability to maintain the status quo.

Apart from their wide-ranging economic steps, the authors also envisage the downgrading of diplomatic representation, discouragement of tourism, and encouragement of the sports boycott as actions to be taken against an unbending South Africa. In other words, they call for a reduction of communication at the very moment when communication will most be needed.

Under the Carter Administration, the United States has done much to improve relations with the Third World. Our concern for human rights is considered sincere even if it is not always understood. Hopefully, individual developing countries are discerning that our government no longer regards them solely as expendable pawns in the great U.S.-U.S.S.R. chess game. In this new atmosphere, there is no need to adopt a public "tough line" with South Africa for the publicity effects in the rest of Africa and Asia. Our credibility has been established, and we should take full advantage of that credibility to explain to black Africa that we favor change in South Africa but not at any price, that we will work toward such change, and that to do so we must maintain the *broadest possible contact with the South African nation*.

The changes taking place in South Africa today seem blindingly fast to older generation Afrikaners, and tortoise slow to teenage blacks from Soweto. There is no question that the rate of change is escalating. A revolution of expectations is taking place in South Africa. It is important, however, to maintain perspective on the ability of any society to absorb great social change in a short period of time. We Americans have a very short time frame for change, which is understandable in a young nation of immigrants and pioneers.

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Many of us whose attention has only recently been directed toward southern Africa, perhaps thanks in part to the relative calm that has settled upon Southeast Asia, become impatient when the apartheid system, which has been developed over several hundred years (and not only since the 1948 elections that brought the Nationalist Party to power) does not disintegrate after a few years of concentrated denunciations. Again, the inevitable comparison with the United States, where we suddenly were reminded in the 1960s that we had done little to remove discriminatory practices 100 years after the Emancipation Proclamation. The sweeping change of the next ten years was a revolution of sorts, although one that is not yet complete, particularly in its economic aspects. The South African situation is infinitely more complex than that which faced the United States, and the conditions appropriate to carry out a bloodless revolution in a short time span simply do not exist. Americans would be well advised to study the differences, and not forget our first 100 years.

The current tone of the debate on South Africa as heard in the United States seems to be turning shrill, and turning away from persuasion and toward confrontation.

Many of the same voices that denounced American intervention in Southeast Asia now support American interference to resolve the problems of southern Africa. In the case of South Africa, there is the same arrogant tendency to dictate the terms of internal change and the timetable for such change to a complex society that we do not fully understand. By encouraging economic disruption or diplomatic/cultural isolation of South Africa, or by promoting an unrealistic timetable for change, the United States will add dangerous pressures to what is already a volatile internal situation in that country.

The United States is the only country that can provide the leadership that will be needed to help South Africa through the long and difficult transitional period to come, with a minimum of hardship for all concerned. We cannot carry out that role from the position of an adversary. We cannot carry out that role if our every action and statement in the South African arena must be scrutinized for its effect on domestic politics in the United States or our relations with black African states. As suggested earlier, we must explain to all concerned that the United States, while it abhors apartheid, must be given time in which to help South Africa carry out the difficult transformation that it faces.

Of course, in return we must expect South Africa's appreciation for the difficult role that the United States would be assuming. The United States would be well advised to urge open consideration of alternative solutions to the complicated problem of power-sharing. To date there has been an almost complete dearth of any solutions to the problem other than "one man, one vote" on the one hand and "separate development" (with 13 percent of the land to the Bantustans) on the other. Nearly everyone knows full well that neither alternative is viable, but there has been a terrible reluctance to commence serious discussion of other alternatives. There is great scope for debate, not only between white and black, but within racial groups, as there is a wide divergence of opinion among the blacks and Afrikaners in spite of the monolithic aspect that the latter society gives to the outside world. What is important is that a start be made and there the United States can play a role.

Let us, therefore, expand contacts with South Africa at every level, commercial, cultural and diplomatic. Greater exposure to the many facets of our great society will achieve more toward the objective of social justice for all than can

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ever be achieved through threats, sanctions and isolation.

JOHN E. PURCELL
Hudson, Ohio

Mr. Purcell is the Regional Director for Asia and Africa of Goodyear International Corporation. This letter expresses solely his own personal views.

Messrs. Ferguson and Cotter reply:

With respect to Mr. Lee's letter:

1. We did not assume that change in South Africa would be "chiefly determined by external influences, particularly the actions and pronouncements of Americans." On the contrary we made it clear that "a combination of serious international *and domestic* pressures" were necessary to convince white South Africans to move toward peaceful change before it is too late. We nowhere stated that *American* actions were likely to be the most important factors determining the future course in South Africa. In fact, we advocated that "wherever possible" the United States should "encourage multilateral action." Our article, by design, dealt with options available to the American people: not that they are the only international forces or even the most important ones. Moreover, we agree that the domestic pressures from rising black anger and militancy constitute the major force for change in South Africa. International actions play only a secondary role.

2. We agree that there has been some minor relaxation of "petty apartheid" (oftentimes—like sports integration—resulting, at least in part, from external boycotts and pressures). There is also less "job reservation" than in the past for blacks, primarily because there are no whites who want those jobs and it is no longer necessary to "reserve" them. However, these minor relaxations are dwarfed by other actions over the past decade that have increased the repression of black leaders and liberal whites as well.

3. There has been no lack of rhetorical "condemnation" during the past years but we deny that there has been any significant external "pressure" from the West. The thrust of our article is that the South Africans do not take our condemnations seriously when our diplomatic, military and economic support of the South African government continues as before or even expands. Actions speak louder than words.

4. South Africa is singled out for special condemnation not "for social sins shared by most multiracial societies" but because it is the only country in the world where *all* political, social and economic rights are completely ascribed by race. Apartheid is not a "social sin" but an all-encompassing legal system enshrining the superiority of the white race.

5. We have not suggested abandonment of "communication." Rather, we suggest that communication, by itself, has not worked and that it should be *combined* with pressures aimed at achievable goals (like the release of political prisoners). We have advocated the use of "carrots" as well as "sticks" and obviously this approach requires a continuation of communication and diplomatic interchange.

6. We would be happy if the United States, with respect to South Africa, could follow the Hippocratic Oath suggested by Mr. Lee: "above all else do no harm." But it is false to assume that a continuation of our current relationships with South Africa "does no harm." On the contrary, many thoughtful observers

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argue that our economic, political and military support of the Vorster government does great harm to the prospects for peaceful change and to the human rights of the vast bulk of the population of that country. We reject Mr. Lee's unstated assumption that a continuation of past American policy (rhetorical condemnation combined with practical support for the status quo) does no harm.

7. Mr. Lee is disturbed that external "pressures" have had unfortunate impacts on the elections in both 1952 and 1977. The whites do rally to the Nationalist Party in the face of this external "pressure." But is there any kind of American policy that could have brought forth a meaningful *electoral* change in the white community? White opposition leaders in parliament have repeatedly declared that there is little chance that their advocacy of limited power-sharing with blacks (through a qualified franchise and a federal system) will find majority support among white voters. In the first place, 60 percent of the voters are Afrikaners and vote almost automatically for the Nationalists. Moreover, much of the English-speaking community, like their Afrikaner compatriots, will vote for Nationalist candidates both because they genuinely fear the prospect of black participation in government and because they do not want to give up any of their current privileges. This is understandable and we cannot imagine any external policies by the Carter Administration or the world community that would change their minds. By concentrating on what is going on within the *white* electorate, Mr. Lee misses the point: the whites are united (and have been throughout the twentieth century) behind a political system that has given them great privileges and, until now, much security. They are not voluntarily going to vote otherwise in the foreseeable future (what people would?). Rather, it is only when the whites begin to see that there are costs to be paid for their intransigence that they are likely to consider the possibility of compromise with representative blacks. A similar process is now occurring in Southern Rhodesia where whites apparently are, finally, and as a result of guerrilla pressures, willing to share power with the black majority. This could also occur in South Africa if there were meaningful pressures that made it clear to the whites that they can not retain all power and privilege indefinitely. It is hoped that economic and diplomatic pressures might serve the same purpose in South Africa that escalating violence has achieved in Southern Rhodesia, namely, bringing the whites to the bargaining table.

8. Mr. Lee unfairly criticizes the Carter Administration for playing "into the hands of the Nationalist Party election strategy with its demand for 'one man, one vote.'" In fact, the Vice President in an interview in the *Rand Daily Mail* in October, had made it quite clear that the Administration had no formula for political power-sharing in South Africa but was simply calling upon whites to begin an internal dialogue with blacks to determine whether some formula might be found that was acceptable to *both* blacks and whites whereby they could share power in the future.

9. Mr. Lee believes "that industrialization is ultimately incompatible with apartheid and discrimination." When is ultimately? Within what time frame can we hope that the process of industrialization (which has already made such enormous gains during the twentieth century) will bring about the end of apartheid and discrimination in South Africa?

10. We do not agree that peaceful change is impossible. The thrust of our article is to get blacks and whites to talk together to avoid a racial war. We feel that those, like Mr. Lee, who have been arguing for communication and

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patience for 25 years, have the burden of describing the forces that they think will lead to peaceful change in the next ten. Mr. Lee argues that we should "stick by the present . . . traditions of American diplomacy" but gives no indication of how or when those traditions might produce meaningful, peaceful change in South Africa. The danger is that if one continues to wait another 25 years, time will expire for the advocates of a multiracial society in South Africa.

With respect to Mr. Purcell's letter:

1. We stand by our belief that apartheid *already* represents a threat to international peace in southern Africa. While the economic relations between neighboring black-ruled states and South Africa are extensive, this has *not* prevented Mozambique from supporting the training of anti-apartheid guerrilla forces. This was highlighted in the South African press, which reported during the summer of 1977, that the police had smashed "several terrorist bases" in Natal Province and had captured a number of "terrorists." The police declared that they had uncovered an invasion plan that was the "the brainchild of the South African Communist Party and the African National Congress operating from overseas *and neighboring African states* (emphasis added)." All the country's borders were said to be heavily guarded. The police seized caches of Russian-manufactured arms, explosives, booby traps and ammunition. The arms included machine guns, rocket launchers and grenades, according to the *Rand Daily Mail* of August 29, 1977. Earlier, in July, police from all over South Africa had been called up for border patrol duty. General Dawid Kriel, Deputy Commissioner of Police in charge of riot control, said the police would patrol "every inch" of South Africa's 1,200-mile-long northern border. Kriel was quoted in the *Rand Daily Mail* of July 14, 1977 as asserting that the call-up was necessary "to prevent further terrorist infiltration by people who had left for training after last year's riots."

While we agree that it is unlikely for Malawi, Zambia or Botswana to become actively involved in military action against South Africa in the near future, the South African government must also think about the governments of Mozambique (which is already reported to be training African National Congress guerrillas), Southern Rhodesia, Angola and perhaps, in the near future, Namibia. Neither Malawi nor Zambia borders on South Africa, and Botswana has had a long-standing policy against allowing guerrilla camps in or raids from its territory. But economic interdependence does *not* mean that South Africa can count on its neighbors to restrict guerrilla activities. Southern Rhodesia has found this to be true with respect to both Zambia and Mozambique despite the very close economic interdependence among those three countries. The present low level of guerrilla infiltration into South Africa will likely escalate once Southern Rhodesia achieves independence (which many believe may occur in 1978).

2. We agree that Polaroid had no operating company or investment in South Africa but the evidence of the decline of U.S. investor confidence in South Africa comes not from an American source but from a survey done by the University of Cape Town's Graduate School of Business in September 1977. Moreover, even Henry Ford, during his much-publicized recent visit to South Africa, stopped short of announcing *an increase* in his firm's investment in South Africa although he did announce that Ford had no intention of pulling out. The list of 41 steps in the January *Foreign Affairs* article *does not* include withdrawal of current investment and is, therefore, consistent with the conservative posture of the U.S. business community today.

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3. We doubt that the Sullivan Principles, even if faithfully carried out, would "eliminate apartheid in work places throughout South Africa." The Sullivan Principles have no goals or quotas, for example, for the ratio of black managers or for closing the average wage gap between blacks and whites. Even if the Sullivan Principles were faithfully carried out by all corporations (and most U.S. corporations have yet to sign them) you would still have a situation where 95 percent of the executive jobs were held by whites and where the average black wage still lagged considerably behind white wages.

4. We concede that a slowdown of U.S. corporate investment would be detrimental to some blacks in the short run. They would either lose jobs or not be able to obtain work that they might have otherwise secured. But only 70 to 100 thousand black South Africans work for U.S. companies—an insignificant proportion of the 22 million who make up the non-white population group.

5. While some black employees of U.S. firms may call for the expansion of foreign investment, they are probably in a minority of black opinion in South Africa today. Donald Woods estimates that perhaps 70–80 percent of those blacks who have thought about the problem would favor economic sanctions against South Africa. Those whose own contacts with black South Africans lead to a different result should remember that most of those articulate black leaders who have called for economic sanctions are either detained or dead and that it is a crime in South Africa to advocate economic sanctions against the country. Thus the validity of personal surveys done by short-term American visitors to South Africa on this issue must be questioned.

6. While the tariff wall and import restrictions may account for much of U.S. manufacturing investment, nevertheless roughly half of U.S. investment in South Africa is in mining, smelting and petroleum, which Mr. Purcell concedes "have benefited greatly from the relatively low cost of black labor." Moreover, the investment returns of U.S. industry have been falling in South Africa recently and would certainly turn negative if "apartheid in the work places" is eliminated as Mr. Purcell advocates.

7. True, wages for South African blacks are higher than those prevalent in many Third World economies. But South Africa is a *developed* economy in which blacks should share the benefits of that level of economic prosperity. It is fairer to compare their wages with either their white counterparts in South Africa or with black wages in the United States. On those comparisons, South African blacks are clearly paid at an unjustly low rate.

8. We agree that tampering with the world gold price is a dangerous step with implications for many besides South Africans. For that reason it must be carefully considered before being attempted. That is the reason why it is step 40 in a list of 41 steps that have been graded from the easiest to implement (step 1) to the most difficult (step 41).

9. The United States has used trade sanctions as a traditional tool of foreign affairs and continues to do so with respect to Cuba and China, to name two prominent examples. Thus, why is it so impossible to think they might also be used against South Africa?

10. We absolutely agree that there should be expanded dialogue in South Africa to discuss alternative forms of power-sharing both between whites and blacks and within racial groups. That is the whole point of our article. The blacks are willing to have such talks but the whites have resisted. We simply do not share Mr. Purcell's confidence that a continuation of our policy over the past 30 years (which has included expanding contacts at every level—commer-

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cial, cultural and diplomatic) will have any impact on the whites in control of the government. They appear determined to keep everything they now have and to press ahead with their Bantustan policy, which both Mr. Purcell and we agree is not a viable alternative.

THE LAW OF THE SEA: A REJOINDER TO RICHARD G. DARMAN

To the Editor:

In the January 1978 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Richard G. Darman advocated "rethinking U.S. interests in achieving a comprehensive agreement at the Law of the Sea Conference." He questioned in particular the "conventional wisdom" that failure to achieve agreement would have "potentially disastrous consequences." Mr. Darman's argument, if I understand it correctly, relies heavily on five critical judgments concerning the present state of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT) that forms the basis for further negotiations when the Conference reconvenes in March 1978.

1. The proposed provisions of the ICNT dealing with a system of international controls over deep seabed mining are fundamentally unacceptable to the United States not only on practical grounds but for basic reasons of principle.

2. The non-seabed provisions of the ICNT are of only modest net benefit to the United States. The argument most strongly urged in their favor—that they would stem and control the spread of unilateral national claims of jurisdiction out to sea—is overstated and in some strategic respects even open to grave question. For example, if the United States is limiting its global policies after Vietnam, a further spread of claims interfering with military uses of the oceans could actually in his view be more disadvantageous to the Soviet Union than to the United States.

3. In any event, these non-seabed provisions are already largely established as a matter of customary law. Codification through an agreed Treaty, while desirable, is not truly essential for U.S. interests.

4. For these practical reasons, there is no urgent reason for the United States to challenge the hitherto accepted premise of the Conference that the seabed and non-seabed provisions of any treaty must stand or fall together as a widely agreed "package." Any "partial treaty" confined to the non-seabed provisions—he in effect argues—is both out of the question and not especially important.

5. Rather, the U.S. fallback position in the event of a failure to reach acceptable seabed provisions should be to abandon hope of any truly universal or even widely accepted treaty at this time. Instead, the United States, for the sake of getting ahead with potentially important seabed mining operations, should pursue as its fallback position a "mini-treaty" dealing solely with the seabed and embodying acceptable rules of control over such operations. Such a "mini-treaty" would be negotiated initially with whatever nations were prepared to go along—presumably a few developed nations initially—but with the aim of attracting the adherence of significant developing nations that could then share in the benefits from such operations, and in a few cases eventually participate directly.

I believe each of these judgments is erroneous, the first three in degree and emphasis, the last two categorically. As things stand there is indeed a substantial chance that the Conference will not produce a draft that would be acceptable to

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the U.S. Delegation—or that would stand a strong chance of ratification by the Congress. But by far the best U.S. fallback position in that event would be to pursue the possibility of wide acceptance of a "partial treaty" that would incorporate the extensive existing areas of agreement on non-seabed issues. While such a treaty might embody agreed general principles concerning the seabed, it would not seek to address the difficult problems of control and governance that have tied up the Conference. These would be left to a future Conference, with the corollary that the United States would slow down its effort to embark on deep seabed mining operations—on the ground that such operations need not be rushed for any valid reason of U.S. national interest that outweighs the international complications that would be likely if American companies went ahead without any wide basis of international agreement.

Let me take up the first three of Professor Darman's points in the order stated above, and then address the question of a "mini-treaty," contrasting it finally with the possibilities and implications of a "partial treaty" approach—always, of course, as a fallback position.

First, the possibility of Conference failure is due not only to the inflexibility of the Group of 77 but also to American ideological stiffness. This conclusion emerges when Mr. Darman argues that the most important issues at stake in the deep seabed negotiations are whether the proposals for an international regime for seabed mining are consistent with the principles of free enterprise and American government. In his words:

> What is fundamentally at stake is a set of precedents with respect to systems of governance. . . . Indeed, the inertial tendency of the Conference is clearly toward a regime that affirms principles of government and economics fundamentally antithetical to both American ideology and pragmatic experience.

The assertion that the proposed International Seabed Authority is an undesirable precedent is open to question. In a world of growing scarcity there would appear to be a need for experience in global management. The scarcities include many essential commodities—heretofore treated as "commons" requiring no public management because they were either beyond reach or in bountiful supply. These include among others propitious weather, space communications and, until recently, many resources in the global ocean. Broadly speaking, the alternative to regulation by public authority (national or international) would be the price mechanism operating in a free-enterprise economy. That is, pricing is thought by some to function so as to ensure enough supply to meet demand. Those who agree with Mr. Darman seek to enable the price mechanism to operate by assigning property rights to seabed commodities, thereby removing them from the global commons. Whether the price mechanism can be counted on to regulate the major variables, including social preferences, that threaten nature's balance seems open to question.

Mr. Darman no doubt also fears the politics and inefficiency of an international bureaucracy. Evidently, he feels the Authority and its Assembly would be paralyzed by the same ideological mind-sets that have led to the present Conference deadlock. Such a view, however, is open to the same charge he levels against those promoting a comprehensive treaty—whom he decries as "codifiers" wishing "to see the world in neat, static terms." On the contrary, the articles relating to the Authority in the ICNT would codify a *process* rather than a static set of rules.

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The process involves governments, firms and individuals interacting in a future political system that would include an Assembly, a Council (where the United States would appear to have the equivalent of a veto), an Enterprise, a Secretariat, and a Court. Indeed, the very argument adduced in favor of a "mini-treaty"—that "several developing countries with high potential as seabed miners" might sign—applies equally if not more to the Authority operating some years from now. Developing countries that might adhere to a "mini-treaty" could also be expected to support American preferences in the Authority's Assembly. To assume the Assembly will behave tomorrow as the Conference does today is to take a static view of ocean politics.

The proposed Seabed Authority, in sum, may be a useful model for regulatory arrangements to cope with problems already on the horizon. It would also appear to be worth trying as a precedent for equity's sake because of its general concern for "mankind as a whole" and its partiality for "developing countries." In this respect, I favor the ICNT pretty much as it stands, even including as a last resort some admittedly unfortunate provisions inserted at the end of the last session in 1977. While the United States should try at the next session in Geneva to delete or alter these, notably the provision pertaining to the consequences of a failure of the Review Conference (Article 153 [6]) and the seemingly obligatory provisions on technology transfer in Article 150, my first preference would be that the United States not scrap the whole treaty "package" if it fails to have its way on the seabed issue.

Second, while it is probably correct to say that failure to achieve a comprehensive ocean treaty would hurt other countries more than the United States, it would be incorrect to conclude that the United States would not suffer. As Jonathan Charney argued in these pages a year ago, the United States stands to gain much in accepting the draft Text.[1] I believe it would gain more than it would lose. So would the other advanced industrial democracies. So would the Soviet Union and even the 50 or so landlocked and otherwise geographically disadvantaged states, in addition to the coastal states that caucus with the Group of 77. The Seabed Authority should commend itself, in part, because it would be a gesture in support of a New International Economic Order. An appropriate tactic would be to accept the preferences of the Group of 77 on the seabed regime in return for their support for the high seas and coastal zone regimes provided for in the ICNT.

I urge this because the non-seabed regimes in the ICNT are more important for the United States than the seabed regime today and even tomorrow. They will provide beneficial regulations for navigation (commercial and military), energy production, fisheries, environmental damage and, to a lesser extent, scientific research. In addition, the United States rightly puts great stock in the compulsory international dispute-settlement system that was included as an integral part of the Text at the last session.

The benefit U.S. marine scientists would derive from the Text is admittedly less clear. The proposed regime is restrictive in that it provides for national regulatory regimes that may well limit freedom of scientific inquiry in coastal zones and on continental shelves by requiring coastal state consent. Coastal states, however, "shall, *in normal circumstances grant their consent*" if a research project is intended to increase knowledge for the benefit of "all mankind." Similarly, research in the "Area beyond national jurisdiction is to be

[1] Jonathan I. Charney, "Law of the Sea: Breaking the Deadlock," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1977, pp. 598–629.

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regulated by the International Seabed Authority. In considering the wisdom of accepting these restrictions, it is fair to say that with or without the ICNT marine science already is, and will continue to be, regulated by public authorities, national or international. Without a comprehensive ocean treaty, marine scientists would still need many bilateral and regional arrangements to protect their activities and might even then fail to achieve a consistent pattern of regulation.

Third, can customary law be counted on to protect U.S. interests in the non-seabed usages I have alluded to in the section above? My answer is negative. The United States would be well advised to seek to incorporate uncertain and even ephemeral customs in a dependable treaty as quickly as possible. On this point I agree with Mr. Charney rather than Mr. Darman. The latter is more tolerant than I of "unilateralism" in ocean policy matters and more optimistic regarding the ability of the "current decentralized system [to] move itself to a new equilibrium without centrally negotiated rules and without throwing itself disastrously out of balance in the process."

The lack of uniformity inherent in a plural system of national ocean science regimes, referred to above, would be even more serious with respect to navigational interests. U.S. commercial and military activities need uniform practices on the high seas and in coastal and territorial waters. Similarly, a uniform code to regulate ocean pollution should be high on the U.S. agenda. True, it is theoretically possible to have a uniform code or global regime as the sum total of many national regimes, but this state of affairs seems unlikely given the number of coastal states that would have to behave in a uniform manner. Customary law, moreover, is generally less dependable and less enduring than statutory law. While we do not yet know to what extent the emerging rules of the ICNT would be enforced, a treaty offers the best hope that provisions of greatest importance to the United States—such as those pertaining to navigational rights in the Exclusive Economic Zone—will be honored in practice.

For these reasons I doubt Mr. Darman's implicit argument that the United States can have the benefits of the ICNT without a formal treaty. There is enough uncertainty about customary usage of ocean resources to suggest that a non-treaty ocean regime will be conflict prone. Uniformity, dependability and some assurance of obligatory dispute settlement procedures in the major current ocean activities are more important for the United States than a future "open access" seabed regime.

Let us then look, *fourth*, at what the United States should do if the seabed provisions are finally judged too unsatisfactory to accept—or not likely to be ratified by the Congress. Should we then seek a "partial treaty" embodying non-seabed provisions predominantly, or fall back all the way to a "mini-treaty" on the seabed alone? The answer depends in some degree on the importance of seabed minerals.

Mr. Darman himself questions whether access to those minerals is a fundamental matter of national security. Although the United States already imports nearly all of its manganese and cobalt and nearly three-quarters of its nickel—minerals that could be commercially available in small quantities from the seabed within a few years—land-based sources of these minerals are today in reasonably friendly hands.[2] And copper is the least worrisome of the available

[2] With respect to seabed minerals and in addition to the sources cited in Mr. Darman's article, the reader's attention is called to: Danny M. Leipziger and James L. Mudge, *Seabed Mineral Resources and the Economic Interests of Developing Countries,* Cambridge: Ballinger, 1976, Chapters 5–8.

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seabed minerals. The United States imported only 15 percent of its consumption in 1976 and is one of the largest, if not the largest, of the copper producers. There is a wide choice of alternate, non-Soviet, land-based suppliers. Efforts by a few producers to regulate pricing through an international copper organization, moreover, have been less than successful.

Manganese may present a problem. The United States produces little or none. The socialist economies (the U.S.S.R. and its associates) produce a great deal, but so do developed countries like South Africa and Austria and developing countries like Brazil, India, Gabon, Ghana and Morocco. There seems to be a measure of safety in the pluralism of supply.

It is true that land-based sources are finite and that the lands offering them may not always be friendly. The United States, on the other hand, has a stake in the economic health of the countries producing these minerals. Some are close neighbors—Canada with its nickel. Some are formal allies—France also with nickel. Some, especially the copper and cobalt producers, are dependent for their economic welfare if not survival on the export of these minerals. It can be argued that the United States should at least not be disinterested in maintaining the export earnings of these countries, especially the developing African countries such as Zambia (copper) and Zaïre (cobalt). The maintenance of these export earnings is one of the reasons for the "inertial tendency" in the proposed seabed regime that Mr. Darman describes as an arbitrary governmental system of production and price controls.

Although conceding that "nodule mining is not a strategic interest for the near term," Mr. Darman nonetheless alludes favorably to a House bill considered in the last session of Congress that would have enabled American companies to begin operations as soon as they are ready to do so. His proposed "mini-treaty" would complement such legislation. If nodule mining is not a major consideration in the short run, it is fair to ask why he favors the "mini-treaty" as a fallback. The reasons would appear to be commercial and economic.

The mining companies firmly believe seabed operations are commercially feasible. They have invested large amounts in research and prototype operations. They now need to borrow much larger amounts to begin operations. To secure loans of the magnitude required, they need the property rights (not territorial rights) that national legislation could give them under the principle of nationality jurisdiction—coupled (they assume) with the high seas freedoms of traditional international law.

The U.S. Delegation may also be influenced by the present large deficit in the U.S. balance of payments. If oil has to be imported for the foreseeable future, prudence dictates a reduction of other imports such as minerals for which there are, in effect, domestic sources of supply. It is argued that the seabed minerals bills under consideration in the last U.S. Congress—with or without an open-ended "mini-treaty" (at best a thin frosting on a rich cake)—would provide a "domestic" alternative to minerals from abroad.

I believe there is an overriding drawback to such a strategy. It would be opposed by nearly all the Group of 77 and would further embitter North-South relationships. As a consequence, the United States might well find its navigational claims obstructed in archipelagic and coastal waters. Is commercial opportunity for the steel and mineral industries worth the price of a stable navigational regime? Is it not likely that urgent development of deep-sea mining, without widely accepted rules for its conduct, would doom not only the codification of important U.S. non-seabed rights, but actually further increase

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the existing chances that customary law in these non-seabed areas would come apart?

Surely, if a comprehensive treaty cannot be agreed upon, a "partial treaty," incorporating many elements of an ocean regulatory regime already *accepted in practice* by a clear majority of states, would be preferable to a "mini-treaty." It would build on areas of agreement rather than disagreement, thus differing sharply from the proposed "mini-treaty." It would bypass the Conference's principal roadblock—the International Seabed Authority—although to have any chance of wide acceptance a "partial treaty" *would* need to include a statement of general principles designating the resources of the (seabed) "area" as the "common heritage of mankind." Such a statement has been endorsed already by U.N. General Assembly members including the United States.

A "partial treaty," it will be argued (as it is implicitly by Mr. Darman) may not be ratifiable. It would be opposed by American mining companies, which could not begin on schedule the operations they are ready to undertake in the early 1980s, and which would lack the safeguards and guarantees they need. Major lobbies would therefore oppose a "partial treaty" in the U.S. Senate as strongly as they oppose the ICNT.

A second argument is that a "partial treaty" would appear to have scarcely any more chance of international agreement than would a comprehensive treaty. Mr. Darman makes this point when he discusses the difficulties of "un-linkage." Moreover, if members of the Group of 77 were to accept a "partial treaty," the Group of 77 would seem in some degree to abandon the cherished liturgy and beliefs of the New International Economic Order. On the other hand, the practical benefits to most of these nations would be substantial; many would surely be moved to go along, in their own interest. Certainly there would be no drawbacks, and many advantages, in a maximum effort by the United States and like-minded nations in all groupings.

In sum, if the Conference breaks down on present lines, a "partial treaty" is well worth trying. A "mini-treaty," on the other hand, is a bad fallback position. At most it should be a last resort reserved for any future contingency of unambiguous threats to national safety arising out of the unavailability of essential minerals from land-based sources. At present such a treaty, dealing solely with the right of access to seabed minerals, would jeopardize the wide agreement on an ocean regime that has already been achieved.

I argue against it even though I agree that failure to obtain agreement on a comprehensive treaty would not be a "disaster." What is at issue is not disaster but the sum total of costs and benefits to the United States in the ICNT. In the last analysis, I weigh navigational and coastal zone issues more heavily than mining and "precedential" issues.

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THE WEAK IN THE WORLD OF THE STRONG: THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM. By Robert L. Rothstein. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, 378 pp. $16.50.

In this major study of relations between industrial and developing societies, the author argues that parallel and complementary changes are required in rich and poor states, in internal and in international society, if the developing world is to be successfully integrated into the international system. The study also provides an extensive and penetrating examination of the emergence of a Third World bloc and of politics within it in UNCTAD and other international forums.

PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE SECRETARIES-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS. VOL. VIII: U THANT, 1968-1971. Edited by Andrew W. Cordier and Max Harrelson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, 709 pp. $37.50.

The concluding volume in this series portrays the frustrations of U Thant during the last four years he served as Secretary-General. The editors depict the dilemmas of a world leader witnessing the erosion in authority of the United Nations and his efforts to provide a forum for resolving international conflicts—the Middle East, Cyprus, Indochina, South Asia—and internal wars—Nigeria. Of special importance are Thant's well-articulated views assessing the role the U.N. has played in the past and should fill in the future.

NATIONS AND STATES. By Hugh Seton-Watson. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1977, 563 pp. $25.00.

This is a bold book by an intrepid historian. Seton-Watson traces the growth of nationalism in the contemporary world and, in the process, spans centuries and continents. His narrative is interspersed with personal reflections, anecdotes and political disillusionments. The study's major weakness is the author's lack of an economic perspective and his failure to relate the history of nationalism to the growth of markets and of the economic role of the state. But the author's mastery of a breathtaking amount of historical, social and political material and his skillful style result in a penetrating and thought-provoking study.

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HUMANITARIAN POLITICS: THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS. By David P. Forsythe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1978, 298 pp. $17.95.

UNOFFICIAL DIPLOMATS. Edited by Maureen R. Berman and Joseph E. Johnson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, 268 pp. $15.00 (Paper, $5.95).

Reduced transportation costs, a growing network of international communications channels, and the inability or unwillingness of governments to treat certain issues in official diplomacy have fostered the growth of multiple "unofficial diplomats" and agencies, including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Quakers and other religious groups, and many international non-governmental organizations. The collection edited by Berman and Johnson—the latter a past president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace—traces many useful and unpublicized activities of several unofficial groups. David Forsythe's study assesses the major efforts of the ICRC in improving conditions of prisoners and in transmitting humanitarian aid since World War II. A concluding chapter and postscript evaluate the changes required in the ICRC if it is to foster humanitarian values in a world of sometimes inhumane nation-states.

EUROPE 2000. Edited by Peter Hall. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, 274 pp. $15.00.

The final report of a vast project launched in 1969 on Europe's future is presented by the Chairman of Plan Europe 2000's Integration Committee. Like all committee reports, it suffers from the homogenization of ideas required for group consensus. Because the major underlying premises about Europe and the world have undergone numerous and dramatic changes since the project began, the project staff also encountered almost insurmountable intellectual difficulties in treating the subject. The use of a range of hypothetical scenarios helps mitigate some of these problems and results in a discussion of frequently surprising trade-offs in choices Europeans will have to make.

THE FUTURE GLOBAL CHALLENGE: A PREDICTIVE STUDY OF WORLD SECURITY, 1977-1990. By Neville Brown. London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies/New York: Crane, Russak, 1977, 400 pp. $19.50.

An immodest and rather superficial study of the complexities of international life over much of the rest of this century. The author treats everything under the sun, but is less than adept at analyzing the interrelatedness of issues and societies or at providing an overarching framework within which international trends and issues might be understood.

PROBLEMS OF WORLD MODELING: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS. Edited by Karl W. Deutsch and others. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1977, 420 pp.

This symposium volume provides succinct statements of the premises, methodologies and results of some of the major efforts at world modeling. Other essays and statements discuss modeling techniques and the utility of models for policy analysis.

BROADCASTING IN THE THIRD WORLD. By Elihu Katz and George Wedell. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978, 320 pp. $15.00.

The uses of public broadcasting by developing countries as an instrument of political control, education and cultural integration conflict sharply and increasingly with Western notions of how a free press should operate. This critical evaluation remains sympathetic to the instrumental role of broadcasting in development, and proposes accommodations which Western broadcasting should make and innovations developing countries might institute.

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RADICALISM IN THE CONTEMPORARY AGE. VOL. III: STRATEGIES AND IMPACT OF CONTEMPORARY RADICALISM. Edited by Seweryn Bialer and Sophia Sluzar. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1978, 356 pp. $15.00.

A useful collection of essays on modern revolution and on the radical Left in Western societies, written by some of the best analysts of this phenomenon.

General: Military, Technological, and Scientific

Richard G. Head

WAR: CONTROLLING ESCALATION. By Richard Smoke. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978, 419 pp. $18.50.

Building on the previous classics in this field by Schelling and Kahn, Richard Smoke has written perhaps the finest study to date of the dynamics of escalation. In a perfect example of focused, comprehensive analysis, he combines a well-defined research method with historical case studies and derives important conclusions. The result is conceptually rigorous, scholastically brilliant, and analytically a major contribution.

CONTROLLING FUTURE ARMS TRADE. By Anne Hessing Cahn, Joseph Kruzel, Peter M. Dawkins and Jacques Huntzinger. New York: McGraw-Hill (for the Council on Foreign Relations/1980s Project), 1977, 210 pp. $9.95 (Paper, $5.95).

A careful and compelling argument that some restraint in future arms trade is not only desirable but possible. Viewing the effects of arms trade to be most significant and largely destabilizing at the regional security level, the study examines and recommends collective exporter, common importer, unilateral (U.S.), and global initiatives to control both the quantity and quality of arms transfers at levels consistent with regional disparities in power and indigenous arms production capabilities.

Henry Nau

THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP AND U.S. DEFENSE SPENDING. By Barry M. Blechman and others. Washington: Brookings, 1977, 61 pp. $2.95 (Paper).

This monograph attempts to answer two important defense policy questions: Is there a genuine Soviet military buildup, and what should be the U.S. response? Answering the first in the affirmative, it cautions against an across-the-board U.S. response—largely for fiscal reasons—but advocates modest growth in the defense budget. The quality of the section on Soviet military capabilities is quite good, the one on Europe less so when compared to other sources. Valuable data; uneven analysis; controversial conclusions.

THE GROWING DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY. By Joseph J. Wolf. Washington: Atlantic Council, 1977, 86 pp.

The author and Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft add their analysis to the lengthening list of warnings of a trend toward Soviet military predominance. The sweep of the study is global, but its emphasis is on political and military, rather than economic, aspects of security. The major danger is seen to be Soviet exploitation of military superiority for political purposes. The policy recommendations are highly generalized, but responsible.

NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY: POINTS OF VIEW. Edited by Robert J. Pranger and Roger P. Labrie. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1977, 510 pp. $6.75 (Paper).

In this single volume are compiled virtually all the important recent statements of U.S. national strategic policy by Brzezinski, Kissinger, Schlesinger, and others. It further provides not only contrasting views by U.S. critics, but

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major strategy and arms control writings by leading Soviet officials. A superb collection, made even more valuable by the editors' excellent introduction and article summaries.

SOLDIERS, STATESMEN, AND COLD WAR CRISES. By Richard K. Betts. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977, 320 pp. $15.00.

An excellent use of analysis to separate policy fact from speculative fiction, disproving the widely held assumption that military professionals are more aggressive than civilian leaders in advocating the use of force. The study concludes that military advice has been most influential when it has counseled *against* military intervention. An extremely important study for Washington officials and students of defense policy.

WORLD POWER ASSESSMENT 1977: A CALCULUS OF STRATEGIC DRIFT. By Ray S. Cline. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1977, 206 pp. $12.75.

An ambitious attempt to calculate national power by assigning index numbers to a range of critical factors, including population, economic strength, military capability, strategic purpose, and natonal will. As the author's disclaimer acknowledges, the many charts aggregate not data, but judgments. The resultant perceived-power-weights may be less valuable than the suggestion of appropriate factors, together with the sure knowledge that the difference between potential and real power is mobilization.

THE PANAMA CANAL CONTROVERSY: U.S. DIPLOMACY AND DEFENSE INTERESTS. By Paul B. Ryan. Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1977, 198 pp. $5.95 (Paper).

A timely monograph, combining a historical overview with issue analysis. Ryan's conclusion, that the current treaties do not adequately protect U.S. defense interests, tends to color his presentation.

THE OFFICER'S HANDBOOK (A Soviet View). Edited by General-Major S.N. Kozlov. Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1971/Washington: U.S. Air Force, 1977, 358 pp.

Intended as a basic working reference, the Handbook assembles a peculiar combination of topics: political ideology, military-party relations, doctrine, military theory, Soviet and NATO forces, psychology, disciplinary regulations, etiquette, and hygiene. Both the selection of information and the commanding tone tell a great deal about the Soviet military.

BLUE-COLLAR SOLDIERS?: UNIONIZATION AND THE U.S. MILITARY. Edited by Alan Ned Sabrosky. Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1977, 166 pp. $5.95 (Paper).

Articles both for and against military unionization as well as others examining the constitutional questions, European military unions, a sociological analysis, and alternatives. Arguing that unionization is *not* inevitable, the most thoughtful, and best-written, essay is by William Taylor, who provides a comprehensive, balanced discussion of the six major issues.

LUFTWAFFE: A HISTORY. Edited by Harold Faber. New York: Times Books, 1977, 267 pp. $15.00.

A popularized condensation of 12 official historical studies written by former high-ranking German Air Force officers for the USAF Historical Division. The officers candidly evaluate German World War II policy in the critical areas of training, procurement, leadership, strategic bombers, air transport, and jet fighters, and the conduct of lost battles—most notably against the Soviet Union.

WAR, STRATEGY, AND MARITIME POWER. Edited by B. Mitchell Simpson III. New Brunswick (N.J.): Rutgers University Press, 1977, 350 pp. $19.50.

A collection of 19 essays and lectures originally delivered at the U.S. Naval War College between 1952 and 1974. Overwhelmingly historical, the articles

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address the nature and purpose of war, strategy, the influence of technology, and several cold war case studies. The most provocative essay is by Vice Admiral John Lee, sketching alternative U.S. military roles in a period of resource scarcity.

SPUTNIK, SCIENTISTS AND EISENHOWER: A MEMOIR OF THE FIRST SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. By James R. Killian, Jr. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977, 305 pp. $14.95.

Writing from his own experience, Dr. Killian discourses with authority on the establishment, operation and major issues faced by President Eisenhower's Science Advisory Committee. While dutifully recounting the chronic White House resistance to active scientific advice, he is lavish in praise for executive and scientific colleagues. Killian's viewpoint is from within the White House but above the bureaucratic and personal battles that went on around him. His recommendations call for a new era of productive interaction among universities, industry and government. A dignified addition to the literature on science and public policy.

THE PHYSICISTS: THE HISTORY OF A SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA. By Daniel J. Kevles. New York: Knopf, 1978, 489 pp. $15.95.

An in-depth descriptive chronicle of American physicists and the general "culture" of the physical sciences in the U.S. from the Civil War to the present. Extensively researched and documented, the work devotes two-thirds of its length to pre-World War II history, providing valuable background material.

General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEM. By Charles E. Lindblom. New York: Basic Books, 1977, 512 pp. $15.00.

At first some patience is needed to follow step by step through some familiar territory, but the effort is worth it. Many things usually believed turn out not to be so; Professor Lindblom of Yale makes unusual distinctions and has new perspectives on critical issues. Authority, democracy, participation and liberty; government and business; what markets can and cannot do, and the different kinds of planning, are among the issues subjected to original and provocative analysis in this outstanding if somewhat uneven book.

ORGANIZING THE WORLD'S MONEY. By Benjamin J. Cohen. New York: Basic Books, 1977, 310 pp. $11.95.

Once a staple, plans for international monetary reform have become rather scarce. To produce his, Professor Cohen gets right down to fundamentals, defines his aims in political as well as economic terms, rejects as inadequate every basic principle on which other people have founded systems, and refuses to go along with the weighty analysts who think that informal understandings are better than new rules. The result is a set of clear prescriptions and a stimulating book that is now essential reading.

FLOATING EXCHANGE RATES AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY. By Stanley W. Black. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977, 204 pp. $12.95. A Council on Foreign Relations book.

In theory, floating exchange rates are supposed to give countries more freedom to manage their domestic economies than they had when rates were pegged. Professor Black of Vanderbilt (and currently of the State Department) shows that the degree and kind of freedom in fact varies a good deal and that

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countries can go wrong under either system. His evidence is a set of concise, realistic studies of Britain, France, Germany, Sweden and the U.S. in 1972-75.

INFLATION, EXCHANGE RATES AND THE WORLD ECONOMY. By W.M. Corden. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977, 160 pp. $11.00.

A neat mind in a messy world will not solve all problems but Professor Corden's application of economic theory produces some enlightening slants on live issues.

STAGFLATION: AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM. Edited by Randall Hinshaw. New York: Marcel Dekker, 1977, 150 pp. $19.50.

THE NEW INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM. Edited by Robert A. Mundell and Jacques J. Polak. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, 240 pp. $12.50.

In a world of economic conferences, these two deserve attention for the high quality of the participants and the reporting.

RICH AND POOR NATIONS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY. By Albert Fishlow, Carlos F. Díaz-Alejandro, Richard R. Fagen and Roger D. Hansen. New York: McGraw-Hill (for the Council on Foreign Relations/1980s Project), 1978, 264 pp. $10.95 (Paper, $6.95).

Four excellent essays from four different perspectives, each presenting a rigorous critique of present economic relations between North and South and an exploration of possible strategies for Southern development. Although all agree on the need for change, prescriptions vary from a recuperation of liberal international principles to selective delinking of North and South to a strategy of basic human needs to radical redistribution both between North and South and within Northern and Southern states.

Joan Spero

THE INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS CRISIS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF EAST-WEST TRADE. By Henri Bourguinat, Stanislaw Raczkowski and others. Brussels: Bruylant, 1977, 150 pp. B. Fr. 500.

Two valuable papers, one Polish and one French, on East-West monetary relations, and a summary of the discussion of them by a group of experts from a number of countries.

EMPLOYMENT, TRADE, AND DEVELOPMENT. By Gerald M. Meier. Leiden: Sijthoff/Geneva: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, 1977, 79 pp.

First-rate, tightly written lectures on the basic themes of current development thinking: employment, poverty, exports, technology.

IMAGE AND REALITY IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By Lloyd G. Reynolds. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977, 497 pp. $25.00.

This ambitious book undertakes many things. The half given to theory reviews past and present thought succinctly, and looks sharply at agriculture and industry, then builds a model to analyze development inside a country and its relation to the world. Under the heading of "experience," a look at the history of Japan is followed by a study of 15 cases of contemporary development (and a brief comparison with socialist countries). That not every board in this large structure seems equally well nailed down is not surprising, nor one's inability to put the results in a few words; but the blend of judicious and stimulating observation is most attractive.

INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND GROWTH IN THE LESS-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. Edited by Charles R. Frank, Jr. and Richard C. Webb. Washington: Brookings, 1977, 641 pp. $9.95 (Paper).

EQUITY, INCOME AND POLICY: COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN THREE

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WORLDS OF DEVELOPMENT. Edited by Irving Louis Horowitz. New York: Praeger, 1977, 298 pp.
INCOME DISTRIBUTION POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A CASE STUDY OF KOREA. By Irma Adelman and Sherman Robinson. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978, 346 pp. $12.50.

The Brookings book was funded by the U.S. AID, and the Korean study by the World Bank, while the Horowitz volume stems from meetings of the American Political Science Association. That spread testifies to the range of interests generated by ideas about greater equity in the distribution of income (which to most people means more equality). How difficult it is to alter distributional patterns unless that is made a major goal of a society and is pursued by a variety of means is borne out by all three studies.

FOOD POLICY: THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE LIFE AND DEATH CHOICES. Edited by Peter G. Brown and Henry Shue. New York: Free Press, 1977, 344 pp. $14.95.

A variety of views mostly focusing on what might be accomplished by different kinds of American food aid.

MONOPOLISIERUNG IM INTERNATIONALEN ROHWARENHANDEL. By Richard Senti. Diessenhofen: Ruegger, 1977, 100 pp. Swiss Fr. 18.

This Swiss scholar's contribution to the raw materials debate is a well-rounded package of proposed rules about producer cartels, the abuse of monopoly power, price stability, stockpiles, commodity agreements, retaliation and countervailing power through consumer cartels.

ISSUES AND PROSPECTS FOR THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER. Edited by William G. Tyler. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1977, 195 pp. $17.00.
ANOTHER DEVELOPMENT: APPROACHES AND STRATEGIES. Edited by Marc Nerfin. Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1977, 256 pp. Skr. 80.

The Tyler volume, mostly by academics, has some good analytical pieces, especially about trade. The Hammarskjöld Foundation's alternatives concern social values, equality, basic needs and the quality of life in rich as well as poor countries.

PRAXIS DES OSTWESTHANDELS: DIE WIRTSCHAFTSBEZIEHUNGEN 1977-1990. By Horst Lange-Prollius. Dusseldorf: Econ, 1977, 689 pp. DM. 98.

A somewhat curious collection of articles, documents and statistics on doing business with communist countries. Mostly of a practical cast, they reflect a good bit of non-political optimism.

The United States

Gaddis Smith

DECENT INTERVAL. By Frank Snepp. New York: Random House, 1977, 580 pp. $14.95.

The author was CIA strategy analyst in Vietnam for five years, including the period from the Paris Accords of 1973 to the final Communist victory in April 1975. His emphatically unauthorized book is an excoriating, almost unbearably painful account of the last days, with emphasis on the delusions and derelictions of high-ranking Americans. The principal target, chillingly portrayed, is Ambassador Graham Martin. Snepp charges that American procrastination and bungling cut off escape for thousands of South Vietnamese. A bitter, disturbing, and controversial book about the sickening end of a tragedy.

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55 DAYS: THE FALL OF SOUTH VIETNAM. By Alan Dawson. Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): Prentice-Hall, 1977, 366 pp. $12.50.

The author was UPI bureau chief in Saigon before and for four months after the Communist victory in the spring of 1975. He focuses on military developments and uses biographical vignettes, slightly fictionalized, as one technique. His conclusions about American self-delusion in Vietnam are much the same as Snepp's (see above).

GRASSHOPPERS & ELEPHANTS: THE VIET CONG ACCOUNT OF THE LAST 55 DAYS OF THE WAR. By Wilfred Burchett. New York: Urizen Books, 1977, 265 pp. $4.95 (Paper).

A turgid, slogan-ridden account of the North Vietnamese victory consisting largely of long self-congratulatory quotations from military leaders. The main point, however, cannot be gainsaid: at the end, the Saigon regime had little support from the populace.

THE WRONG HORSE: THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION AND THE FAILURE OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY. By Laurence Stern. New York: Times Books, 1977, 170 pp. $10.00.

Succinct, illuminating description and critique of U.S. policy toward Greece, Cyprus and Turkey from the early 1960s to the present. The "wrong horse" was the Colonels' junta that came to power in 1967 and was supported by the U.S. until its collapse in 1974. The author is highly critical of the CIA, Ambassador Henry J. Tasca and Secretary of State Kissinger. He contends that, by putting shibboleths about NATO's southern flank ahead of humanitarian concern for the people of Greece and Cyprus, the American government contributed to tragedy and failed even on its own misguided terms.

THE PANAMA CANAL: THE CRISIS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE. By Walter LaFeber. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978, 248 pp. $10.95.

This timely and valuable historical analysis traces the 19th-century roots of Panamanian nationalism, the nature of Panamanian politics and personalities, the country's economic difficulties, the history of U.S.-Panamanian negotiations, and—in revealing detail—the events since 1964. Indispensable for intelligent discussion of the new treaties—which the author supports.

THE DIPLOMACY OF DETENTE: THE KISSINGER ERA. By Coral Bell. New York: St. Martin's, 1977, 278 pp. $12.50.

Defining détente as "a mode of management of adversary power," the author analyzes a set of issues and events since 1969 with grace and perception. She concludes that détente has redistributed "diplomatic leverage" in ways "useful to Western purposes and . . . the preservation of peace." Professor Bell has a sure grasp of American politics but the strength of the book derives from her broad international perspective.

QUEST FOR EQUILIBRIUM: AMERICA AND THE BALANCE OF POWER ON LAND AND SEA. By George Liska. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1977, 254 pp. $14.00.

The author, professor of political science at Johns Hopkins, is a philosopher of international relations. This study, like all his work, provides no instant enlightenment, but will repay those who have the time and stamina to wrestle with close reasoning, complex syntax, and a high level of abstraction. To oversimplify: his argument is that the U.S. historically has avoided the choice of control through empire or through balance-of-power politics while periodically seeking a non-existent third stance—separation.

IN AND OUT OF THE IVORY TOWER: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM L. LANGER. New York: Neale Watson, 1978, 264 pp. $15.00.

Straightforward, relaxed memoirs by the prodigiously industrious and learned Harvard diplomatic historian and head of the Research and Analysis

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Section of OSS, who died in December 1977. Fine reading for anyone interested in academic life and in the connections between scholarship and policy in foreign affairs.

ONCE TO EVERY MAN. By William Sloane Coffin, Jr. New York: Atheneum, 1977, 384 pp. $12.95.

Fascinating memoirs at mid-career by the former Yale chaplain and now senior minister of the Riverside Church in New York. For Bill Coffin, ideas live through physical action, not meditation. He describes a combative childhood, army service in World War II, in the CIA in the early cold war, leadership in establishing the Peace Corps, civil disobedience against racial injustice and the Vietnam War.

THE POLITICS OF PROPAGANDA: THE OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION 1942–1945. By Allan M. Winkler. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978, 230 pp.

A fine monograph on the bureaucratic and ideological turmoil surrounding the American propaganda effort in World War II. The naive expectations of Elmer Davis and Co. were, in the end, tempered by military necessity and the skepticism of practical men.

BEYOND TOP SECRET ULTRA. By Ewen Montagu. New York: Coward, McCann, 1978, 192 pp., $7.95.

In the recent flood of accounts of the (usually) masterful use by the British of intelligence and deception operations during World War II, this ranks very high. The author, who will be remembered for the earlier *The Man Who Never Was* describing one such classic operation, now gives a first-hand account of the whole array, as seen from the Navy standpoint. The result is terse, balanced, beautifully written, and at least as informative as the tomes that have tended to occupy the recent spotlight.

W.P.B.

THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1978. By Michael Barone, Grant Ujifusa, and Douglas Matthews. New York: Dutton, 1977, 1029 pp. $16.95 (Paper, $7.95).

This work, after four annual editions, deserves its growing reputation for crisp writing, insight and usefulness. It describes the essential characteristics of every state and congressional district, notes trends and issues, and profiles every Governor, Senator and Representative. An important reference work and irresistible to the browser.

The Western Hemisphere

Robert D. Crassweller

MUST CANADA FAIL? Edited by Richard Simeon. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977, 307 pp. $13.00 (Paper, $5.95).

The English-speaking authors (mostly on the faculty of Queen's University) of these clear-eyed essays take the possibility of Canada's disintegration very seriously indeed. They hope that Canada will hold together, but, should fears come to pass, they suggest ways to mitigate the pain and injury. An important book.

G.S.

LE DÉFI QUÉBÉCOIS. By François-Marie Monnet. Paris: Laffont, 1977, 258 pp. Fr. 39.

An emotional history of Quebec nationalism by a former *Le Monde* correspondent in Canada. The author rejoices in the achievements and direction of the movement.

G.S.

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THE DECLINE OF POLITICS: THE CONSERVATIVES AND THE PARTY SYSTEM 1901–1920. By John English. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977, 237 pp. $15.00.

An excellent study which combines a thorough knowledge of Canadian political history, deep research in manuscript sources, and the ability to use theoretical insights from social science. The lasting impact of World War I on every phase of Canadian life is becoming increasingly recognized.

G.S.

OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CANADA IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR. By W.A.B. Douglas and Brereton Greenhous. New York and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977, 288 pp. $16.95.

An outstanding brief account thoroughly researched and presented in a popular style with superb photographs. The authors show how the war "made Canadians nationalistic and gave them confidence in themselves and their country."

G.S.

THE PUBLIC MAN: AN INTERPRETATION OF LATIN AMERICAN AND OTHER CATHOLIC COUNTRIES. By Glen Caudill Dealy. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1977, 128 pp. $10.00.

Professor Dealy, a political scientist, has produced a short but extremely interesting and valuable cultural analysis, in search of motivations and behavioral traits that lie beneath and beyond class and political distinctions. He posits a political culture of *caudillaje*, an ethos that impels men to an overly ardent quest for public influence, with such reverberations as the separation of private and public morality.

THE LATIN AMERICANS: THEIR LOVE-HATE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES. By Carlos Rangel. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977, 301 pp. $11.95.

In a striking work of demythologization, the Venezulean author and former diplomat exonerates the U.S. from responsibility for the failures of Latin America. He identifies the real causes as indigenous: differing historical traditions, social structures, religious ethics, and the distortions associated with the Latin American myth of the hero.

REVOLUTION OF BEING: A LATIN AMERICAN VIEW OF THE FUTURE. By Gustavo Lagos and Horacio H. Godoy. New York: Free Press, 1977, 226 pp. $14.95.

A product of the World Order Models Project, this study advances a new kind of development pattern, a "preferred-world model" based on humanist values and a humanist economy. The aim is to combine personal liberation with national independence.

BEYOND POPULISM. By Candido Mendes. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977, 112 pp.$10.00.

A well-known Brazilian political scientist, who also possesses credentials in the world of affairs, presents a thoughtful, challenging and densely textured analysis of social confrontation in the principal Latin American countries. The familiar and widespread recent progression from populist to authoritarian and technocratic-military governments provides the framework for this significant study.

THE OVERTHROW OF ALLENDE AND THE POLITICS OF CHILE, 1964–1976. By Paul E. Sigmund. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977, 326 pp. $14.95.

This is the most complete and thoughtful analysis yet made of the Allende and Frei Administrations. The reader is further rewarded by meditations upon

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related themes, such as the relation of equity to liberty. Sigmund concludes that Allende moved, not too slowly as the Left believes, but too rapidly in pursuit of "irreversible" changes. "The result was to reverse the advances that had been made for the last thirty years...."

CHILEAN VOICES. Edited by Colin Henfrey and Bernardo Sorj. Atlantic Highlands (N.J.): Humanities Press, 1977, 196 pp. $13.00 (Paper, $6.00).

Interviews with supporters and activists of Unidad Popular describing their experiences during the Allende regime in cities, universities and the countryside.

PERSONA NON GRATA: AN ENVOY IN CASTRO'S CUBA. By Jorge Edwards. New York: Pomerica Press, 1977, 274 pp. (New York: Dutton, distributor, $8.95).

A Chilean intellectual, a socialist who served Allende as Ambassador to Cuba, describes his experiences in that country in 1970–71 and records his disenchantment with the pervasive repression. Noting the silencing of the poet Herberto Padilla, he concludes: "The conflict ended with the establishment on the island of a system of bureaucratic thought-control."

THE LEGACY OF CHE GUEVARA: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY. By Donald C. Hodges. New York: Thames and Hudson, 1977, 216 pp. $14.95.

Excerpts of speeches, articles, and similar sources are assembled to illustrate the history of the Guevarist movement, its principles and conflicts, and its impact on and relationship with other radical approaches.

CONTEMPORARY VENEZUELA AND ITS ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. Edited by Robert D. Bond. New York: New York University Press, 1977, 288 pp. $15.00 (Paper, $6.95). A Council on Foreign Relations book.

Of the seven competent essays presented here, three trace the connections between domestic aspects and foreign affairs and four analyze Venezuelan foreign policy. The consensus is moderately optimistic, with an affirmation that the country is playing "an essentially constructive and responsible role in world affairs."

VENEZUELA: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE. Edited by John D. Martz and David J. Myers. New York: Praeger, 1977, 406 pp.

A broad Venezuelan survey in three parts: the historical and social framework; the articulation and aggregation of the main interest groups; and policy and performance in specific areas, including oil and foreign policy. The democratic-reformist prognosis is favorable for 10 to 12 years; after that, "prospects are problematic."

MINAS GERAIS IN THE BRAZILIAN FEDERATION 1889–1937. By John D. Wirth. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977, 332 pp. $17.50.

All aspects of political, economic and social life are examined in this first volume of a tripartite series to be devoted to Brazilian regionalism from the beginning of the Republic to the coming of the *Estado Novo*.

VICTIMS OF THE MIRACLE: DEVELOPMENT AND THE INDIANS OF BRAZIL. By Shelton H. Davis. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977, 205 pp. $14.95 (Paper, $4.95).

An anthropologist describes the social and environmental effects, and the human costs to the indigenous Indians, of the Amazon development program.

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Western Europe

Fritz Stern

COMMUNIST POWER IN EUROPE 1944–49. Edited by Martin McCauley. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1977, 242 pp. $21.50.

A collection of lectures, originally given at London University, on the efforts of Soviet leaders and their foreign instruments to gain power in Eastern and Western Europe. An informative, intelligent introduction to one of the major themes of the postwar period, made still more valuable by the personal recollections of England's foremost scholar on Eastern Europe, Hugh Seton-Watson, who concludes that East European opponents of communism lost because "there was nowhere the strength which would enable them to stand up to Soviet Russian imperial power as it flowed into the vacuum left by Hitler, congealed, and brought in the political ice age."

ITALY AT THE POLLS: THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS OF 1976. Edited by Howard R. Penniman. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1977, 386 pp. $5.75 (Paper).

This readable and informative collection of essays by American scholars on the important aspects of Italian politics, both before and after the 1976 elections, provides a helpful background to the current discussion of Italy's political future. There is no single line that prevails in the book, although judgments are offered, such as the assertion that the "almost three decades of political hegemony [of the Christian Democrats] . . . have been irresponsibly squandered."

ITALIE 77: LE "MOUVEMENT," LES INTELLECTUELS. Edited by Fabrizio Calvi. Paris: Seuil, 1977, 218 pp.

Documents from the revolutionary, sometimes Dadaist and anarchist, extremist movements that shook Italy in 1977 and posed a challenge to all, perhaps especially to the Communists. Also a collection of excerpts from the response of *engagé* intellectuals to these events. A useful anthology.

INTELLECTUALS AND DECOLONIALIZATION IN FRANCE. By Paul Clay Sorum. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1977, 295 pp. $16.95.

A splendid subject: the gradual mobilization of French intellectuals against continued colonialism, set in the context of French politics and of the traditional role of "the intellectual [as] the explorer of the sacred." A bit pedestrian in exposition, it is nevertheless an important contribution to the neglected study of decolonialization.

WHO SPEAKS FOR EUROPE? THE VISION OF CHARLES DE GAULLE. By Lois Pattison de Ménil. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1977, 232 pp. £7.50.

An elegant essay on the roots and development of de Gaulle's European policies, by an American scholar well-versed in French affairs. It is a canny, realistic de Gaulle who emerges in these pages—and to a large extent, in his words—and not the bugaboo of American Atlanticists.

78, SI LA GAUCHE L'EMPORTAIT. Edited by J.-F. Held. Paris: Ramsay, 1977, 368 pp. Fr. 42.

Eighteen leading Frenchmen, representing views of the Left and Right, are asked what would happen in their particular domain, ranging from army and police to the quality of life, if the Left were to win the election. The book, prepared before the break on the Left, presents lucid arguments and shrewd views.

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LES 180 JOURS DE MITTERRAND: HISTOIRE DU 1er GOUVERNEMENT DE L'UNION DE LA GAUCHE 3 AVRIL–2 OCTOBRE 1978. By Philippe de Commines. Paris: Belfond, 1977, 234 pp.

A *jeu d'esprit*, which has become a best-seller in France: the imaginary history of a left-wing government under Mitterrand. The anonymous author, taking the name of a famous French chronicler, presents a simple scenario–growing political and economic turmoil, departure of the Communists from the government, Giscard's dissolution of the National Assembly, and Mitterrand's resignation. The book provides details of amusing plausibility.

BRITAIN SAYS YES: THE 1975 REFERENDUM ON THE COMMON MARKET. By Anthony King. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1977, 153 pp. $3.75 (Paper).

The Referendum was an overwhelming vote for staying in Europe: a well-known British political scientist explains the process by which this decision ("one of the half-dozen most important events in postwar British history") was reached.

AMERIKA UND WESTEUROPA. Edited by Karl Kaiser and Hans-Peter Schwarz. Stuttgart: Belser, 1977, 406 pp. DM. 38.

A symposium of distinguished scholars and former diplomats on the problems facing Western Europe and the U.S. The approaches are different, but a basic consensus about the need of collaboration among the industrial democracies is the underlying premise. The book offers a superb and on the whole a necessarily somber *tour d'horizon*, with few but eminently sensible prescriptions.

VODKA COLA. By Charles Levinson. Paris: Stock, 1977, 476 pp. Fr. 45.

A polemic against détente, under cover of which American and European multinationals reap profits trading with the East. A book full of fantasies of American-Soviet collusion, largely tied to well-known American Establishment figures, whose secret purposes are divined, but whose names are frequently misspelled. Unpersuasive to say the least, but perhaps symptomatic of anti-Americanism *réchauffé*.

WEGE IN DER GEFAHR. By Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker. Munich: Hanser, 1976, 268 pp.

A much-respected German philosopher-physicist, long concerned with contemporary issues, presents an analysis of the dangers of today's world including the likelihood of war, and suggests steps appropriate to these dangers. A penetrating and disturbing tract that also assesses the future uses of atomic energy and the course of economic development. An important book that tries to advance what it argues is the principal necessity today: a change in our understanding of the world.

THE DIPLOMACY OF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ON BERLIN. By Honoré M. Catudal, Jr. Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1977, 335 pp. $12.90.

A preliminary study, based on official sources and some interviews, of the background of the Berlin Agreement of 1971.

DEUTSCHE UNTER SICH–POLITIK MIT DEM GRUNDVERTRAG. By Jens Hacker. Stuttgart: Seewald, 1976, 192 pp. DM. 16.

A short account of the relations between the two Germanies, with principal emphasis on developments after the Great Coalition came to power at the end of 1966.

INTERNATIONALE KONFLIKTE–VERBOTENE UND ERLAUBTE MITTEL IHRER AUSTRAGUNG. By Hanspeter Neuhold. Vienna and New York: Springer, 1977, 598 pp. $54.20.

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A major work in international law, dealing with the U.N. definition of friendly relations among states, and types of conflicts among them. The book tries to relate the work of the social sciences to the study of international law.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

John C. Campbell

EUROPE AND THE COMMUNISTS. Edited by V. Zagladin. Moscow: Progress, 1977, 286 pp. (Chicago: Imported Publications, distributor, $2.25.)

The Soviet view of the negotiations prior to and at the Berlin Conference of European Communist Parties in June 1976, the document adopted there, and the tasks ahead. Throughout, "the Communists" are those of all the parties (except the Albanian), and the reader would hardly know they had any disagreements. The authors face up to the question of proletarian internationalism and face down any who would challenge their definition of it.

THE SOVIET UNION AND SOCIAL SCIENCE THEORY. By Jerry F. Hough. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977, 275 pp. $16.50.

As the title suggests and much of the content confirms, this collection of essays (some previously published) is in essence a book for scholars, but its fresh approach to many aspects of the Soviet system makes it relevant to the international issues of the present and future. On such questions as bureaucracy, decentralization, pluralism, and the nature and role of the Party, Hough goes as far as the evidence and his judgment will take him and states frankly what remains unproven.

SOVIET DEMOCRACY: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE. By Konstantin U. Chernenko. New York: Vantage Press, 1977, 77 pp. $6.00.

A primer for English readers, and an answer to critics, on the true democracy of advanced socialism as it exists in the U.S.S.R., written by—or for—a member and Secretary of the Central Committee.

THE ECONOMY OF THE SOVIET UNION TODAY. By T. Khachaturov. Moscow: Progress, 1977, 338 pp. (Chicago: Imported Publications, distributor, $3.50).

SOVIET ECONOMIC POLICY: INCOME DIFFERENTIALS IN USSR. By Vinod Mehta. Atlantic Highlands (N.J.): Humanities Press, 1977, 134 pp. $7.50.

Khachaturov describes the Soviet economy in the stage of "developed socialism" as it proceeds onward and upward on the basis of the decisions of the 25th Party Congress in 1976. His is a useful summary of official views and plans, with statistics. Mehta, an Indian scholar and journalist, contributes a balanced but somewhat thin study of one aspect of the Soviet economy, income policy.

TECHNOLOGY AND COMMUNIST CULTURE. Edited by Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. New York: Praeger, 1977, 518 pp.

THE TECHNOLOGICAL LEVEL OF SOVIET INDUSTRY. Edited by R. Ammann, J. M. Cooper, and R. W. Davies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977, 575 pp. $30.00.

These two volumes take us several strides ahead in understanding of a subject that is both elusive and of international importance. The one edited by Fleron, ranging topically from theory to specifics and geographically from Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. to China, has few literary merits but contains some solid and thoughtful contributions. The study on Soviet industry is the first volume of a large-scale project based at the University of Birmingham and contains detailed case studies, industry by industry, plus a useful overview.

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THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS THOUGHT OF RUSSIAN "SAMIZDAT": AN ANTHOLOGY. Edited by Michael Meerson-Aksenov and Boris Shragin. Belmont (Mass.): Nordland, 1977, 624 pp. $29.50.

Although much dissident Soviet writing has already appeared in the West, this work goes farther afield and represents a remarkable job of selection bearing witness to the scope and variety of such writing.

THE UKRAINE, 1917–1921: A STUDY IN REVOLUTION. Edited by Taras Hunczak. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977, 424 pp. $15.00.

Leading experts on Ukrainian history in the U.S. and Canada, many of them native Ukrainians, reexamine the brief period of Ukrainian independence amid war and revolution. These are scholarly rather than partisan political writings.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, 1939–1949. By Dennis J. Dunn. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, 296 pp. $17.00.

A careful play-by-play monograph on how the Vatican and the Kremlin dealt with each other in the decade of the 1940s, especially on the problems arising from Soviet domination of Eastern European lands with large Catholic populations.

EASTERN EUROPE'S UNCERTAIN FUTURE. Edited by Robert R. King and James F. Brown. New York: Praeger (in cooperation with Radio Free Europe), 1977, 359 pp. $25.00.

In the welter of controversy over Radio Free Europe as a propaganda organ the fact that it has an excellent research staff is often overlooked. The papers here are good examples of those that have been helpful to scholars and government officials in recent years.

WINTER INTO SPRING: THE CZECHOSLOVAK PRESS AND THE REFORM MOVEMENT, 1963–1968. By Frank J. Kaplan. Boulder (Colo.): East European Quarterly, 1977, 208 pp. (New York: Columbia University Press, distributor, $14.00).

Yet another book on the Prague Spring, this one containing no revelations but a clear picture of the central role played by the press and a good analysis of the fateful dilemmas facing Dubček and his colleagues in trying to establish a free press and a new kind of socialism without paying the price.

CLASH OVER ROMANIA: BRITISH AND AMERICAN POLICIES TOWARD ROMANIA, 1938–1947. By Paul D. Quinlan. Oakland (Cal.): American Romanian Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1977, 173 pp.

Diligent research in British and American published and archival material makes this monograph the most informative account available on British policy toward Romania on the eve of World War II and Anglo-American policies during and after it, although the focus is rather narrow and the story of the U.S. role in the "abortive coup" against the Groza government in 1945 is overdrawn.

LA ROUMANIE DANS L'ENGRENAGE. By Nicolette Franck. Paris and Brussels: Elsevier Sequoia, 1977, 269 pp.

This book provides many details of what was happening in Romania in a critical period covered by Quinlan's study (noted above), but from a different viewpoint (that of the Romanians and especially King Michael, who was himself a source) and with a different theme (that of betrayal by the West).

PRAXIS: MARXIST CRITICISM AND DISSENT IN SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA. By Gerson S. Sher. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977, 360 pp. $15.00.

Praxis, the journal of Yugoslavia's radical intelligentsia from 1964 to 1975, was

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both a product of Tito's break with Soviet orthodoxy and an independent voice the new Yugoslav orthodoxy could not tolerate. Sher's study is a competent and sympathetic one, informed by conversations with the principals as well as scrutiny of their philosophy.

YUGOSLAVIA AFTER TITO. By Andrew Borowiec. New York: Praeger, 1977, 122 pp.

Weighing the imponderables of Yugoslavia's future, an American observer reaches generally pessimistic conclusions for the survival of Titoism and for Western interests. He is properly skeptical of official explanations and zealous in pursuit of the facts, but a lack of depth tends to muffle the book's impact.

The Middle East and North Africa

John C. Campbell

DECADE OF DECISIONS: AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, 1967–1976. By William B. Quandt. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977, 321 pp. $14.95.

This comprehensive and discerning account of American policy and diplomacy from the Six-Day War to the election of Carter has the added advantage of being an inside story for those years (1972–74) when the author served on the NSC staff (where he is again now serving). Chasing down the facts and permitting himself occasional interpretations and judgments, he sets a standard against which other accounts past and future should be measured. Despite all the disappointments, risks and difficulties he sees a continuing major role for the U.S. as necessary, indeed inevitable.

ISRAEL: THE EMBATTLED ALLY. By Nadav Safran. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978, 613 pp. $18.50.

Building on his earlier studies of Israel and Israeli-American relations, Nadav Safran now gives us a massive comprehensive work which covers both subjects and shows convincingly how Israel's history and politics have affected the tie with the U.S. Much of the book covers the same ground as Quandt's, with the same detachment but from a different angle. A book that combines scholarship (though eschewing footnotes) with a keen sense of the realities of contemporary politics and diplomacy.

QUEST FOR PEACE: UNITED STATES-ISRAEL RELATIONS AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. By Bernard Reich. New Brunswick (N.J.): Transaction Books, 1977, 495 pp. $24.95.

Bernard Reich's book invites comparison with Safran's because its subject and theme are the same. He tells the story with less historical depth and background but with a wealth of citations and footnotes that is almost intimidating. He knows his subject well, knows what everyone else has said or written about it, and like Safran he is objective in his attempt to assess the "special relationship."

THE POLITICS OF DEFEAT: AMERICA'S DECLINE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By Joseph Churba. New York: Cyrco Press, 1977, 244 pp. $10.00.

A vocal critic of U.S. policy in the Middle East, first inside the Pentagon (in Air Force intelligence) and later outside, decries appeasement of the Soviets and Arabs and failure to recognize Israel as a strategic asset. The words are generally stronger than the arguments.

THE GUN AND THE OLIVE BRANCH: THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By David Hirst. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977, 367 pp. $12.95.

A British journalist's swiftly moving narration of the Arab-Israeli dispute from its origins in the 19th century to the present, written with understanding

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of and for both sides (though less for Israel) and with stress on the resort to violence which has been the ultimate answer of both to the problem.

THE ECONOMIC WAR AGAINST THE JEWS. By Walter Henry Nelson and Terence Prittie. New York: Random House, 1977, 269 pp. $10.00.

The Arab boycott interpreted as a weapon in a worldwide war for the destruction of Israel. This is a fighting book, concerned about Arab oil power and the way it has strengthened the boycott, contemptuous of Western business firms and governments which do not stand up against it, and calling for a principled international counteraction.

ABBA EBAN: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY. New York: Random House, 1977, 628 pp. $15.00.

For those who might wonder whether Eban, after so many speeches and earlier books, has anything further to say, the answer is affirmative. This personal story is an informal and informative history of Israel's diplomacy since before the birth of the state and also includes a mixture of philosophic reflection and views on personalities and politics, all presented in Eban's well-known felicitous style.

THE PALESTINIAN ARAB NATIONAL MOVEMENT. VOL. II: 1919–1939. By Y. Porath. London: Cass, 1978, 414 pp. (Totowa, N.J.: Biblio, distributor, $27.50).

This second volume (Vol. I noted in *Foreign Affairs,* April 1975) of a detailed history by an Israeli scholar covers the period in which the Palestinian movement became an activist force to be reckoned with by both the British authorities and the Jewish settlers. Drawing on British, Jewish and some Arab sources, the study is particularly good in showing how the growing connections between the Palestinian Arabs and the Arab states affected British policy and the dimensions of the Palestine question.

ARAB POLITICS: THE SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY. By Michael C. Hudson. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977, 434 pp. $22.50.

An impressive work of scholarship on the political culture and changing society of the entire Arab world. The author gives us a good picture of each country as he pursues his general themes of legitimacy, nationalism, Arabism, and the inevitable "modernization."

EGYPT'S LIBERAL EXPERIMENT, 1922–1936. By Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid-Marsot. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977, 288 pp. $14.00.

An illuminating history of Egypt in the era of semi-independence, nascent liberal political institutions, and rising nationalism. The author, combining careful research with personal knowledge of Egypt's leading families of the time, draws a fine portrait of Saad Zaghlul and his era and throws new light on the triangular relations of the British, the King, and the Wafd. Her overall conclusions on the period are surprisingly positive.

TWENTIETH CENTURY IRAN. Edited by Hossein Amirsadeghi. New York: Homes & Meier, 1977, 299 pp. $21.50.

Eight excellent essays on modern Iran covering such topics as the reigns of Riza Shah and of the present Shah, development of the oil industry, social transformation, foreign policy, and Iran's future strategic role.

A SAVAGE WAR OF PEACE: ALGERIA 1954–1962. By Alistair Horne. New York: Viking, 1978, 640 pp. $15.00.

A masterful narrative of the Algerian revolution and war of independence, packed with detail yet written with color and style and a full appreciation of the causes and the personalities. The best treatment in English and perhaps in any language.

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Asia and the Pacific

Donald S. Zagoria

MAO'S CHINA: A HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC. By Maurice Meisner. New York: Free Press, 1977, 512 pp. $17.95.

Of the thousands of books that have been written about contemporary China, only a few will stand the test of time. This is one of them. Meisner's book is a history of the People's Republic of China with both the scope and the depth to assess comprehensively the critical first quarter-century of transformation.

CHINA AND THE MAJOR POWERS IN EAST ASIA. By A. Doak Barnett. Washington: Brookings, 1977, 416 pp. $12.95 (Paper, $5.95).

A very timely study of China's relations with the Soviet Union, the United States and Japan. Barnett foresees "no sudden drastic change" in the four-power equilibrium in East Asia because none of the four will have a realistic basis for trying to achieve regional hegemony. A limited détente between Moscow and Peking, he argues, would alter the existing pattern only "marginally."

CHINA AND AMERICA: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW RELATIONSHIP. Edited by William J. Barnds. New York: New York University Press, 1977, 254 pp. $15.00. A Council on Foreign Relations book.

The greatest merit of this unusually strong collection of policy-relevant essays is that it offers a variety of formulae to meet the need for normalizing U.S.-Peking relations without abandoning Taiwan. On this and other issues involved in improving U.S. relations with China, this volume should be read in conjunction with "Normalization of Relations with the People's Republic of China: *Practical Implications*," hearings before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, 95th Congress, Sept./Oct. 1977, obtainable from the U.S. Government Printing Office.

SOUTHEAST ASIA IN TRANSITION. Edited by Jae Kyu Park and Melvin Gurtov. Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyung Nam University, 1977, 243 pp. $8.00.

A good collection of essays on post-Vietnam War Southeast Asia. The volume is the result of a conference in Seoul (October 1976) which brought together scholars from eight countries and it reflects their disagreements.

DIVERSITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE COMING DECADE. By Guy J. Pauker, Frank H. Golay and Cynthia H. Enloe. New York: McGraw-Hill (for the Council on Foreign Relations/1980s Project), 1977, 191 pp. $9.95 (Paper, $5.95).

This competent collection of essays should be read in conjunction with the Park and Gurtov volume mentioned above. Several of the authors underline the obstacles to regional cooperation, but Enloe comments that such cooperation, however difficult, "would seem to offer the best chance for the states of the region to gain the ends they seek—greater autonomy, reduced dependence on and vulnerability to outside powers, regional stability, and resilient development."

ASIA'S NUCLEAR FUTURE. Edited by William H. Overholt. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1978, 285 pp. $17.00.

A useful but uneven collection of essays. The highlight is Passin's essay on the Japanese attitude toward nuclear weapons, the most thoughtful piece yet written on the subject. After analyzing the reasons behind the contemporary Japanese consensus against nuclear rearmament, Passin considers the factors that might favor or inhibit such rearmament in the future. Overholt also issues a timely warning about the possibility of proliferation chains in northeast Asia

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from Taiwan to Korea to Japan and in south Asia from India to Pakistan to Iran.

JAPANESE INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATING STYLE. By Michael Blaker. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, 250 pp. $15.00.

A fascinating account of prewar Japanese bargaining behavior that reveals a coherent national style of negotiating. One ingredient is diplomatic tenacity; sticking doggedly to original positions. Another is passivity: the Japanese acted "only when the pressure of events forced them to act." They compromised only in the later stages of negotiations; they postponed compromises as long as possible; and their negotiating behavior required "infinite patience" on the part of the negotiating partner.

AGRARIAN REFORM AS UNFINISHED BUSINESS: THE SELECTED PAPERS OF WOLF LADEJINSKY. Edited by Louis J. Walinsky. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977, 603 pp. $22.00 (Paper, $10.75).

A splendid testament to the life's work of Wolf Ladejinsky, a man who combined a passionate dedication to democracy with a mission to alleviate rural poverty in the Third World. Few other men in this century have understood as well as Ladejinsky the political importance of land. For anyone interested in agrarian reform this is essential reading.

BURMA: MILITARY RULE AND THE POLITICS OF STAGNATION. By Josef Silverstein. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977, 224 pp.

Although this volume helps fill the enormous gap in analysis of contemporary Burma, it lacks depth. The author avers that those who see the military as modernizers will find that a study of Burma brings that proposition into serious question. But he does not go very far in helping to explain why the Burmese regime of "socialist-soldiers" has been so ineffective.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE PHILIPPINES. By Claude A. Buss. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1977, 152 pp. $3.75 (Paper).

A competent if somewhat unfocused and superficial review of U.S. relations with the Philippines.

Africa

Jennifer Seymour Whitaker

HOW LONG WILL SOUTH AFRICA SURVIVE? By R.W. Johnson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977, 327 pp. $15.95 (Paper, $8.95).
A HOUSE DIVIDED: SOUTH AFRICA'S UNCERTAIN FUTURE. By John de St. Jorre. New York and Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1977, 144 pp. $4.00 (Paper).

Rather than answering the question posed in its title, Johnson's sprawling, gossipy, entertaining, sometimes brilliant but not always accurate book explores South Africa's role in international politics over the past several decades and particularly the international economics of white supremacy. The author has a keen nose for intrigue (such as an alleged U.S. squeeze on the price of gold and subsequent stimulus of the gold market to reward Pretoria for delivering Ian Smith) and an imaginative view of far-flung connections—for instance, between Britain's entry into the EEC and Portugal's loss of its African empire. John de St. Jorre's beautifully written account covers South Africa's international position more briefly, but provides carefully researched and richly detailed companion portraits of black and white nationalism in South Africa, and of their respective power structures. This study ought to attract a wide general audience, but its sophisticated reportage and analysis should also be useful to specialists.

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LAND AND RACIAL DOMINATION IN RHODESIA. By Robin Palmer. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977, 307 pp. $15.75.

The author, a Rhodesian expatriate and Senior Lecturer in history at the University of Zambia, succinctly analyzes the origins of present-day Rhodesian land tenure and the corresponding phases in the subjugation of the country's Africans: the ever-widening expropriations made official in 1914, 1920, and 1930; the destruction of a flourishing agriculture; the creation of a class of African wage labor integrated into the white economy; the segregation of African land and agriculture and the strict limitation of African opportunity in the white economy. An affecting description of the creation of African dependency and demonstration of its extreme usefulness to the European colonist.

THE LONRHO CONNECTION: A MULTINATIONAL AND ITS POLITICS IN AFRICA. By Suzanne Cronjé, Margaret Ling and Gillian Cronjé. Encino (Cal.): Bellwether Books, 1977, 316 pp. $15.00.

Despite Lonrho's massive holdings in white-ruled southern Africa, its London-based chief, Tiny Rowland, has extended Lonrho's operations in black Africa and often deeply into black politics. This saga of Lonrho's wheeling and dealing simultaneously north and south of the Zambezi is recounted in a deadpan style that underplays the message the book conveys—that of charlatanism on a fabulous scale.

AFRO-ARAB RELATIONS IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER. By E.C. Chibwe. London: Friedmann, 1977, 156 pp. £7.95.

This study by the former Director of the Bank of Zambia emphasizes economic relations. Chibwe provides hard data and valuable information on African financial needs, Arab and OECD aid, and the workings of the Arab Bank for African Development, but tends toward hopeful prognostication rather than analysis of the issues underlying present and potential Afro-Arab relations.

THE LAST CARAVAN. By Thurston Clarke. New York: Putnam, 1978, 286 pp. $10.95.

The Sahel drought and the consequent destruction of the nomadic Tuareg way of life are graphically rendered in this moving narrative, which sets the experiences of several families against a backdrop of universal hunger and dispossession. The busy relief workers, inquisitive tourists, and indifferent governments interrupt but do not halt the drought-induced disintegration.

IDI AMIN: DEATH-LIGHT OF AFRICA. By David Gwyn. Boston: Little, Brown, 1977, 240 pp. $8.95.

Gwyn (a pseudonym masking the identity of a Briton who apparently served in Uganda's government under colonial rule and through the beginning of Amin's regime) assaults the reader with a terrifying barrage of facts, dates, places, names, with modes of torture, mutilation, death. His extraordinary indictment is followed by the thoughtful reflections of Ali Mazrui on Uganda and the dilemma it poses for Africans regarding human rights in the black-ruled states of the continent.

THE UNFINISHED QUEST: AFRICAN UNITY AND THE OAU. By Zdenek Červenka. London: Friedmann, 1977, 256 pp. £7.50.

This study covers some of the same territory as the author's previous book *The Organization of African Unity and Its Charter*, but includes new material on the OAU liberation committee, the Congo crisis, OAU policy and strategy on Southern Africa, and the OAU and Afro-Arab relations. Longer on facts than analysis, this work, like its predecessor, provides a useful source.

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Janet Rigney

SOURCE MATERIAL

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. 20402. *United Nations, International Court of Justice:* United Nations, Sales Section, New York 10017. *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org.* and *Food and Agric. Org.:* Unipub, Inc., P.O. Box 433, New York 10016. *Int. Labor Office:* 917 15th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005. *European Communities:* 2100 M St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037. *Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development:* 1750 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006.Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, and Congressional documents, unless otherwise noted, are for the 95th Congress, 1st Session. New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

Africa

EXPRESSING concern about the recent acts of repression by the government of the Republic of South Africa. Report, Committee on International Relations, House, to accompany H. Con. Res. 388, Oct. 28, 1977. Washington, 1977. 5 pp. (H. Rept. 95-779.)

REPORT of the World Conference for Action against Apartheid, Lagos, 22-26 Aug., 1977. N.Y., 1977. 2v. (E.77.XIV.2.) $5.00.

Agriculture

THE U. S. proposal for an international grain reserves system-II. Report of a staff study mission to the Sept. 28-Oct. 3, 1977, meeting of the International Wheat Council Preparatory Group. Washington, 1977. 18 pp. (Com. Print.)

Asia and the Pacific Ocean

CHINA's birth rate, death rate, and population growth: another perspective. Report prepared for Committee on International Relations, House, by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Sept. 1977. Washington, 1977. 31 pp. (Com. Print.)

INDOCHINA Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1977. Report, Committee on Human Resources, Senate, to accompany S. 2108, Oct. 5, 1977. Washington, 1977. 7 pp. (S. Rept. 95-471.)

INVESTIGATION of Korean-American relations. Hearings, Subcommittee on International Organizations, Committee on International Relations, House, June 22-Aug. 3, 1977. Washington, 1977. 2 pts.

Atomic Power

NUCLEAR energy. Washington, Central Intelligence Agency, 1977. 66 pp.

NUCLEAR Nonproliferation Act of 1977. Hearings, Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Federal Services, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Senate, on S.897, Apr. 1-May 13, 1977. Washington, 1977. 686 pp.

———. Report, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, to accompany S.897, Oct. 3, 1977. Washington, 1977. 138 pp. (S. Rept. 95-467.)

NUCLEAR nonproliferation and export controls. Hearings, Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, and International Environment, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, on S.897 and S. 1432, May 23-June 15, 1977. Washington, 1977. 231 pp.

NUCLEAR order and human values; London: 1977. Report on the eleventh meeting of members of Congress and of the European Parliament, July 11-13, 1977, pursuant to H. Res. 313, Oct. 1977. Washington, 1977. 83 pp. (Com. Print.)

OVERVIEW of nuclear export policies of major foreign supplier nations. Washington, U.S. General Accounting Office, 1977. 60 pp.

Commercial Policy and Trade

EUROPEAN Community restrictions on imports of United States specialty agricultural products. Hearing, Subcommittee on Trade, Committee on Ways and Means, House, on H. Res. 238 and H. Res. 320, Sept. 12, 1977. Washington, 1977. 63 pp. (Serial 95-34.)

INTERNATIONAL commodity agreements. Report of the U.S. International Trade Commission to the Subcommittee on International Trade, Committee on Finance, Senate, 94th Cong., 1st. Sess., Nov. 1975. Washington, 1975. 189 pp. (Com. Print.) $2.70.

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